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A B S T R A C T
Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity 
involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical ne­
cessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence — of what 
follows from what — need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at 
all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral 
dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine’s 
scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his 
classic paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, the very intelligibility of notions such as 
meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is 
clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend 
Quine’s criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and empha­
sising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as 
such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory 
about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. 
Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and 
claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then 
show that holism à la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of 
logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine’s substitutional account of logical con­
sequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of 
logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account 
of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine’s 
claim — and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
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IN T R O D U C T IO N
0.1 R ation a lity  and necessity
W hat does it mean to be rational? One mark of rationality has to do with rea­
soning. Reasoning, it could be said, consists mainly in our inferential practice, i.e., 
in correctly inferring propositions from other propositions. For instance, it is not 
rational to infer that Socrates is mortal from the premise that the Earth is round. 
On the other hand, it is rational to infer that Socrates is mortal from the premises 
that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man. The central notion of this feature 
of rationality is that of logical consequence, a notion very closely tied with logical 
necessity. Indeed, it seems at first blush that instances of correct logical consequence 
such as;
(Premise 1) All men are mortal.
(Premise 2) Socrates is a man.
(Conclusion) Socrates is mortal.
hold of necessity. That is, it seems that if (1) and (2) are true, then the truth of 
(C) necessarily follows. It also seems, intuitively, that the truth of such ascriptions 
of logical necessity is something we recognise, something that is imposed on us — it 
appears that we have cognitive access to logical necessities and that we are equipped 
to ‘track’ these modal facts. These two thoughts are manifestations of, respectively, 
a non-sceptical stance towards logical necessity and a realist outlook.
Thus we have it that:
1. Reasoning is central to rationality.
2. The notion of logical consequence — of ‘what follows from what’ — is (partially) 
constitutive of our inferential practice.
3. Logical necessity is, at first blush, a crucial property of correct statements of
logical consequence.
It follows from this that logical necessity is an important ingredient of at least one 
important feature of rationality, namely correct reasoning. An enquiry into the nature 
of logical necessity can therefore be seen as a contribution towards an understanding 
of rationality. This thesis is such an enquiry, approaching the topic via a thorough 
study of the various kinds of scepticism brought against the notion of logical necessity.
In this introductory Chapter, we will first circumscribe the object of the present 
thesis — logical necessity — in a more rigourous manner than has been done with 
the intuitive characterisation given above. It will also be shown that the concept of 
logical necessity manifests itself in different ways. Following that, various kinds of 
scepticism about logical necessity will be introduced. Each of these sceptical stances 
will constitute, roughly, a chapter in the body of the dissertation. The goal of the 
thesis is to defend the notion of logical necessity against these sceptical arguments. 
In the last section of this Introduction, the plan of the thesis is outlined.
0.2 C ircum scribing th e  topic: logical n ecessity
Let us now try to give a precise characterisation of logical necessity. Something 
necessary tout court is something that, to borrow Quine’s expression, is true ‘come 
what may’. The notion of necessity often appears in a qualified fashion. Philosophers 
talk about epistemic necessity, metaphysical necessity, physical necessity, logical ne­
cessity, and the like; moreover, they contrast these different kinds of necessity. Some 
writers on the subject reject some of them while retaining others, and some go as far 
as rejecting all of them. It is also possible to classify these kinds of necessity according 
to their relative strength. There is an interesting argument to the effect that logical 
necessity is the ‘strongest’ kind of necessity, that it is, so to speak, the absolute kind 
of necessity. It is impossible, without anticipating what follows in the course of this
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thesis, to discuss whether such a classification is correct or even appropriated
The present investigation will concern logical necessity exclusively. The nature of 
logical necessity is a question that must be addressed right at the beginning of such 
an enquiry. Of course, to characterise the nature of logical necessity is not to give a 
philosophical account of it, but is merely to specify the object of our study. Which 
account such a notion of logical necessity deserves and whether logical necessity, so 
conceived, exists or not, are the key questions addressed in this study.
What, then, is logical necessity? First, a word on what it is not. Logical laws are 
often said to be necessary and, accordingly, there is a temptation to focus the issue 
upon them. That is to say, one might wish to conduct an investigation about logical 
necessity by comparing different sets of logical systems and weighing the reasons for 
adopting this or that set of logical laws. For instance, one might study the dispute 
between classicists and intuitionists, and arrive at the conclusion that, say, classical 
logic is the ‘right’ logic. On this basis, one could maintain that logical necessity is 
exemplified by classical logic, and that what is logically necessary is determined by 
it. The present inquiry shall not be concerned with this kind of dispute. In fact, 
the most interesting and penetrating sceptical arguments about logical necessity go 
beyond the examination of a particular logical system and its properties. W hat they 
are concerned with is the question: what makes a correct theorem of any logical 
system necessarily follow from its axioms?
Let us make this claim more precise. The logical necessity in play here is closely 
related to the concept of proof. Any axiomatic logical system consists of a set of ax­
ioms with rules of inference. The theorems of a particular logic are said to follow from 
these axioms by repeated use of the rules of inference. Not only that, but moreover 
they seem to follow necessarily from the axioms and the rules of inference: that is 
to say, the theorems of the system must be what they are — a logical system char-
S^cG Hale (1996) for a discussion on absolute and relative necessities.
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acterised in the usual fashion cannot contain different theorems. They are obtained 
by proof, and each step in the proof follows necessarily from what has been proved 
antecedently. Whether these theorems are ‘true’ or ‘correct’ as such (independently 
of the logical system) need not concern us here — this is why the issue has nothing 
to do with the appropriateness of one given logical system over another. In fact, the 
concept of logical necessity we are interested in is not confined to its application to 
logical systems, but is also in play in mathematics and, more generally, in considera­
tions having to do with ‘following a rule’. In order to see this, consider that we want 
to say that the theorems follow necessarily from the axioms (via a suitable proof) in 
virtue of the rules of inference. The rules of the system play a crucial role. I will say 
more on these different manifestations of logical necessity in what follows.
Before giving a precise formulation of the concept of logical necessity, another of 
its general feature must be highlighted. On any account, logical necessity is a property 
ascribed to true statements. It is fairly uncontroversial that some statements are true; 
it so happens that some of them are not merely true, but are also logically necessary
— unless the sceptic is right. So logical necessity is a modal operator that can be 
attached to sentences.^ In the course of this thesis, therefore, logical necessity is to be 
understood as a sentence-forming operator, attaching to a sentence to form another 
sentence. For any sentence S, then, we can form the sentence OS, which reads: ‘it is 
logically necessary that S’. That sentence in turn will be one that can be either true 
or false. So logical necessity is something we ascribe to a sentence. Whether or not 
we have any reasons to make such ascriptions — and, if we do, what their nature is
— are the main topics to be explored in the following Chapters.
An ascription of necessity is, we have just seen, of the form ‘OS’, where ‘S’ is 
a sentence and ‘O’ the sentence-forming operator meaning ‘it is logically necessary
^More precisely: necessity, possibility, and impossibility are alethic modalities, in that they affect 
the sense in which a sentence is true or false.
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th a t’. Now of course, such ascriptions can be either true or false. To correctly (truly) 
apply the operator ‘O’ to a sentence ‘S’, we need to know the range of sentences to 
which ‘O’ is susceptible to engender truth. It is, for instance, perfectly meaningful to 
say ‘it is logically necessary that the cat is on the m at’, but also obviously false. In 
order to keep things as clear as possible, let us concentrate on the first manifestation 
of logical necessity, namely the one exemplified in logical systems. In this case, what 
we have is an axiomatic base, together with rules of inference. Given the axioms 
and given the rules, we want to say that the theorems (logically) follow. It could be 
represented thus:
(S*) Given any axiomatic basis A supplemented with a non-empty set of rules of 
inference R i,. . .,Rn, the theorems T i , . . .,T„ follow.
Logical systems are clearly one area where, intuitively, it makes sense to apply the 
operator of logical necessity. But there are other instances of logical necessity, and 
it is important to isolate and capture these since they illustrate the pervasiveness of 
the concept. In his famous ‘rule-following considerations’, Wittgenstein often refers 
to the series ‘2, 4, 6, 8, ...’, obtained by applying the function ‘+ 2 ’ (starting with 
0).^ It seems, intuitively, that the terms of the series follow necessarily, that is to say, 
that each term of the series is determined in advance: it is impossible that the series 
turns out to contain other terms than those it actually contains. For instance, it is 
necessary that from 1000 onwards, the series extend to ‘1002, 1004, 1006, ...’. The 
kind of necessity illustrated in this example can be characterised — just like in the 
case of logical systems — as logical necessity. This is due to the fact that in both 
cases, the following ingredients play a crucial part: a basis, a rule, an outcome. In 
order to see this clearly, let us generalise the example as follows:
(S**) Given a number N to start with and a rule of addition R, the series Z i,.. .,Z,;
^See his Philosophical Investigations, §§143-242, and numerous passages in his Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics.
follows.
The similarity with (S*) should be obvious.
The third example of logical necessity can perhaps be regarded as a generalisation 
of the second. Arithmetic is often said to be necessary. For instance, ‘7 +  5 =  12’ is 
often considered to be a necessary statement. It is impossible that, for instance, ‘7 
+  5’ yields a different result than the one it actually does. Here again, the necessity 
in question is logical. The basis, in this particular case, consists of the two numbers 
7 and 5. The rule is the rule of addition, and the outcome (12) is the result of 
performing the operation of addition upon the basis, namely 7 and 5 . It is clear 
that addition is but an example of the various operations that can be performed on 
numbers when one is doing arithmetic. Generalising, we find that what is logically 
necessary in arithmetic are statements of the form:
(S***) Given appropriate numbers N i,.. .,N,i and a function F, the result Z follows.
Thus, to say that, for instance, ‘7 +  5 =  12’ is a necessary statement, is to say: it is 
necessary that if we take the two numbers 7 and 5 and we perform addition on these 
numbers, 12 will be the outcome of the operation.
Now these three manifestations of logical necessity all share the same form. Let’s 
focus first on logical systems. Take T ’ to refer to the axioms of an arbitrary logic, 
‘L’ to the rules of this system, and ‘0  to refer to the theorems of this logic. Under
these stipulations, (S*) has the following abstract form:
(A F) (F Fz, 0 )
True statements of the form (AF) are exactly those, intuitively, that are logically 
necessary. It is this kind of statement, when we are concerned with logical necessity 
as it occurs in logical systems, to which the sentence-forming operator of necessity is 
attached to in the last analysis. It does not matter what T ’ is, nor what ‘0 ’ consists 
of. All that matters is that the theorems do indeed follow from the axioms. In other
words, the fact that from a given logical system certain theorems follow is not what 
is at issue: what is at issue is whether true statements of the form exemplified by 
(AF) are necessary or not. Sentences such as (AF) form the range of sentences that 
can be said to be logically necessary. It is easily seen that (S**) and (S***) are also 
instances of (AF).
Notice furthermore that our original example:
(Premise 1) All men are mortal.
(Premise 2) Socrates is a man.
(Conclusion) Socrates is mortal.
is also an instance of (AF). Indeed, the ‘theory’ in this case consists of the premises 
and the ‘theorem’ is the conclusion. The ‘logic’ consists of the rules inherent in our 
inferential practice (in this case, modus ponens). The present inquiry is concerned, 
at a very general level, with getting clear about the nature of our inferential practice.
Ultimately, then, we shall focus on the necessity of sentences having the form 
(AF). That is to say, the issue of scepticism about logical necessity revolves around 
the meaningfulness and truthfulness of statements having the form:
(M) o(r Pz, 0)
Most philosophers agree that statements displaying the form of (AF) are capable of 
being true or false. Therefore, the bone of contention has nothing to do with the truth- 
aptness of statements exemplifying (AF), but rather with the truth, or correctness, 
of statements displaying the form (M). This is tantamount to saying that the issue 
has nothing to do with the correctness of a particular logical system, since ‘P ’ can 
be any logic. It also becomes clear, when focusing on statements having the form 
(M), that the issue does not revolve around metaphysical necessity. This latter kind 
of necessity is the one displayed in statements such as ‘water is necessarily H2 O’. For
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one thing, such statements do not have the form displayed by (M). Furthermore, that 
kind of statement seems best understood, prima facie at least, as an expression of 
essentialism. In contrast, no such prima facie commitment to essentialism is involved 
in statements of the form (M).^
It is obvious enough that logical necessity, so conceived, is what distinguishes a 
proof from an experiment. A conditional ‘B T ’ — taken as formalising the trilogy 
basis, rule (operations carried), outcome — can easily be thought of as giving a picture 
of empirical experiment. An experiment, in effect, consists of an initial state on which 
some operations are performed, and these operations result in an outcome. Such an 
experiment is of course contingent, not necessary. In contrast, a proof, according to 
the traditional conception, is supposed to conclusively establish its conclusion in such 
a way that it is impossible for a correct proof to lead to a different result from the one 
it actually arrives to. In the case of an empirical experiment, the most it can achieve 
is support and adduce strong empirical evidence for a particular scientific theory. In 
other words, ascribing necessity to a conditional of the form ‘B —> T ’ — conceived as 
an experiment — is usually not an option. Contrast this with the readiness with which 
we accept that true statements of the form (F hi, 0 ) are logically necessary. Indeed, 
the three paradigms of logical necessity presented above ((S*), (S**), (S***)) can 
in effect all be understood in terms of proof, and this is shown by the fact that.
^Jackson (1998: 68-85) challenges the distinction here between metaphysical necessity and logical 
necessity. He argues that there is only one notion of necessity, and that notion is sufficient to 
explain both ‘water is necessarily Pig O' and statements of the form a ( r  h i  0 ) .  The apparent 
distinction between logical and metaphysical necessity can be explained, Jackson concedes, in a 
purely epistcmological manner: the former is a priori, the latter a posteriori. But at bottom, both 
kinds of necessity are different manifestations of the same phenomenon and can be given a uniform 
account. However, Jackson’s unified account of necessity relies directly on the acceptance of both 
propositions and possible world semantics. The first kind of scepticism studied (Radical Irrealism) 
rejects propositions and possible world semantics. Whether it is right to do so is another matter, 
but we can’t prejudge the issue against the Quinean if we want to be fair. Moreover, even if Quine 
is wrong and that possible world semantics is intelligible, it is another (controversial) issue whether 
it malces sense to explain logical necessity on the basis of this semantics (this issue is addressed in 
the Appendix). Admittedly, it may well turn out that, after all is said and done against the sceptic, 
logical necessity and metaphysical necessity are after all manifestations of one kind of necessity. But 
such a view is certainly not the obvious one: it has to be earned.
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intuitively, it makes sense to ascribe necessity to (F h i  0 ) as applied to them. Proof, 
then, seems to be an essential feature of logical necessity, in this sense: correct proofs 
are logically necessary, if anything is. In contrast, an empirical experiment cannot 
be said to be logically necessary. Whether or not it makes sense to ascribe necessity 
to proofs, and whether proofs really differ from experiments, are of course questions 
pressed by a sceptic about logical necessity.^
One who wishes to enquire further in the nature of logical necessity will study 
the concept of proof. It is one thing to notice, as I did in the last paragraph, the 
connection between necessity and proof; it is another to identify what exactly makes 
proof the object of ascription of logical necessity. One could say that given the basis 
F, the theorems 0  follow since they are valid. Validity, in turn, is explained in modal 
terms — that is to say, it is impossible that given F, the theorems do not follow. 
Impossibility being the mirror-image of necessity, the central question has to do with 
the nature of that kind of impossibility. One can therefore understand the present 
investigation as being concerned with defending the notion of validity against various 
kinds of scepticism about it, and with sketching an account of the notion of validity. 
We now introduce those various kinds of scepticism.
0.3 In troducing scep tic ism  about logical n ecessity
Dummett (1959: 169) famously wrote that ‘the philosophical problem of necessity 
is twofold: what is its source, and how do we recognise it?’ Such a characterisation 
of the problem points to interesting questions and debates about the nature and the 
epistemology of logical necessity. It assumes, however, that there is such a thing as 
logical necessity® — that there are true (or at least, if one feels queasy about truth.
^For more on the relation between proof, experiment, and logical necessity, see Wright (1980: 
Part Three, especially Chapter XVII).
®As pointed out by Hale (1989: 175).
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‘correct’) ascriptions of the form G (r h i  0 )7  Of course, if it turns out that there 
is no such thing as logically necessary statements, Dummett’s questions would be 
empty. Accordingly, the most fundamental problem of logical necessity is: ‘is there 
such a thing as logical necessity?’. To answer in the negative is to be a sceptic about 
logical necessity. Reviewing various sceptical theories and defending the viability of 
the notion of logical necessity against them is the main objective of this thesis.
Scepticism about logical necessity, in its broadest sense, is the view according 
to which there is no such thing as logical necessity. When we make ascriptions of 
necessity, it seems at first blush that we are saying the kind of thing that is sometimes 
true, sometimes false. All the sceptical views studied here recoil from this and suggest 
that such ascriptions are never true. Thus the cluster of sceptical theories to be 
examined in this thesis have it that there are no true ascriptions of logical necessity 
— no true statements of the form □(F h i  0 ). W hat distinguishes the various forms 
of scepticism are the explanations as to why such ascriptions are never true.
Broadly speaking, there are two forms such an explanation might take: Radical 
Irrealism and Error-theoretic Irrealism. The first is the most destructive and bold 
sceptical argument. It consists of the view that the notion of logical necessity itself 
is not meaningful. That is to say, according to this sceptical stance, ascriptions of 
necessity such as D(F h i  0 ) simply do not make sense; when one judges a statement 
to be necessary, one would not be making a meaningful judgement — let alone a 
true one. This incredibly counter-intuitive thesis has been put forward, it is widely 
believed, by Quine in his 1951 paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. It is true that 
Quine’s target in that paper is not explicitly the notion of logical necessity as it 
is understood here. Nevertheless, it is clear that his arguments apply equally well 
to it, since when Quine attacks analyticity, he intends it as an attack on necessity
also assumes that logical necessity is something we recognise, a claim disputed by non- 
cognitivists (of which more below).
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(in general) as well. So it will be straightforward to reconstruct his charge against 
analyticity as one against logical necessity as well.
There is nothing more destructive that can be said, for any notion, than claiming 
that it is not meaningful. If a sceptic maintains that a particular notion does not 
even satisfy certain accepted standards of meaningfulness, it will follow that all the 
other kinds of scepticism — for that particular notion — are validated, as it were, 
by default. Until the other kinds of scepticism have been reviewed, however, it is 
impossible to make that last claim precise. Yet, intuitively, it seems right to maintain 
that, at the very least, such a drastic charge against a particular notion is radical. 
This is why this form of scepticism will be called Radical Irrealism.
The second form of scepticism acknowledges, contrary to Radical Irrealism, that 
ascriptions of necessity are meaningful. It also recognises their truth-aptness: that 
is, on such a view, ascriptions of necessity can, in principle, be true or false. The 
sceptical thought, in this case, is not that the notion is not meaningful but rather 
that in all ascriptions of necessity, a false statement is produced. Statements of 
the form D(r \~l  0 ) are meaningful and truth-apt, but they are all false. Think 
of scepticism about wizards: for all we know, it is possible — in principle — that 
wizards exist, and to say of someone that he is a wizard is meaningful. I t’s just 
never true. This view is clearly sceptical about wizards. Similarly, the corresponding 
thought about logical necessity is sceptical. If such a view is true, that would mean 
that there is no such thing as true ascriptions of necessity. This kind of scepticism 
will be labelled Error-theoretic Irrealism, since it always erroneous, on this view, to 
ascribe necessity to a statement.
It is important to distinguish between Error-theoretic Irrealism and a related 
cluster of theories about logical necessity. These other theories also acknowledge the 
meaningfulness of ascriptions of logical necessity. Thus those taking this line can 
hold, contrary to the Radical Irrealist but like the Error-theorist, tha t necessity is a
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meaningful notion — however, and crucially, for them it is not truth-apt, contrary to 
the Error-theorists. That is to say, ascriptions of necessity, on that account, are not 
expressions capable of being true or false. For instance, to say that it is necessary 
that 2 4- 2 — 4 is not to say something which is appraisable in terms of truth or 
falsity. This kind of theory need not — and usually does not — claim that ‘2 4 - 2  
— 4’ per se is not a true statement. W hat it denies is that ascribing the necessity 
operator over and above these true statements results in the kind of sentences which 
can be meaningfully true or false. According to this line of thought, then, when the 
necessity operator is attached to a truth-apt statement (of the kind exemplified by 
(F h i  0 )), it results in a non-truth-apt statement. Such views are non-cognitivist 
theories of logical necessity.®
Expressivism and projectivism are examples of non-cognitivism. In a sense, they 
are compatible with Error-theoretic Irrealism since they also imply that no ascrip­
tions of logical necessity are true. However, they differ in their diagnosis of why no 
such ascriptions are true. For non-cognitivists, this is due to a category mistake: 
ascriptions of necessity cannot be true since they are not the kind of statement that 
can meaningfully be true or false. Nonetheless, the non-cognitivist continues, it is 
possible to appraise ascriptions of necessity in other categories than those of truth 
and falsity. The Error-theorist, by contrast, locates the failure of truth-aptness of 
ascriptions of logical necessity elsewhere — namely that they are false. Expressivist 
views are not sceptical of the notion of logical necessity. Rather they recoil from a 
realist understanding of logical necessity. Such views will not be studied here — we 
are only interested in scepticism about logical necessity as such, not scepticism about 
a particular understanding of the notion. However, scepticism as understood here 
also rejects realism about logical necessity — it’s just that it rejects, on top of that, 
any account of logical necessity, be it realist or non-cognitivist.
®Simon Blackburn holds such a non-cognitivist view in his ‘Morals and Modals’.
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Indeed, it is fair to say that scepticism also recoils from realism. For Quine, a post­
positivist who developed the core of his views in the forties and fifties, non-cognitivism 
was apparently not a viable option. For him, statements are either truth-apt or 
meaningless, thus leaving no space for a non-cognitivist account — the latter requiring 
(at least for Quine) both a denial of truth-aptness for the class of statements under 
question and acceptance of their meaningfulness. Moreover, for him, if a discourse is 
truth-apt, then it is a realist discourse. Indeed, it requires a contemporary framework 
to acknowledge the possibility of a discourse being truth-apt and anti-realist (non- 
cognitivism, of course, being a version of anti-realism) — certainly a post-Quinean 
framework, such as the one suggested by Crispin Wright in his Truth & Objectivity.^
0.4 P lan  o f th e  thesis
The topic of this thesis, then, is scepticism about logical necessity as understood 
above. We have seen that sceptical theories come in two fashions: Radical Irrealism 
and Error-theoretic Irrealism. Both types of scepticism are prominent in Quine’s 
writings, and his ideas will be the main target of the thesis. The Chapters of the 
thesis can be divided into three main parts: there is first Radical Irrealism, studied in 
Chapter 1. Then, in Chapters 2 and 3, we examine Quine’s holism, which can be seen 
as a form of Error-theoretic Irrealism. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses another kind of 
Error-theory, namely Quine’s substitutional account of logical consequence. The main 
textual source for Chapters 1-3 is Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. For Chapter 
4, we approach Quine’s scepticism via his Philosophy of Logic (1986). Nonetheless, 
although these will be the principal texts upon which I focus, interpreting Quine 
will sometimes requires understanding them within the wider perspective of his other 
works.
°In this section I borrowed the framework and terminology of that book to put scepticism about 
logical necessity in perspective.
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The first Chapter deals with Radical Irrealism. Not many philosophers are inter­
preted as claiming that logical necessity is a meaningless, or unintelligible, notion. 
The most prominent figure seemingly advocating such a view is Quine. Indeed, he 
is often interpreted as holding that the notions of meaning, necessity, synonymy, and 
analyticity are meaningless. On this understanding of his views, it appears that Quine 
is a Radical Irrealist not only about logical necessity but also about meaning, analyt­
icity, etc. This is consistent with the fact that many interpreters of Quine understand 
him as being a ‘meaning-sceptic’.^ ®
The basis for such an interpretation of Quine resides mainly in his highly infiuential 
paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. The dogmas in question are, respectively, the 
analytic /  synthetic distinction and the verificationist theory of meaning. It is in the 
first dogma that his Radical Irrealist stance can be found. His attack on analyticity 
has a domino effect on other notions, in such a way that a critical stance towards 
analyticity also becomes, ipso facto, a critical stance towards meaning and necessity. 
The first thing to do, then, is to carefully study Quine’s argument against analyticity 
in ‘Two Dogmas’. I do this in the first part of Chapter 1, where an interpretation 
of the first four sections of that paper is given. In the course of doing that, it will 
become clear that Quine is not really a Radical Irrealist, contrary to what is often 
claimed. Moreover, despite the rather critical position taken towards Quine’s views in 
the other Chapters, I find myself agreeing with his views on meaning and analyticity 
— assuming that my interpretation is faithful to what he actually meant.
The remainder of the Chapter examines various attempts to criticise Quine’s ar­
gument. Grice &: Strawson’s counter-arguments are studied, followed by Wright’s 
and Boghossian’s. The main line of thought in these discussions is this: under my 
interpretation of Quine’s views — backed up by references to other writings than 
‘Two Dogmas’ — these counter-arguments do not address them. Indeed, it is clear
^°For instance, Grice & Strawson (1956) and Boghossian (1997).
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that they interpret Quine as a Radical Irrealist. But since he does not advocate that 
view, it follows that the criticisms levelled against him simply miss their target.
In Chapter 2, the first strand of Quine’s Error-theoretic Irrealism — his holism
— is then analysed. The textual basis for this analysis is the latter part of ‘Two 
Dogmas’. The picture of knowledge advocated by Quine is sceptical towards logical 
necessity since it ‘does without necessity’, which is exactly what scepticism of this 
kind is all about. This Chapter begins, like the previous one, with a textual analysis 
of the relevant passages of ‘Two Dogmas’. It will become clear that in this case, Quine 
really is advocating a sceptical theory about logical necessity (and, more generally, 
about intensional notions). Following that, the status of logical laws in holism — 
crucial to understand Quine’s Error-theoretic Irrealism about logical necessity — is 
examined. This attempt to locate logical laws in the web of belief reveals a surprising 
fact about Quine’s philosophy of logic: holism cannot accommodate logical laws as 
they are understood by Quine. The problem is that there is an inconsistency between 
Quine’s epistemological views (‘naturalized epistemology’) and his philosophy of logic. 
The discussion on logical laws and holism is continued with a study of Lewis Carroll’s 
regress in his ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Here we go beyond Quine’s philos­
ophy and address crucial questions about the epistemology of logical laws in general
— not only in relation to Quine’s system. We close the Chapter with a discussion of 
Stewart Shapiro’s interpretation of Quine’s views regarding the a priori.
Chapter 3 resumes the discussion of holism with the study of a well-known ar­
gument by Wright. He contends that Quine’s holism does not yield a satisfying 
philosophy of logic. According to Wright, Quine’s holism collapses because he does 
not accept that statements of logical consequence are a priori and logically necessary. 
Wright’s argument and various criticisms levelled against it are first discussed. Cru­
cially, I examine a criticism to the effect that Wright’s argument does not accomplish 
its goal (showing the necessity of necessity). I then offer an interpretation of Wright’s
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argument showing that it has the resources to answer that criticism. The upshot 
is that Wright’s argument, thus understood, does show the necessity, as it were, of 
logical necessity.
Turning next to another kind of error-theoretic scepticism, Quine advocates a 
theory of logical truth and logical consequence that, he claimed, did not require 
any appeal to modal notions such as necessity and impossibility. This is difficult to 
conceive: how can a plausible non-modal account of logical consequence be possible? 
Indeed, the usual definition of validity given in logic textbooks and elsewhere is modal 
— an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be true and 
the conclusion f a l s e . A  sceptic about logical necessity, if he wants to keep the 
notion of validity, has to find a way to give an account of logical consequence free 
of modal notions. Quine does so with his substitutional account. In Chapter 4, the 
substitutional account is examined. It will be shown that Quine’s theory does not 
work. More generally, it will be argued that any account of logical consequence — of 
what follows from what — has to be irreducibly modal.
'■Or: an argument is valid if and only if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises.
C H A P T E R  1 
R A D IC A L  IR R E A L ISM
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1.1 In trod uction
The most destructive and bold sceptical line against logical necessity is that the 
notion is not meaningful. I have called this thesis ‘Radical Irrealism’ since it is a 
version of irrealism — logical necessity, on this view, not being a real property — 
espousing a radical standpoint. Indeed, Radical Irrealism about logical necessity, if 
true, has the disastrous effect of depriving of meaning sentences of the form 0 ( r  0)
in virtue of the thesis of the compositionality of meaning. If such sentences are sheer 
nonsense, it follows with certainty that logical necessity is not truth-apt, let alone an 
objective feature of the world. This thesis appears, at first blush, incredible. How is 
it possible that a notion we seem to understand relatively well, and for which there 
seems to be a reasonably uniform use in the community of competent speakers, turns 
out to lack meaning? How can a convincing argument to that effect be constructed 
and, at least potentially, lead the users of the notion to abandon it?
Quine, it is commonly assumed, is a proponent of Radical Irrealism about log­
ical necessity. A student of Carnap and a son of logical positivism, Quine can be 
interpreted as having standards of meaningfulness even more stringent than those 
advocated by the members of the so-called ‘Vienna Circle’. It is well known that log­
ical positivists did not disregard intensional notions such as meaning and analyticity. 
Consider Carnap, for instance. His whole system, as displayed in The Logical Syntax 
of Language^ rests on these notions, particularly the notion of analyticity. For Quine, 
acceptance of these notions is strongly connected to a pervasive ‘dogma’ of empiri­
cism, the analytic /  synthetic distinction. But, according to him, this distinction does 
not satisfy adequate standards of meaningfulness. A proper epistemology, then, must 
reject the distinction and construct our cognitive relation to the world without it. 
Quine’s rejection of the distinction has far-reaching effects: it implies that a complete 
set of intensional notions are to be rejected along with analyticity. Quine’s argument 
has a domino effect.
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The notions in question include meaning and, crucially for us, necessity. For 
Quine, analyticity, meaning, necessity, and synonymy form an inter-definable circle 
of notions. The circle is so tight that, according to Quine (implicitly at least), it 
suffices to show that one member of the circle is meaningless to show that the others 
are as well. If analyticity is shown to be meaningless, then so is necessity.^ His 1951 
paper in which he spells out that view, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, has had such 
an impact on analytic philosophy — an impact still strongly felt today — that it is 
appropriate to devote a whole chapter on it in order to see what exactly the argument 
is and to evaluate it properly. Similarly to the Chapters that follow, the aim here is 
not wholly destructive, even if the view defended is, in the end, non-sceptical. Very 
often, the fact that counter-intuitive arguments have found such sympathy in the 
philosophical community is a good sign that there is something ‘right’ in them, or at 
least that they show something of significance. Accordingly, I will, in the course of 
showing where I think Quine’s argument goes wrong, try to see where I think he’s 
right. This way of approaching the various sceptical arguments will reveal suitable 
constraints that an account of logical necessity must meet to be both plausible and 
safe from sceptical attacks.
The strategy adopted to tackle Radical Irrealism as espoused by Quine will be the 
following. In the first place, I give a detailed exposition of Quine’s argument in the 
first four parts of ‘Two Dogmas’, where he advances his reasons for saying that we 
can’t make sense of analyticity. This thorough examination is necessary, firstly, to 
understand all the assumptions in play at the heart of the argument, and secondly, 
to see how his Radical Irrealism about analyticity is also a Radical Irrealism about 
necessity. Another reason for such a detailed account resides in the fact that Quine’s 
argument is often referred to but is nevertheless seldom given a meticulous analysis.
^At the end of section 1, I wlli explain the link between Quine’s argument against analyticity 
and logical necessity. A thorough examination of the argument is necessary to fully grasp the link
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Secondly, I examine and discuss some well-known criticisms of Quine’s argument. 
Grice and Strawson’s reaction is dissected into two related parts and Wright’s counter 
argument to Quine is also discussed in relation to Grice and Strawson’s. A discussion 
of Boghossian’s reductio argument against Quine’s meaning-scepticism follows in the 
fifth section. It will emerge that despite the fact that I take none of these arguments 
to show conclusively that Quine’s argument is flawed, they do reveal its limitations 
and, by the same token, its force. I conclude that our study of Quine’s argument 
shows something important about the form any viable account of (logical) necessity 
must take.
1.2 Sections 1-4 o f ‘T w o D ogm as’
One of Quine’s explicit targets in ‘Two Dogmas’ is the analytic /  synthetic dis­
tinction. However, that paper both contains a criticism of the veriflcationist theory 
of meaning, and a picture of knowledge that claims to do without the dogmas. The 
way he presents his argument, it appears that his alternative epistemology somehow 
follows naturally from the abandonment of the dogmas. That is, Quine sometimes 
write as if his epistemological holism and the rejection of the two dogmas stand or 
fall together. However, since it is possible in principle — and also in practice — to 
disentangle these two main strands, I will tackle them separately. This Chapter is 
concerned solely with Quine’s attack on ajialyticity in the first four sections of the 
paper, that is, the sections that contain his argument to the effect that analyticity 
is a meaningless notion. In the following Chapter, I address the line of argument 
contained in the last two sections of ‘Two Dogmas’.
Quine’s overall strategy in sections 1-4 is to examine various attempts that have 
been made to explain the notion of analyticity and to reject them one after the other. 
The first attempt he considers is the following. An analytic statement is often said 
to be a statement which is true by virtue of meaning and independently of fact. For
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instance, ‘Kennedy was shot in Dallas in 1963’ owes its tru th  both to what the words 
used in the statement mean and to empirical facts; but an analytic statement such 
as ‘no bachelor is married’ is said to owe its tru th  exclusively to the meaning of the 
words used in that statement, and not at all to the facts — except of course facts 
about meaning. The key notion presupposed in this explanation is the notion of 
meaning. ‘No bachelor is married’ is said to be true, on this account, by virtue of 
the meaning of ‘bachelor’, ‘married’, and the logical particles. Since ‘bachelor’ has 
the ‘same meaning’ as ‘not married’, it follows that ‘no bachelor is married’ is true 
solely by virtue of this fact about meaning. For Quine (1948: 11-12), this account, 
as it stands, requires that we reify meanings. Talk of ^having the same meaning as’, 
Hhe meaning of’, and so forth, encourages the thought that meanings are entities 
of some sort. One could be tempted to assume that Quine is here endorsing the 
thesis of the priority of syntactic category: if an expression belongs, irreducibly, to 
the category of singular terms, then the sort of objects denoted by these singular 
terms exist.^ That is, if a singular term appears in a true sentence, there seems 
to be a case to be made to the effect that the object denoted by the singular term 
exists. Quine, however, doesn’t make much of this thesis: “we can use singular terms 
significantly in sentences without presupposing that there are the entities which those 
terms purport to name” (1948: 12). For Quine, then, one’s ontology has to be decided 
on other grounds then syntactic category. If there happens to be an obstinate singular 
term that purportedly refers to an unwanted kind of objects, Quine uses Ramsey’s 
device and manipulates the syntax of the language, thus transforming singular terms 
in another ‘neutral’ category.^ The way to understand Quine’s remarks about the 
reification of meanings in relation to expressions such e l s  ‘the meaning of’ is simply 
that this kind of talk tempts one to reify meanings. Using such expressions makes it
'^ For more on the thesis of the priority of syntactic categories, see Wright (1983: chaps. 1 and 2).
very good example of this manoeuvre is in Quine (1960: 37-38), where he eliminates singular 
terms altogether.
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natural to reify meanings, but, Quine warns us, it is a temptation we must resist.
In sum, if we try to explain analyticity by using the notion of meaning as a 
primary and irreducible concept in the explanation, we are led, intuitively at least, 
to reify meanings.^ This might explain the temptation to succumb to an ontology of 
meanings — but we’ll come back to that in later sections. In any case, Quine does 
not accept meanings in his ontology, and his main reason is certainly that it is very 
difficult to state a criterion of identity for meanings. We see here one of Quine’s most 
famous slogan at work, ‘no entity without identity’. In ‘Two Dogmas’, he does not 
argue directly against meanings understood as abstract entities, but relies instead on 
arguments he develops elsewhere.® A more thorough examination of Quine’s demands 
for a satisfactory elucidation of meaning will be given in the next section, in which 
we scrutinise criticisms addressed to his arguments against analyticity.
1.2.1 Possible worlds and truth by definition
Let’s now resume our exposition of ‘Two dogmas’. After mentioning that meanings 
are obscure entities, Quine draws a distinction between two kinds of analytic state­
ments, The first group consists in the logical truths, such as ‘no unmarried man is 
married’. The truth of this statement does not depend on what the non-logical words 
mean, but owes its truth to the fact that it “remains true under all reinterpretations 
of its components other than the logical particles” (1951: 23). This is interesting 
since this account of logical truth does not seem to rely on meaning: Quine does not 
say that ‘no unmarried man is married’ is true by virtue solely of the meaning of the 
logical particles. In fact, he offers here a substitutional account of logical truth. For
^If on the contrary we try to explain meaning by using another notion, e.g., synonymy, then 
we have to give an account of the notion used in the explanation, and the problem of elucidating 
analyticity shifts from using meaning to using something else in the explanation. More on that 
below.
®See for instance Quine (1948: 9; 1960: chaps. 1 and 2 and 42-43; 1986 chap. 1.)
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Quine the analyticity of these statements is not problematic (at least in that paper) 
since they are not true by virtue of meaning or any other unclear notion. Due to their 
unproblematic nature in the context of making sense of analyticity, Quine does not 
discuss logical truths in the first four sections of ‘Two dogmas’. We shall follow his 
lead and focus on the second group of analytic statements. The analyticity of logical 
truths will be examined in Chapter 4.
The second group of analytic statements are those, like ‘no bachelor is married’, 
which can be transformed into a logical tru th  by putting synonyms for synonyms. 
Arguably, this understanding of analyticity results from an attem pt to explain the 
notion of meaning by using the notion of synonymy: two words have the same meaning 
if and only if they are synonymous. Accordingly, we can replace ‘bachelor’ with 
‘unmarried man’ since they are synonymous. So instead of saying that ‘bachelor’ 
and ‘unmarried man’ have the same meaning, we here say that they are synonymous, 
and that their relation of synonymy is precisely what gives ‘no bachelor is married’ 
its analyticity. Alas, for Quine the notion of synonymy is as unclear as the notion 
of analyticity. The problem with synonymy, considered as explaining analyticity, is 
akin to the problem encountered above concerning meaning: as such, the notion of 
synonymy is not clear and therefore it needs clarification. Quine decides to postpone 
discussions of synonymy and considers other explanations of analyticity.
One such explanation consists in using Carnap’s notion of state description as de­
veloped in Meaning and Necessity, which is intended to explain necessary and analytic 
truths.® This idea is an adaptation of Leibniz’s possible worlds and Wittgenstein’s 
possible states of affairs.^ For sake of simplicity, we’ll use the more familiar notion of 
possible worlds in what follows — it does not affect the substance of the argument
®See Carnap (1956: 8-9).
refer, of course, to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.
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to proceed that way.^ On this account, ‘no bachelor is married’ is analytic since it 
is true in every possible world. This means that there is no world where someone 
is both a bachelor and a married man. This is plausible enough. But why is it the 
case that such a world does not exist? At this stage, the only answer must be that 
one will never encounter a man who is married and a bachelor since ‘bachelor’ means 
‘unmarried man’. So instead of throwing light on the concept of meaning and analyt­
icity, we see that the appeal to possible worlds merely pushes back the problem to the 
notion of meaning. Admittedly, this way of putting the m atter differs from Quine’s 
own. Quine does it the other way round: he asks us to consider a possible world 
{i.e., a state description) where the value True is assigned to both ‘John is married’ 
and ‘John is a bachelor’. This would render the analytic statement ‘no bachelor is 
married’ false — but clearly this statement is not false. Viewed this way, the prob­
lem is: why can’t we assign the value True to both statements about John? The 
friend of analyticity is forced to answer: because ‘no bachelor is married’ is true by 
virtue of meaning, thereby blocking the possibility of a world which would render this 
statement false. We thus see clearly that the explanation of analyticity in terms of 
possible world (or state description) presupposes the notion we are trying to explain, 
as is shown by the occurrence of the italicised idiom ‘true by virtue of meaning’ in 
the previous sentence.
A further attempt to explain analyticity involves claiming that ‘no bachelor is 
married’ is true by definition (section 2 of Quine’s paper). The thought is that this 
statement is analytically true since ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’. But 
what is the basis of such definitions? Quine rightfully points out that an appeal to 
the dictionary won’t do in this case. The lexicographer is an “empirical scientist” who 
bases his definitions on usage. He correlates ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ from his
is assumed, for the sake of the argument, that we have a clear and unproblematic semantics 
for possible worlds. A sceptical about necessity as understood in terms of possible worlds would 
challenge this assumption.
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observation that these two words are used synonymously. This empirical discovery 
of an anterior relation of synonymy between two expressions cannot explain, in the 
relevant way, why it is permissible to substitute ‘unmarried man’ for ‘bachelor’ in ‘no 
bachelor is married’. All this discovery can do is to confirm empirically that there 
is indeed a relation of synonymy of some kind between the two expressions, but it 
cannot go beyond that and explain the presupposed notion of synonymy. It has no 
explanatory value. This notion of definition, conceived as correlating pre-existing 
relations of synonymy, is empirical and clearly can’t explain analyticity — the latter 
requiring an elucidation that explains why this particular kind of tru th  is not based 
on empirical matters.®
Notice that in this account of the lexicographer’s task, Quine attributes to him 
a notion of synonymy. If the lexicographer does not have a ‘working’ notion of syn­
onymy, how can he confirm or discover that there is indeed a relation of synonymy 
between a pair of expressions? The interesting question here is to enquire into the 
nature of the lexicographer’s notion of synonymy. If it turns out that the lexicog­
rapher has a clear and sharp notion of synonymy, it would mean that there is after 
all such a notion. The fact that this sharp notion of synonymy hasn’t been given a 
satisfying theoretical characterisation would merely show that we haven’t succeeded 
yet in finding one, not that the notion of synonymy — and meaning — is hopelessly 
unclear. Since Quine’s argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ relies heavily on principled objec­
tions for the possibility of a satisfying clarification of the notion of synonymy, this 
point is of crucial importance.
In his discussion of the lexicographer’s definitions, Quine himself hints at how
®In section 2, Quine goes on to examine variant kinds of definition, such as definitions used 
in formal work and definitions having an explanatory value. However, as Quine points out, they 
suffer from exactly the same problem: they turn out to rely on prior relations of synonymy. The only 
really transparent case of definitions creating synonymy relations are introductions of abbreviational 
notations, such as ‘(a ^  b) =df ~ (a  =  b)’. But since this kind of definition has nothing to do with 
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’, it can’t be used to explain the analyticity of ‘no bachelor is married’ 
and the like.
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this problem might be solved: “The notion of synonymy presupposed here has still 
to be clarified, presumably in terms relating to linguistic behavior” (1951: 24). This 
appeal to linguistic behaviour makes plausible the following interpretation of the 
lexicographer’s notion of synonymy. In a given linguistic community, speakers often 
use terms interchangeably. For instance, it might be the case that when a speaker 
uses the word ‘bachelor’, he could as well have used instead the expression ‘unmarried 
man’. This can be verified empirically, and we can picture the lexicographer’s task as 
one of recording these correlations. But these observed correlations do not amount 
to an elucidation of the notion of sameness of meaning, since it is very unlikely that 
the empirical match between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ will be perfect. The 
working notion of synonymy used by the lexicographer is an approximate one, i.e., 
a vague one. For him, two expressions are ‘synonymous’ if they are more or less 
used interchangeably by the speech community. His job is to report these vague 
correlations. Now if we take this notion of synonymy as the basis for an elucidation 
of analyticity, we should have to say that ‘no bachelor is married’ is analytic since 
‘bachelor’ means more or less the same as ‘unmarried man’. On this account, analytic 
truths depend both on meaning and empirical matter of facts, since the synonymy in 
play here is contingent.
Recently, Quine has re-addressed this issue and offered a slightly different perspec­
tive (1995a: 83). The lexicographer’s task, he now tells us, is to specify the meaning 
of particular expressions. Since the lexicographer is after meanings, it seems that he 
must have both a notion of meaning, and a the notion of sameness of meaning — of 
synonymy. But Quine points out that the entries in a dictionary are there for explana­
tory purposes, exemplifying the use of the expression in typical circumstances. This 
is Quine’s reason for claiming that the notion of meaning used by the lexicographer 
is not a theoretical one. The lexicographer’s notion of meaning is to be understood 
in its vernacular sense. For Quine, there is no harm in talking of ‘meaning’ as long as
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we do not engage in theorising about what meanings are: “I feel no reluctance toward 
refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby deny that words and statements are 
meaningful” (1948: 11). Quine is free to take the fact that sentences are meaningful 
as an irreducible one, or alternatively to seek an analysis of meaning in terms of be­
havioural criteria. The latter course is what Quine attempts in, for instance, chapter 
two of Word and Object. We will discuss these matters further in section 1.5.
1.2.2 Synonymy and necessity
In section 3, Quine returns to the problem of explaining synonymy and carefully 
examines a criterion designed for telling whether or not two expressions are synony­
mous. This attempt to capture the notion of synonymy is crucial. If indeed we can 
devise a clear and satisfying condition which will tell us, for any pair of words, whether 
they are, in the relevant sense needed here, synonymous or not, we will have solved 
the problem of explaining analyticity. The criterion under study here is the following. 
Two expressions are synonymous if and only if they are interchangeable salva veritate\ 
that is to say, two expressions are synonymous if and only if putting one for the other 
in a true statement does not change the truth-value of that statement. It is hoped 
that this criterion gives us clear conditions of application for the notion of synonymy 
and therefore explains why statements like ‘no bachelor is married’ are analytic. Un­
der this account, we could say that these statements are analytic since ‘bachelor’ and 
‘unmarried man’ are everywhere interchangeable salva veritate, so that performing 
the substitution results in transforming ‘no bachelor is married’ into a logical truth.
As it will soon become clear, the force of the proposed criterion depends on the 
language in which it is applied. Quine starts by examining the criterion as it works 
in an intensional language and then studies its behaviour in an extensional language. 
For the sake of exposition. I’ll reverse Quine’s dialectic and study the criterion as it 
works in an extensional language first. For Quine, a language is extensional if “any
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two predicates which agree extensionally (that is, are true of the same objects) are 
interchangeable salva veritate*'' (1951: 30). Now consider the obvious logical truth, 
couched extensionally:
(1) All and only bachelors are bachelors.
The needed interchangeability of ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’ is grounded on 
the following (extensional) statement:
(2) All and only bachelors are unmarried men.
W hat (2) says is that there is a material equivalence relation between the set of 
bachelors and the set of unmarried men: they consist of the same members. The 
statement (2) is our criterion for the synonymy of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’. 
It is a criterion for synonymy in the sense that if (2) is true, then ‘bachelor’ and ‘un­
married man’ are synonymous in the following sense: everything that is a bachelor 
is also an unmarried man. Assuming the truth of (2), we can produce from it the 
logical truth (1), therefore making a case that (2) is analytic since it is reducible to 
a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms. We can use the same routine to 
produce ‘no unmarried man is married’ from ‘no bachelor is married’ and (2), thereby 
showing, so the thought goes, that ‘no bachelor is married’ is analytic
The problem with this extensional approach can be illustrated by contrasting the 
example above with the following. Consider the logical truth:
(3) All and only creatures with a heart are creatures with a heart.
Consider also the following material equivalence, based on the model exemplified
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earlier by (2):
(4) All and only creatures with a heart are creatures with kidneys.
On the extensional approach, (4) must be said to be an analytic statement since 
it is reducible to (3) by putting ‘creatures with a heart’ for ‘creatures with kidneys’ 
in (4). Since (3) is a logical truth, it follows that (4) ought to be analytic. It is clear, 
however, that the truth of (4) does not rest exclusively on the meaning of ‘creatures 
with a heart’ and ‘creatures with kidneys’. It is an empirical (contingent) fact that 
these two expressions coincide in extension. Therefore, the truth of (4) does not rest 
exclusively on the meaning of its constituent expressions and fails to be analytic. In a 
nutshell, even if the expressions ‘creatures with a heart’ and ‘creatures with kidneys’ 
coincide in extension, they clearly don’t have the same meaning,^® showing that the 
extensional criterion for synonymy does not work. An extensional language simply 
does not have the means to devise a sufficiently fine-grained criterion for the purpose 
of explaining analyticity.
W hat is needed to explain analyticity is a criterion for what Quine calls cognitive 
synonymy, not mere extensional equivalence. Quine does not say much about the 
notion of cognitive synonymy, except that it is this kind of synonymy which is central 
for analyticity (1951: 28, 31). One way to interpret the notion of cognitive synonymy 
that would, I believe, be congenial to Quine is to stress that it is to be contrasted with 
synonymy understood as extensional equivalence. On this view, cognitive synonymy is 
simply non-extensional synonymy. If someone were to press the issue further and ask 
about the troublesome word ‘cognitive’, we could provide the following line of thought. 
Extensional equivalence is one kind of synonymy, but we have seen that it does nothing
assume, with Quine, that we are working with an intuitive notion of meaning and that the 
present inquiry is an attempt to make sense of that intuition.
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to explain the notion of analyticity. This kind of synonymy is extensional in the sense 
that it is a function of how the world is: ‘creatures with a heart’ and ‘creatures with 
kidneys’ are extensionally synonymous due to the empirical fact that everything that 
is a creature with kidneys is also a creature with a heart. Concerning ‘bachelor’ and 
‘unmarried man’, by contrast, we want to say that their synonymy goes beyond mere 
extensional equivalence: there is some yet unspecified connection between these two 
expressions, and a correct account of synonymy is after that unspecified connection.
A criterion for cognitive synonymy in the sense just explained can be devised by 
thinking about the difference between (2) and (4). Arguably, (2) is necessary whereas
(4) is contingent. Is that the key for cognitive synonymy? That is to say, is that the 
unspecified connection? Extensional equivalence not being enough, we are led to the 
idea that these equivalencies must also be necessary to do the work and distinguish 
between the kind of equivalence needed for analyticity and mere extensional equiva­
lence. On this account, to be cognitively synonymous — to have the same meaning 
— is to be necessarily interchangeable salva veritate. At first blush it seems to work. 
The statement:
(5) Necessarily, all and only bachelors are unmarried men
is true, whereas its counterpart ‘necessarily, all and only creatures with a heart are 
creatures with kidneys’ is not. If (5) is true, ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ have 
the same meaning and it will form the basis to say that (2) is not merely true, but 
true by virtue of meaning — that is to say, that (2) is analytic. We appear to have 
explained why ‘no bachelor is married’ and the like are analytic: it is because their 
non logical expressions are cognitively synonymous, where the concept of ‘cognitive 
synonymy’ is to be explained in terms of statements involving the notion of necessity, 
such as (5). Our new criterion is fine-grained enough to discard unwanted exten-
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sional equivalencies such as the one between ‘creatures with a heart’ and ‘creatures 
with kidneys’.
But why is it that we are entitled to ascribe necessity to ‘all and only bachelors are 
unmarried men’ ? The argument above presupposes that we are working within a non- 
extensional language. A non-extensional language is, for Quine, simply a language 
in which it is not the case that any two predicates which agree extensionally are 
interchangeable salva veritate. For instance, even if ‘necessarily, all and only creatures 
with a heart are creatures with a heart’ and ‘all and only creatures with a heart are 
creatures with kidneys’ are both true, the result of putting ‘creatures with kidneys’ 
for one of the occurrences of ‘creatures with a heart’ results in the falsity ‘necessarily, 
all and only creatures with a heart are creatures with kidneys’. Here we have a clear- 
cut case of two predicates which agree extensionally yet are not interchangeable salva 
veritate. This is due to their occurrence within the scope of an intensional operator, 
in this case the operator of necessity. Such an intensional language, containing the 
concept of necessity, indeed affords the means to devise a suitable — that is to say, 
suitable for explaining analyticity — criterion for interchangeability salva veritate, as 
we saw above.
Let’s grant that we all know that ‘all and only bachelors are unmarried men’ 
is true. Now what does it mean to say that it is not merely true, but necessarily 
so? Why does it have to be the case that all bachelors are unmarried men? The 
only available answer seems to be that all bachelors must be unmarried men because 
‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’. If this is right, then the explanation is, again, 
circular. Using the notion of necessity was supposed to explain synonymy — which 
in turn was expected to explain meaning — but on close examination it turns out 
that synonymy and meaning were taken for granted all along.
It is important to point out that the notion of necessity in play here is applicable 
only to analytic statements, and that this is the reason why the approach fails in the
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encl. We have seen, in effect, that attaching the necessity operator to an extensional 
statement of equivalence results in a truth only when both sides of the equivalence 
have the same meaning, i.e., when the statement of equivalence is not merely true 
but also analytic. This notion of necessity corresponds to Quine’s first grade of modal 
involvement.^^ Statements, not propositions, are analytic, and necessity of the first 
grade consists of a semantical predicate attachable to names of statements. This is 
not a problem for Quine as long as we attach this semantical predicate to the first class 
of analytic truths, the logical truths. This class of truths is perfectly determined, so 
that there is no hesitation or vagueness e i s  to the application of the necessity predicate 
over this class if we wish to treat logical truths as necessary t r u t h s , B u t  when it 
comes to ascribe necessity to analytic statements of the second group — those true by 
virtue of meaning — its conditions of applications are by no means clear because its 
applicability depends on relations of synonymy which are not sharply defined. Thus, 
says Quine, “the synonymy relation on which such cases [analytic truths of the second 
group] depend is supposedly a narrower relation than that of the mere coextensiveness 
of terms, and it is not known to he amenable to any satisfactory analysis" (1953a: 
171, italics are mine).
In view of these considerations, it appears that we have two closely related argu­
ments against the criterion of interchangeability salva veritate. The first is that we 
cannot explain analyticity with this criterion since the notion of sameness of meaning, 
and therefore of analyticity, is presupposed in the formulation of the criterion. This 
first argument is the one Quine is mainly concerned with in ‘Two Dogmas’, and is 
the one we have tried to make as clear as possible in the last few paragraphs.
The second argument is that the criterion does not work. We are, according to
i^See Quine (1953c) for his view on the ‘three grades’ of modality.
'^^ But such a notion of necessity is very ‘meagre’ for Quine. It does not even correspond to the 
notion of necessity as used in prepositional modal logic (1953c: 171). This notion of necessity is 
merely to be equated with validity — that is, with one form of logical necessity as explained in the 
Introduction. We’ll return to Quine’s ‘acceptable’ notion of logical necessity in Chapter 4.
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Quine, likely to hesitate over its application since it depends on a notion of synonymy 
which is not sharply defined. It is somehow assumed in ‘Two dogmas’ that synonymy, 
meaning and analyticity are not sharp notions. This is precisely why explaining 
analyticity in terms of synonymy fails: if it were possible to devise a sharp notion of 
synonymy, Quine’s high standards would be satisfied, independently of the circularity 
in the explanation. In other words — to anticipate what follows — if it were possible to 
devise a satisfying identity principle for meanings, Quine’s argument would collapse. 
The view that unsharp or somehow ‘vague’ notions are to be discarded or regimented 
can be seen as an ideal of logical positivism. This ideal, even if it is not defended and 
stated in ‘Two dogmas’, seems to play a crucial role in the dialectic of this paper, 
especially in the first three sections. On close examination, Quine is in effect arguing 
that the problem with the notion of analyticity is that we can’t reduce it to or explain 
it in terms of other notions which are satisfyingly sharp. We will see in section 1.3, 
where we discuss criticisms addressing Quine’s attack, how this second argument 
plays a crucial role.
1.2.3 Semantical rules
Section 4 of ‘Two dogmas’ examines the Carnapian proposal to use the notion 
of semantical rules as a key to explain analyticity. This part of Quine’s paper is 
important since it has often been said that the problem with analyticity results from 
the vagueness inherent in natural languages. If we could make sense of analyticity in 
artificial languages, we would thereby show that the problems in explaining analyticity 
are due to the fact that we are dealing with unregimented, undisciplined natural 
languages. To make sense of a notion in the framework of an artificial language is, 
for Carnap and for Quine, to show its use where it counts, i.e., in scientific discourse.
Semantical rules are part of artificial languages free of vagueness. The idea of 
such rules is to determine exactly (perhaps recursively) which statements are to be
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analytic relative to a language L. These rules are semantical since they deal with 
truths of a particular sort, i.e. the analytic ones. Let’s say we’re working within 
a given artificial language Lq — the details of that language are irrelevant. The 
role of the semantical rules is to specify exactly which statements of Lq are to count 
as analytic. We thereby avoid the problem encountered more than once previously, 
namely the ‘sharpness’ problem: given these rules, we know exactly which statements 
are analytic and which ones are not, so that we never hesitate over the application of 
the term ‘analytic’ relative to that particular language. But from the point of view of 
explaining what is meant by the notion of analyticity, the appeal to semantical rules 
so conceived is misguided. The rules presumably have this form: ‘a statement S is
analytic for Lq if and only i f  ’, where ‘__ ’ specifies recursively a set of statements,
which will consist of a subset of the true statements of L q .  But this only tells us 
which statements are to count as analytic in this language, they do not tell us why 
they are analytic. Indeed, if one were to ask why the statements specified by the 
rules are analytic, the sole response available (that is to say, the sole response not 
presupposing analyticity) would be that they are analytic because the semantical 
rules say they are. This obviously won’t do: what we are after is an explanation, not 
just a list of analytic statements. It is the sole possible response in this context since 
any other explanation would have to involve the thought that the semantical rules 
determine the ‘right’ statements since they are so construed as to deliver all and only 
those statements which are true by virtue of meaning, thereby refocusing the problem 
on what is meant by ‘true by virtue of meaning’ and its cognates. Quine concludes: 
“Semantical rules determining the analytic statements of an artificial language are of 
interest only in so far as we understand the notion of analyticity; they are of no help 
in gaining that understanding” (1951: 36).
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1.2.4 Summing up
We have seen that Quine has been refuting various attempts to explain the notion 
of analyticity. He used two main strategies to dismiss the explanations on offer. One is 
to show that the explanation does not clarify the notion, and the other is to show how 
the purported explanation depends on the notion of analyticity. In the remaining two 
sections, he addresses the second dogma and sketches his holist epistemology. These 
sections also contain a sceptical argument about analyticity and logical necessity, and 
we’ll examine it in Chapters 2 and 3.
Now that we have rehearsed Quine’s argument, let us ask: what is the relation 
between analyticity and necessity, and in which sense does the argument affect log­
ical necessity? Quine is concerned with analyticity in Carnap’s sense. For Carnap, 
analyticity coincides with logical truth, logical consequence, and validity. In other 
words, Carnap takes it that what is logically necessary in the sense explained in the 
Introduction will also be analytic. He is in fact, especially in his Logical Syntax of 
Language, trying to justify the concept of logical necessity through the notion of an­
alyticity. A statement of the form 0 (F  \~l 0 ) will be true, for Carnap, by virtue of 
the syntax — the rules — governing the expressions it contains. Such statements are 
L-true for Carnap, that is, analytic. Since Quine’s attack is directed against Carnap’s 
notion of analyticity, it follows that it is also directed to logical necessity. Quine’s 
apparent conflation of the notions of analyticity and necessity is to be understood 
by relation to Carnap — he also conflates them, at least to a certain extent. The 
statements of logical necessity with which we are concerned here also happens to be 
analytic in Carnap’s system, and Quine’s main goal in ‘Two Dogmas’ is precisely to 
attack Carnap’s notion of analyticity.
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1.3 G rice & Straw son’s defence
The first section was devoted to presenting Quine’s argument against analyticity. 
We saw that his main criticism is that analyticity can’t be satisfyingly explained. 
The problem is, roughly, that explaining analyticity by using synonymy or meaning 
fails since we don’t have a clear (sharp, not vague) criterion of application for these 
notions. Grice and Strawson, in their joint paper ‘In Defence of a Dogma’, mount 
an elaborated and sophisticated defence against Quine’s arguments in ‘Two Dogmas’. 
We can discern two main strands in Grice & Strawson’s section of the paper where 
they discuss Quine’s argument as displayed in the first four sections of ‘Two Dogmas’. 
The first line of defence concentrates on Quine’s demands on explanation, that is to 
say, on Quine’s idea of a satisfactory elucidation of a given notion. The second 
strand has to do with the implicit assumption made by Quine to the effect that the 
unintelligibility of a given notion follows from the fact that we haven’t yet provided 
an adequate explanation for it. We will begin our investigation with the first counter­
argument, i.e., the claim by Grice h  Strawson that Quine’s demands on explanation 
are excessive.
Grice and Strawson contend that Quine raises the usual standards on explanation 
of concepts in ‘Two Dogmas’, and that this is why he condemns the notions of ana­
lyticity and meaning. If it could be shown that Quine is indeed raising the standard 
to an inappropriate level, it would follow that his attack on analyticity fails to be 
convincing. In this section, it will be argued that Quine’s demands in ‘Two Dogmas’ 
are on the contrary perfectly reasonable ones. First, we will examine and criticise 
Grice and Strawson’s interpretation of Quine’s demands on explanation. Secondly, 
we will offer our own interpretation of what Quine’s standards are. Finally, we will 
study the question whether these demands are reasonable or not and conclude that 
they are. Since they are reasonable and since Quine has shown that they are not 
satisfied, it follows that he is justified in maintaining that there is as yet no satisfying
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explanation of analyticity — in a sense to be clarified. The further claim that the 
unintelligibility of analyticity follows from this lack of a satisfying explanation is of 
course another topic, taken up in the next section.
A good way to start the discussion is to quote the crucial passage in which they 
give their interpretation of what Quine’s demands on explanations are:
To make satisfactory sense (for Quine) of one of these expressions would seem  to  
involve two things. (1) It would seem  to involve providing an explanation which 
does not incorporate any expression belonging to the family-circle. (2) It would  
seem  that the explanation provided m ust be of the sam e general character as 
those rejected explanations which do incorporate members of the family-circle 
{i.e.,  it m ust specify some feature com m on and peculiar to all cases to which, 
for exam ple, the word “analytic” is to be applied; it m ust have the sam e general 
form as an explanation beginning, “a statem ent is analytic if and only if... ”).
(1956: 147-48)
Let’s begin by focusing on the first condition. According to Grice & Strawson, one of 
Quine’s necessary conditions for explaining analyticity is that the explanation must 
not involve any of the terms belonging to the family-circle. Now what exactly is 
this circle? The first thing to notice is that Grice & Strawson seem to think (1956: 
147) that the ‘circle’ in question is composed of all the candidate notions to explain 
analyticity examined by Quine in his paper. These notions, as we saw in the first 
section, are meaning, synonymy, interchangeability salva veritate, truth by definition, 
necessity, truth in all possible worlds, and semantical rules. Grice and Strawson’s 
interpretation of Quine’s view on this particular point presupposes that Quine’s main 
contention is that analyticity is part of a circle consisting of these notions. However, 
I will offer two reasons against characterising Quine’s main criticism in this way.
First, we saw in section 1.2 that the structure of Quine’s argument is not, strictly 
speaking, a circle. For one thing, the attempts to explain analyticity by appealing to
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semantical rules and possible worlds fail because the correct use of these supposedly 
explanatory notions relies on a prior understanding of analyticity. That is to say, in 
order to know that a sentence is true in all possible worlds, we must already know 
whether or not it is analytic. Concerning semantical rules à la Carnap, all they give 
us is a list of analytic statements; therefore, in order to have the ‘right’ rules, we must 
ensure that these rules will yield all and only analytic statements. But to do that, of 
course, we must already know what are the analytic statements. These explanations 
fail, not because the notions they use are part of a circle, but rather because the 
understanding of the notion we are trying to explain is presupposed. To make that 
clear, think about the following putative explanation. Let’s say I want to explain to a 
child the concept of blue in the following way: ‘something is blue if, and only if, when 
you see that thing, it is blue’. The criterion as such is not incorrect; i t ’s just that 
it is of no use to understand the concept on the left-hand side — something more is 
needed, perhaps an ostensive definition in this particular case.
Explanations of this kind can be usefully compared to Dummett’s ‘pragmatic 
justifications’.^ ® Such a justification, concerning logical laws in Dummett’s context, 
proceeds by using the very logical law being justified. It certainly shows something 
about the law, and it can certainly be illuminating. But it cannot possibly be persua­
sive for someone who does not already consider as valid the logical law being justified. 
A persuasive justification of a logical law, it can plausibly be argued, must not employ 
the law being justified. Likewise, we could borrow Dummett’s idea and distinguish be­
tween a pragmatic explanation and a persuasive explanation. The above explanation 
of ‘blue’ would be, on that account, a pragmatic explanation. Now the explanations in 
terms of semantical rules and possible worlds might be a bit more sophisticated, but 
they suffer from basically the same problem: in order to apply correctly the criterion, 
we must already know which statements are analytic. Such explanations are merely
i^Soe Dummett (1991: 200-204).
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pragmatic: they will only convince one who already has an idea of what analyticity 
is. It is clear that Quine’s investigation is directed towards a persuasive explanation. 
He wants to show that one who is sceptical about the intelligibility of a notion cannot 
be convinced or persuaded that it is meaningful.
Strictly speaking, then, these notions (semantical rules and possible worlds) are 
not part of a ‘circle’ of explanation. Contrary to the other notions examined by Quine, 
the problem with them is not that they are unclear or lack sharpness, but rather that 
they directly presuppose the notion we are trying to explain. By ‘directly’, we mean 
that the intelligibility of the notion that is supposed to explain analyticity rests on 
the intelligibility of the notion of analyticity. It seems to be good reason to reject 
explanations of analyticity using this kind of strategy — indeed to reject any such 
putative explanation. In fact, Carnap himself never claimed that semantical rules 
could explain our concept of analyticity. They were rather meant to supply a precise 
characterisation, to ‘precisify’, as it were, our everyday concept of analyticity.
The second reason why it is not correct to picture Quine’s main argument the way 
Crice & Strawson do is related to the circularity problem. If there is a circle in Quine’s 
argument, it is composed of analyticity, meaning, synonymy, tru th  by definition, 
necessity, and back to analyticity again. We saw in the previous section that in order 
to explain analyticity, we might be tempted to use the notion of meaning. But this 
notion being unclear, we try explaining meaning by using synonymy. Synonymy not 
being sharp, we then try to explain it using truth by definition, but it turns out 
that definitions rely on a prior understanding of synonymy. Now if we try to explain 
synonymy by using necessity, we find that this latter notion presupposes analyticity. 
This looks more like an explanatory circle. The circle results from the fact that in the 
quest for an explanation of analyticity, we encounter unclear notions. This being so, 
we are forced to try to sharpen these notions by using other notions, but these latter 
notions turn out to be as unclear as the previous ones. We come full circle when we
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attempt to elucidate the notion of synonymy by using necessity; Quine shows that in 
order to know whether a statement is necessary or not, we must know whether it is 
analytic or not.
In order to see that the circle is not, for Quine, the whole story, we can imagine 
what would have happened if the attempt to explain synonymy by using necessity 
was either not available or else resulted in a vague right-hand side. We would not 
have, strictly speaking, a circle, but rather a chain of unsatisfying explanations. Even 
if there would be no circle of explanation in this case, Quine would still claim that 
analyticity has not been satisfyingly explained. That is the important point: the 
explanations on the table are not clear. If on the other hand a case could be made 
that explaining analyticity in terms of, say, synonymy resulted in a clear and sharp 
elucidation, Quine would be forced to acknowledge the intelligibility of analyticity, 
circle or not. The circle results from one last attempt to explain synonymy {i.e., the 
one using necessity), and it turns out that this last attempt presupposes directly an 
understanding of the notion of analyticity: the intelligibility of the notion of necessity 
(as construed by Quine) rests on the intelligibility of analyticity. The way I see it, 
circularity is a mere by-product of the whole attempt to elucidate analyticity.
The above considerations show why it is a mistake to interpret Quine as demand­
ing, for a satisfactory explanation of analyticity, that it should not involve any notion 
which is part of the circle. If, for instance, we could provide an explanation of an­
alyticity in terms of a sharp and clear notion of synonymy, Quine would have to be 
satisfied. It is true that if there were a satisfying explanation of analyticity by using 
synonymy, we would get out of the circle. But the primary goal is not to break out 
of the circle. It is, rather, to supply a clear characterisation. The first demand on 
explanation attributed to Quine by Grice & Strawson — namely the demand that 
analyticity should not be explained by using a member of the circle — is therefore 
misleading. It is misleading since it obscures what Quine really is after.
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W hat about the second constraint on explanation attributed to Quine? Recall 
that it is the demand that the explanation should have the form ‘a statement is
analytic if and only i f  where ‘___ ’ states sufficient and necessary conditions
for a statement to be analytic. This way of interpreting Quine is faithful to the
spirit of ‘Two Dogmas’, but with the proviso that ‘___ ’ may contain notions that
are part of the explanatory circle, for the reasons explained above. This slightly 
modified requirement seems to be a prima facie reasonable demand on explanation. 
W hat is wrong, indeed, in requiring such explanations when one is doing philosophical 
analysis?
Let’s take stock. Grice & Strawson contend that Quine’s demands on explanation 
are unrealistic. They go as far as claiming that “it is perhaps dubious whether any 
such explanations can ever be given” (1956: 148). We have to keep in mind that 
given the way they represent Quine’s exigencies, they might be justified in claiming 
that they are excessive. It is indeed difficult to imagine what an explanation of 
analyticity would be like if we could not use intensional notions such as meaning and 
synonymy. But Quine is not saying that there is a principled reason why we can’t 
explain analyticity in terms of intensional notions: all he’s asking, in the end, is that 
the notion(s) used be clear and sharp. If it turns out that there is a sharp notion 
of, say, synonymy, then Quine’s demands would be satisfied. To repeat, it is crucial 
to keep in mind that Quine’s main point in ‘Two Dogmas’ is not tha t analyticity is 
part of an explanatory circle, but rather that the explanations on offer do not clarify 
it. The circle results from the lack of a clear notion to explain analyticity — it is 
a by-product which does not play a crucial part in the argument. Since Grice & 
Strawson’s interpretation of Quine’s requirements is not fully faithful to what Quine 
actually maintains, they cannot, on the basis of that interpretation, accuse him of 
raising the standards.
But what, exactly, is Quine asking? We know he’s after a clear and sharp expia-
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nation, and now it is time to examine what Quine means by that. The most obvious 
and straightforward way to explain analyticity is by using the notion of meaning, 
since to be analytic is to be true by virtue of meaning. Remember that the friend of 
analyticity wants to say that ‘all unmarried men are bachelors’ owes its analyticity to 
the fact that ‘unmarried man’ and ‘bachelor’ have the same meaning. Now if we could 
tell, for any pair of expressions, whether they have the same meaning or not, then 
we would be equipped with a clear-cut criterion for sameness of meaning — think 
here of his famous slogan, ‘no entity without identity’. Thus, we would also have a 
clear-cut criterion for analyticity, and Quine could not conclude that analyticity is 
unintelligible. This explains why the endeavour to elucidate analyticity in terms of 
meaning is crucial in ‘Two Dogmas’. In effect, the attempt to explain meaning in 
terms of synonymy is also part of the project of explaining analyticity in terms of 
meaning, and so is the attempt to define synonymy by using tru th  by definition.
To sum up, Quine, working under the assumption (largely shared in the fifties) that 
meanings in the relevant sense are abstract entities, requires an appropriate principle 
of identity for meanings before accepting them into his ontology. This doesn’t  seem 
to be an extravagant demand at all. In the section following the next, I will develop 
in more details the role of the principle of identity in Quine’s attack on analyticity. 
For the moment, let’s turn to Grice &: Strawson’s second defence.
1.4 D oes lack o f sa tisfy ing  exp lanation  im ply
u n intellig ib ility?
It may well be that analyticity is a concept poorly explained, that we don’t have 
a satisfying account of it. The friend of analyticity can bite the bullet and claim 
that this state of affair has nothing to do with the intelligibility of the concept. The 
inference from the unavailability of a satisfying explanation for a given concept to its
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unintelligibiiity is, she can argue, unjustified in the case of analyticity. In this section, 
we will examine carefully this line of thought, and see how a Quinean can reply to 
that objection.
Grice and Strawson, as well as Wright (1986), hold that there ought to be two 
steps in Quine’s argument for Radical Irrealism about analyticity. The first step is to 
show that analyticity is inextricably entangled in an explanatory circle of concepts, or, 
as I prefer to interpret him, to show that analyticity is hopelessly unclear. The second 
step is that this unclarity, or circle, calls the meaningfulness of the notions involved 
into question. Quine persuasively argues for the first step, but virtually says nothing 
to buttress the second. This gap has been exploited by defenders of the analytic 
/  synthetic distinction such as Grice & Strawson (1956) and Wright (1986). The 
substance of their counter-argument is nicely put in the following passage (Wright, 
1986: 190)
Quine, like Socrates, seem s to have supposed that the absence of any clear, non­
circular definition of a concept som ehow calls its propriety into question. The 
proper response is that it does nothing of the sort, provided there is independent 
evidence that the concept is teachable and is generally w ell-understood. A  
sceptic about the intelligibility of a concept does not have to be answered by a 
rigourous explanation of it; it is enough to supply unm istakable evidence that 
the concept is  well understood.
Wright is here explicitly blocking the inference from step one to step two: explanatory 
circle /  unclarity do not entail the unintelligibility of the concepts involved. It is 
undeniable that Quine never discusses the implicit step uncovered by Wright. He is 
content to point out the lack of a satisfying explanation for analyticity, and leaves it 
at that. W hat we have to evaluate here is the force of Wright’s consideration against 
a Quinean. To get started, let’s have a look at Wright’s criterion for deciding whether 
a concept is well understood, appearing immediately after the passage quoted above:
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And what better evidence could there be than that there is manifest in the 
community at large a disposition towards non-collusive assent in the applica­
tion of these concepts — crucially, in our application of them to previously 
unconsidered cases?
The key idea is that of non-collusive assent. An expression prompts non-collusive 
assent if a suitable community of speakers apply the expression in a more or less 
uniform manner without consulting each other as to the correctness or incorrectness 
of its applications. Wright’s claim, then, is that the expression ‘is analytic’ generally 
prompts non-collusive assent in the philosophically informed community. That is, 
most of us ascribe analyticity to more or less the same cases, and that very fact suffices 
to show, according to Wright, that the concept of analyticity is well understood. 
Therefore, the argument goes, Quine is wrong to say that the concept of analyticity 
is unintelligible.
Let us grant, if only for the sake of the argument, that analyticity does prompt 
non-collusive a s s e n t . T h i s  hne of thought presents itself as a real threat to the 
Quinean for the following reason. The criterion of non-collusive assent is congenial to 
Quine, since it is empirically observable whether an expression satisfies it or not. He 
can therefore not afford to dismiss the criterion on the basis that it is not sufficiently 
clear, ill defined, vague, etc. Quine can only agree that — if indeed it is the case — 
‘is analytic’ prompts non-collusive assent. At first blush, then, if Wright is correct to 
hold that non-collusive assent implies intelligibility, Quine would be refuted.
One possible reply available to the Quinean is to resist the thesis according to 
which non-collusive assent implies intelligibility. One of Quine’s criteria for intelligi­
bility is, we have seen, clarity in the explanation of the concept. Wright dismisses this
‘^‘It’s not clear that it does. Any logical law, the paradigm case of analytic statements, can be 
disputed. That is, for any logical law, there is at the very least a community of speakers who would 
not apply the expression ‘is analytic’ to it. Hume’s Principle is another disputed case, and so is 
‘everything green is extended’ (this last is taken from Quine (1951: 32)).
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criterion and suggests another one, non-collusive aasent. Quine could thus challenge 
Wright’s criterion and put forward arguments to the effect that his criterion is better 
than Wright’s, or that, simply, Wright’s criterion is not acceptable for such and such 
reasons. This strategy is, I take it, very risky. It would mean that Quine has to 
show that despite the fact that speakers generally agree on the application of a given 
expression, it remains possible that these speakers are just talking nonsense every 
time they do. This is very counter-intuitive — the arguments to motivate this view 
would have to be correspondingly complicated and contentious.
I have no intention, however, to defend that view. On the contrary, I want 
to suggest that a Quinean can: a) accept Wright’s thesis about the link between 
non-collusive assent and intelligibility and b) accept that the expression ‘is analytic’ 
prompts non-collusive assent, but c) nevertheless stick to her Radical Irrealism about 
analyticity. The key is to reflect on what exactly satisfaction of Wright’s criterion 
for intelligibility establishes for a given expression. The most such a criterion can 
establish for analyticity is that there is, corresponding to the expression, a concept 
of analyticity used by the speakers of a suitable community. In other words, it es­
tablishes that speakers are not uttering sheer nonsense when applying the expression 
‘is analytic’ to statements.
Does that signal defeat for Radical irrealism? I wish to offer a reason why I 
think it does not. Competent speakers mostly agree on the application of the concept 
of analyticity because they mostly agree on their use of the concept of synonymy. 
Speakers uniformly say that ‘all bachelors are married men’ is analytic in view of the 
fact that they agree that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous expressions. 
They’re going to say, if pressed, tha t the reason why they ascribe analyticity to this 
statement is because the two expressions involved mean the same thing, and that this
Grice and Strawson claim that non-collusive assent does even more than that. According to 
them, non-collusive assent, in the case of analyticity, means that there is, in a realist sense, an 
analytic /  synthetic distinction.
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relation of synonymy is why, ultimately, the sentence is true by virtue of meaning. 
So it is beyond doubt that competent speakers have a concept of analyticity. Their 
concept is the expected one: for them, an analytic statement is one true by virtue 
of meaning alone. Underlying this uniform use of the concept of analyticity is an 
agreed understanding of synonymy and of which expressions are synonymous with 
each other.
However, this does not show that competent speakers are endowed with the con­
cept of analyticity that Quine has in mind. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, 
Quine’s target is not the intelligibility of analyticity qua notion, but rather its Pla- 
tonistic construal. W hat Wright’s argument shows is that competent speakers have 
a concept of analyticity — nothing about the nature of the concept is shown. Quine 
would be happy to agree with Wright and he would certainly suggest that analyticity 
has to be understood in terms of assent and dissent, which is just what he does in 
section 14 of Word and Object But such a construal of analyticity need not com­
mit one to the existence of a realm of a priori knowledge. Since the a priori is, as I 
will argue in the next section, Quine’s main target in ‘Two Dogmas’ and elsewhere, 
Wright’s argument perhaps fails to address the heart of the controversy.
1.5 B ogh ossian ’s reductio
After the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, the notion of ana­
lyticity fell into disrepute for several decades. It is only recently, thanks to the work 
of Boghossian and others, that analyticity started to regain a respectable status in 
the philosophical world. In his paper ‘Analyticity’,^ *^ Boghossian defends the notion 
against Quine’s forceful and influential attack. One contention of ‘Two Dogmas’ is 
that there is no fact of the m atter as to whether an expression is analytic or not. In
®^A11 page references in this section are to this paper, unless specified otherwise.
other words, Quine maintains a non-factualist thesis about analyticity. Boghossian, 
in the aforementioned paper, puts forward an argument to show that non-factualism 
about analyticity entails scepticism about meaning — and this very fact supposedly 
shows that Quine’s argument can’t be right. In sum, Boghossian’s argument is in­
tended as a reductio ad absurdum of non-factualism about analyticity. In this section, 
I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian’s attempted reductio fails against 
the Quinean. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine’s argument, 
properly interpreted, is successful as it stands but has a more limited scope than is 
generally believed.
1.5.1 Quine’s argument
Quine’s charge against analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ mainly proceeds through a 
criticism of the notion of meaning. The reason for this is straightforward. Quine is 
interested in the notion of analyticity in its contemporary sense: to be analytic, in 
this version, is to be true by virtue of meaning. In particular, he wants to attack 
the notion of analyticity as it appears in the writings of Carnap, e.g., in The Logical 
Syntax of Language and Meaning and Necessity. Analyticity plays a pivotal role 
in these two books, so much so that a definitive rebuke of the notion would mean 
that the foundation of Carnap’s methodological framework is flawed at its very core. 
Carnap’s notion of analyticity, of course, is inextricably tied to meaning. Thus Quine, 
by mounting his criticism of analyticity on the back of meaning, threatens to demolish 
the underpinnings of Carnap’s system.
Let’s have a closer look at the structure of Quine’s argument. A sentence such 
as ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ is analytic, according to the proponents of the 
notion, due to the fact that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ mean the same thing. 
This is precisely what Quine wishes to undermine by arguing that we don’t have an 
adequate explanation of what it is for two expressions to mean the same thing in the
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relevant sense. Therefore, the argument goes, we don’t have an adequate explanation 
of analyticity. Since such an explanation is neither available nor forthcoming, it 
follows that analyticity is not a factual notion. We can reconstruct the argument as 
follows:
1. the notion of analyticity is best cashed out in terms of the notion of ‘meaning 
the same as’
2. there is no satisfying explanation of the notion of ‘meaning the same as’
3. if there is no satisfying explanation of a particular notion, then there is no fact 
of the matter about its application
4. therefore, we should be non-factualists about the notion of ‘meaning the same 
as’
5. since (1), non-factualism about analyticity follows
As seen in the previous two sections, there is more than one way to dispute the 
correctness of this argument. Grice & Strawson’s (1956) well-known criticism of 
Quine’s argument focuses on (2) and (3). Wright (1986) adopts a similar strategy. 
According to them, it is not clear that there is no satisfying explanation of analyticity 
(or of ‘meaning the same as’). Furthermore, they argue, even if Quine is right in this 
respect, it does not follow that the notion is not factual. That is, they dispute both
(2) and (3).
However, I wish to examine another counter-argument, that put forward by Boghos­
sian. His strategy is to show that (4) leads to an absurdity. That is, Boghossian does 
not try to convince us that there is a satisfying explanation of ‘meaning the same 
as’ by supplying one: he claims rather that to hold that there is no such explanation 
is self-refuting. Grice Sz Strawson anticipated an argument of this kind in their ‘In 
Defence of a Dogma’:
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We want only to point out that if we are to give up the notion of sentence- 
synonym y as senseless, we m ust give up the notion of sentence-significance (of 
a sentence having meaning) as senseless too. B ut then perhaps we m ight as 
well give up the notion of sense. —  It seem s clear that we have here a typical 
exam ple of a philosopher’s paradox. (Grice & Strawson, 1956: 146-147).
If Grice &; Strawson’s line of thought is persuasively exploited by Boghossian — if, 
that is, the crucial premise (4) is false — it follows that Quine’s argument against an­
alyticity does not go through. The advantage of such an approach is that it dispenses 
with the need to invoke the battery of complicated arguments in order to dispute (2) 
and (3). Unfortunately, as we will see, the reductio is fallacious.
1.5.2 Boghossian’s anti-Quine argument
Before we examine Boghossian’s argument, we need to put it into context. In 
particular, we have to distinguish between three notions of analyticity. In his ‘Ana­
lyticity’, Boghossian puts forward a notion of analyticity — which he calls ‘epistemo- 
logical analyticity’ — in the hope that it will provide, in his words, an ‘explanation 
of the a priori’ (p. 332). Epistemological analyticity is defined thus (where ‘S’ refers 
to an arbitrary sentence):
E pistem ological analy tic ity : S is analytic if grasp of the meaning of S suffices for 
holding S true. (See p. 334).
This notion is to be contrasted with metaphysical analyticity:
M etaphysical analy tic ity : S is analytic if it owes its truth-value completely to its 
meaning, and not at all to the ‘facts’. (Ibid.)
For a set of reasons that need not be discussed here, Boghossian is not interested in 
the metaphysical notion and indeed praises Quine for making us realise its inappro­
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priateness (p. 335). In the section discussed here, Boghossian is concerned to defend 
a type of epistemological analyticity, namely what he terms ‘Frege-analyticity’;
F rege-analy tic ity : S is Frege-analytic if it is transformable into a logical truth by 
substituting synonyms for synonyms, (p. 337).
This notion of analyticity, as is well known, is the one attacked by Quine in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. Indeed, in that paper, Quine discusses neither the analyticity nor the 
putative a priority of the logical truths. But a considerable set of analytic statements 
fall into the category of Frege-analyticity; so if sense can be made of their analyticity, 
then the problem of the a priori will be reduced to that of making sense of the 
analyticity of logic (as Boghossian himself points out (p. 339)). Boghossian’s hope is 
that a vindication of Frege-analyticity — a vindication, namely, that sentences such 
as ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ are analytic — will provide the means to defend 
the claim that such statements are known a priori. It is important to keep in mind 
that Boghossian’s ultimate aim is to defend a priori knowledge and that Quine’s aim, 
as we will discuss below, is to undermine this kind of knowledge.
Let us scrutinise in more details the attempted reductio. The argument levelled 
against Quine is that to claim, as he does, that there is no satisfying explanation of 
the expression ‘meaning the same as’ leads to an outright rejection of the notion of 
meaning itself. And this, Quine’s opponents argue, is totally unacceptable. According 
to Strawson & Grice, as we have seen, it shows that Quine’s line of thought leads to 
a ‘paradox’, whilst for Boghossian (p. 342) it amounts to a reductio of his rejection 
of analyticity.
Boghossian (pp. 342-43) gives a compelling argument to support his claim. How is 
it possible, he maintains, that there be a fact of the matter as to what each expression 
means without there being a fact of the matter as to whether two expressions mean 
the same? That is, given that some expression E determinately means M, how could 
it be indeterminate whether another expression F, which also possesses a determinate
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meaning, does or does not mean the same as E? Given the two meanings, it should be 
a determinate matter whether they are the same or not. And since Quine argues that 
there are no facts of the matter concerning the synonymy of two expressions, he must, 
logically, endorse the thesis according to which there are no facts of the matter as 
to what each expression means. On examination, it appears that Boghossian is here 
using a contraposing argument. Take ‘FM I’ to mean ‘there are facts of the matter 
as to what each expression means’ and ‘FM2’ to mean ‘there are facts of the matter 
as to whether two expressions mean the same or not’. Boghossian puts forward an 
argument to show that FMI —> FM2. Given the truth of FMI —)■ FM2, we just have 
to contrapose to get ~FM2 —» ~FM1. This last conditional is what leads to the 
reductio: it shows that Quine’s criticism of synonymy — FM2 — leads inevitably 
(logically) to a rejection of meaning — FMI. The argument can be formalised thus:
1. FMI —> FM2 Premise
2. -~FM2 ~FM1 Contraposition on (1)
3. ~FM2 Quine’s thesis (‘4’ in the argument above)
4. Therefore, ~FM1 Modus ponens on (2) and (3)
There is thus no doubt that Boghossian’s reasoning is valid. Prima facie, it also 
seems that Quine should accept not only the validity of the argument, but also its 
soundness. Indeed, Quine repeatedly mentions that he dislikes the notion of meaning. 
It is explicit, in ‘Two Dogmas’, that he intends to show that the notion of meaning 
stands or falls with the notion of analyticity. In the attempt to explain analyticity, 
we have, he maintains, to use the notion of meaning. But the appeal to the notion 
of meaning does not help, since that notion is as unclear and hopeless as the notion 
of analyticity itself. Therefore, since he rejects analyticity on the ground that it does 
not satisfy his standards of explanation and since meaning likewise does not satisfy
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these standards, he would be inconsistent if he tried to discard analyticity without 
discarding, at least in some sense, meaning as well. In fact, this is a consequence 
of the ‘domino effect’ inherent in the structure of Quine’s argument. His criticism 
of analyticity has consequences, if he is right, for all the notions in the explanatory 
circle, which consists, principally, of the notions of analyticity, meaning, necessity, 
and synonymy. In this sense, Boghossian’s argument shows something that Quine is 
perfectly aware of and is glad to accept. If he is, how come he would not (presumably) 
consider Boghossian’s argument as being a reductiol That is, why is the rejection of 
meaning seen as a destructive consequence for Quine’s views according to Boghossian, 
but not for Quine himself? It is true indeed that the consequences of a complete 
rejection of meaning are difficult to imagine. If Quine really is jettisoning the notion 
of meaning — any notion of meaning — he owes us an explanation of how he intends 
to live without meaning. So we are, it seems, facing a dilemma: either Quine holds 
an incredible thesis about meaning, or there is something wrong with Boghossian’s 
argument — despite all appearances to the contrary.
1.5.3 Exegetical study: Part I
Quine’s ideas about meaning have often been taken to suggest that he is trying 
to get rid of the notion a lto g e th e r .A n d  his writings strongly suggest that interpre­
tation. But that reading is, I think, not wholly faithful to what Quine is after in his 
criticism of meaning. I want to suggest that Quine does not maintain that he can 
actually do without the notion of meaning as such, and moreover that there need be 
no inconsistency on his part. That is, there is conceptual space for both a criticism of 
the notion of meaning such that it fulfils the role Carnap intends it to have and the 
acceptance of meaning as a legitimate notion. I wish to argue that Quine occupies 
that conceptual space.
^See for instance Strawson (1985: 69-95). For a discussion of this topic, see Quinton (1990).
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In order to drive that point home, we have to reflect upon Quine’s arguments 
in support of the premise (4) in his argument for the non-factuality of analyticity. 
The first thing to bear in mind is that Quine assumes (for reasons to be explained 
shortly) that meanings are (abstract) objects. The relation of ‘meaning the same as’ 
is therefore a relation that holds or fails to hold between objects of a particular kind. 
The second thing to remember is how these considerations relate to Quine’s dictum 
‘no entity without identity’. Since meanings are objects, they have to be provided 
with suitable criteria of identity if they are to be accepted in his ontology. Also, since 
‘meaning the same as’ is a relation of identity, the attempt to explain satisfactorily 
this relation is crucial in two respects. Firstly, it is needed to make sense of the 
analyticity of statements such as ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ in view of the fact 
that the putative analyticity of this kind of statements depends on the synonymy of 
‘unmarried man’ and ‘bachelor’. Secondly, it is needed to render intelligible the very 
notion of meaning. Quine is therefore acutely aware that (2) amounts to a rejection 
of meaning, given the fact that it follows according to standards of his own.
In the light of these preliminary considerations, what would be a satisfying eluci­
dation of the notion of meaning for Quine? It must be recalled that Quine attacks 
meaning as it is needed for an appropriate notion of analyticity. In addition, we must 
bear in mind that such a notion derives its utility in its capacity to explain a priori 
knowledge. Indeed, this is recognised by Boghossian himself: ‘ “All bachelors are 
male” does seem to be (Frege-Analytic), and that fact does seem to have something 
important to do with that statement’s apriority’ (p. 339). To be sure, why else would 
we need a notion of analyticity if not to explain a priori knowledge? Arguably, this 
is the reason for its introduction in the history of philosophy. After it was recog­
nised that explaining a priori knowledge via intuition is a project doomed to failure, 
and after the linguistic turn made possible the introduction of a notion of analytic­
ity understood in terms of meaning, the project to explain the a priori was revived
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by, amongst others, the logical positivists.^® Another thing to bear in mind is that 
a suitable conception of meaning — one adequate for explaining the a priori — is 
the abstract, Platonist conception of meaning. We can see here two main strands in 
Quine’s thought working hand in hand, namely his anti-Platonism concerning mean­
ing and his anti-a priori outlook. The idea, roughly, is that if we somehow have access 
to an abstract realm of objects, the connection between these objects will be known 
a priori. Knowledge of meanings to access the realm of the a priori replaces intuition. 
Again, this is acknowledged by Boghossian: “Indeed, it seems to me that epistemic 
analyticity can be defended quite vigorously, especially against the background of a 
realism about meaning” (p. 358). Accordingly, Quine’s target is meaning understood 
in that sense. Let us recapitulate the exegetical points just made:
• Quine attacks meaning as it is needed for an appropriate notion of analyticity.
• Such a notion derives its utility to explain a priori knowledge.
• An abstract, Platonistic notion of meaning does the job.
• Accordingly, Quine’s criticism targets such a notion of meaning.
It is clear that if this is correct, Quine attacks only a particular conception of meaning, 
not the notion as such. This subsection and the next are devoted to defending this 
claim.
The key to understand Quine’s target in ‘Two Dogmas’ lies in his well-known 
dictum ‘no entity without identity’. Indeed, a satisfying elucidation of the Platonist 
notion of meaning must go through a specification of the identity condition for such 
objects. For Quine, not only is this a necessary condition for the acceptability of 
meanings; it is also sufficient (Quine, 1995a: 75-76). A careful reading of the crucial 
section 3 of ‘Two Dogmas’ reveals that this is exactly what Quine is after: a criterion
^®See Coffa (1991) for a fascinating historical account of these issues.
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of identity for meanings in terms of synonymy. A criterion of identity for meanings 
would have the form:
(C IM ) Vo:V/?((the meaning of a  =  the meaning of 5) ^  {a /?)),
where the Greek letters stand for names of expressions — say ‘a ’ for ‘ “bachelor” ’ 
and for ‘ “unmarried man” ’— and represents some equivalence relation. The 
essential point is that we can illuminate Quine’s remonstrance about meanings by 
reading him as saying that there is no satisfying equivalence relation on the right- 
hand side of (CIM) to derive from it a criterion of identity for meanings. These 
considerations are directly relevant to the second premise in Quine’s argument as 
explained above since (CIM) is in effect an attempt to explain what it is for two 
expressions to ‘mean the same’. The most promising instance of (CIM) for meanings 
is the version in which meaning is defined with the help of synonymy:
(C IM *) Vo;Vy0((the meaning of a  =  the meaning of P) ^  (a  is synon. with P))
It is plausible, and fruitful, to read section 3 of ‘Two Dogmas’ as criticising the 
viability of (CIM*) on the ground that the relation of synonymy on the right-hand 
side can’t do the job, i.e., individuate meanings in the appropriate manner.
1.5.4 Exegetical study: Part II
We saw that Quine’s views on meaning are best understood in connection with 
the identity principle. This principle affords a method for individuating objects (ab­
stract or concrete), thereby making such objects ‘acceptable’ in one’s ontology. Quine 
holds, under my interpretation, that there is no suitable identity principle for mean­
ing. Therefore, the view goes, meanings can’t be accepted in a properly regimented 
ontology. I take it that this is the crux of Quine’s remonstrance about meaning: 
we can’t make sense of meanings as (abstract) objects. This is what he establishes 
in ‘Two Dogmas’ and elsewhere. It is a compelling argument, as long as we don’t
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‘inflate’ it and read too much out of it. The argument establishes (convincingly, in 
my opinion) that Platonism about meaning is false. Platonism about meaning is the 
view, very roughly, that meanings are somehow ‘out there’ in the abstract world and 
that our words and sentences attach mysteriously to these abstract objects. What 
Quine shows is that meaning so construed is a myth: there is no such t h i n g . I n  
this sense, Quine is attacking a particular conception of meaning, not the notion as 
such. The only way we can take him to criticise the very concept of meaning is to 
say that for him, the notion of meaning is irreducibly tied to Platonism. A criticism 
of Platonism would therefore amount, implausibly, to a rejection of meaning. A par­
allel with the philosophy of mathematics might help to put these considerations in 
perspective. Those who argue against Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics 
do not necessarily wish to deny that the concept of number is a legitimate notion — 
in fact, I can’t think of one single philosopher who holds that view. W hat they reject 
is a particular conception of numbers, namely the view according to which numbers 
are abstract objects and that numerals refer to these objects.
It is true that Quine sometimes gives the impression that he wants to reject 
the very notion of meaning. His paper ‘The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics’, 
written a few months after ‘Two Dogmas’, is further evidence for that interpretation 
(1953b: 47-49) but it also contains what purports to be accounts of synonymy and 
of significance. It is plausible to hold that in that paper, Quine is trying to reduce 
the concept of meaning to an acceptable notion of synonymy and also to the less 
problematic linguistic notion of significance. Talk of ‘significance’ instead of ‘meaning’ 
is recommended by Quine (1948: 11; 1953b: 48-49) on the ground that the notion of 
significance does not have the ontological connotations associated with the notion of
^^Wittgenstein attacks the same conception in his Philosophical Investigations.
^°It should be clear that Quine has nothing against abstract objects per se: it is not because 
meanings as objects are abstract that he does not accept them in his ontology, but rather because 
there is no criterion of identity for them. He is happy to accept sets and other well-defined abstract 
objects.
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meaning.
W hat is perhaps misleading regarding Quine’s attitude towards meaning is his 
insistence that we have to ‘get rid’ of intensional notions in general, including meaning. 
For Quine, it seems that to criticise the view according to which meanings are abstract 
objects is to criticise the very notion of meaning. This way of seeing the matter can 
be justified through the thesis of the priority of s y n ta x ,s in c e  if talk of meaning 
does commit one to an ontology of meanings as abstract objects, and if, in addition, 
it can be conclusively shown — as Quine tries to do — that we can’t make sense 
of such objects, then there is every reason to jettison the notion in question. The 
problem here is, of course, that the assumptions under which the argument depends 
are controversial, especially the one having to do with the priority of syntax. There 
seems to be every reason to think that the notion of meaning can be interpreted in a 
non-Platonistic way.
1.5.5 Boghossian’s argument: The revenge
Equipped with this interpretation of Quine’s views, it appears at first blush that 
we have a convincing case against Boghossian’s attempted reductio. By restricting 
the scope of Quine’s argument, it is tempting to conclude that it leaves open the pos­
sibility of a non-Platonistic construal of meaning, and as such the Quinean argument 
displayed in (1) -  (5) would not be committed to meaning-scepticism. Unfortunately, 
things are not so simple since Boghossian draws a distinction between monadic and 
relational construals of meaning. A relational construal of meaning is one according 
to which any significant expression E bears a relation R to its meaning M. It is plain
^^The thesis of the priority of syntax is the thesis according to which the appropriate syntactic 
category of expressions somehow determines their ontological import. Take for instance singular 
terms: if it can be shown that an expression belongs (irreducibly) to the syntactical category of 
singular terms, this is taken as strong evidence that the singular term in question refers to an object, 
given that the term appears in true sentences. Talk of the meaning of such and such expressions and 
of having the same meaning as such and such expressions, and so forth, commits us to the existence 
of meanings according to this thesis.
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that such accounts of meaning would be unacceptable for a Quinean, since it involves 
talk of the meaning of given expressions, and such talk commits one to the ontology 
Quine is criticising. Any relational construal of meaning appeals to meanings as ob­
jects, since it depends on irreducible meaning-facts. Quine certainly does hold that 
we must avoid the notion of meaning so conceived, and in this sense he would regard 
Boghossian’s argument not as a reductio, but as a valid and true argument. That is 
to say, Quine would be happy with Boghossian’s conclusion, if all it involves is merely 
a rejection of meaning in this sense.
But Boghossian goes further and argues that his argument is stronger than that. 
According to Boghossian, the argument he offers against non-factualism about analyt­
icity will go through for any ‘monadic’, as well as relational, conception of meaning. 
This kind of construal of meaning has it that any meaningful expression E has a 
monadic property P which is central to the conception of meaning in question. For 
instance, in a behaviouristic conception, an expression E provokes the disposition D; 
the meaning of E is to be explained on the basis of that disposition. In a version of 
use-theoretic accounts of meaning, any meaningful expression E has a history of use 
H; this property H is used to explain the meaning of E. Other monadic conceptions 
follow the same pattern. A monadic conception of meaning is subjected to the re­
ductio since any such account requires appeal to facts of the matter, i.e., in order to 
explain the meaning of E we have to look at, for instance, the disposition assigned to 
it, which is, in principle, something determinate. It is because it is determinate — 
because there is a fact of the m atter as to what an expression E means — that it is 
subjected to the argument.
In sum, to resume the thread of the central argument, it would appear that 
Boghossian holds the view according to which an attack on the notion of analyt-
^^ ‘The question naturally arises whether this result is forthcoming only against the background 
of a relational construal of meaning. I think it’s quite clear that the answer is “no”’ (p. 343).
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icity through a criticism of the notion of meaning, either on a relational or monadic 
construal, is self-refuting. This argument of Boghossian is designed to show why 
Quine’s attack on analyticity leads inevitably to a total rejection of meaning. So it 
would seem to mean that it doesn’t matter i f — as I have done a few paragraphs back 
— we interpret Quine as merely jettisoning the Platonistic conception of meaning. If 
Boghossian is right, Quine is in effect jettisoning any conception of meaning without 
realising it.
1.5.6 Quinean defence completed
If this were the case, it would truly be disastrous for Quine. How can a philosopher 
reject any explanation of meaning? It is clear that some expressions have sense, mean 
something, are significant, etc. An argument to the effect that any explanation of 
that phenomenon is impossible requires much more than what we can extract from 
‘Two Dogmas’. The truth is that Quine would not object, on principled grounds, 
to a monadic construal of meaning. He would certainly be happy, for instance, with 
a use-theoretic account (Quine, 1981 ). To see that, let’s reflect on an important 
feature of monadic construals. They are, in effect, reductive accounts of meaning: 
they reduce meaning to something else, something that can, in the best cases, be 
readily and determinately identifiable. It is certainly in accordance with a Quinean 
spirit that reductive accounts are put forward. At the very least, such accounts are 
preferable to relational ones since they do not depend on a Platonistic conception of 
meaning.
In fact, Quine attempts such a reductive, monadic construal of meaning in Chapter 
two of Word and Object The notion of ‘meaning the same as’ is to be reduced to 
that of ‘stimulus-synonymy’ and, in general, the meaning of an expression is to be 
understood in terms of the concept ‘stimulus meaning’, which is cashed out in terms of 
assent and dissent (1960: Chap. 2). This is, roughly speaking, an account of meaning
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in terms of disposition: an expression’s meaning is reduced to the set of dispositions 
it is likely to provoke in any given speaker. It is in this sense that such an account 
is monadic, and not relational. If Boghossian is right, Quine is contradicting himself 
when putting forward this theory of stimulus meaning, since according to Boghossian, 
Quine is committed — on the basis of his criticism of analyticity — to reject any 
account of meaning.
Putting aside this alleged contradiction for a moment, let’s pause to reflect on 
the status of Quine’s theory of ‘meaning’. This theory fits nicely in Quine’s general 
ideas about the nature of philosophy and about ontology. Concerning the first, recall 
that for Quine, philosophy is a branch of empirical science.^® The notion of stimulus 
meaning is clearly one that is empirical: there are facts of the matter (as Boghossian 
would put it) as to whether an expression provokes this or that stimulus. Concerning 
Quine’s ontological preferences, it almost goes without saying that stimulus meaning 
is a notion that accords particularly well with his strong taste for a ‘purified’ ontol­
ogy, in which preference is to be given to objects somehow ‘sanctioned’ by empirical 
observations. In short, there is nothing distinctively troublesome in an ontology of 
stimuli since it is basically an observational notion: one can observe a stimulus.
Now, is Quine contradicting himself? Does his argument against analyticity as 
displayed in the first four sections of ‘Two Dogmas’ really commit him to reject 
any account of meaning, including the dispositional one outlined in Word and Ob­
ject? Boghossian’s argument seems, again, to trap Quine into a very uncomfortable 
dilemma: to avoid contradiction, it seems that he must either withdraw his criticism 
of analyticity or reject any account of meaning, be it relational or monadic. Both 
horns of the dilemma are non-options for Quine. As to the first, it is clear that his 
rejection of analyticity plays a pivotal role in his whole system, especially concerning 
epistemology and ontology, two central areas of his thought. The second is plainly
^^His paper ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ is the classic exposition of this thesis (1969a)
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absurd, as Boghossian points out (p. 342). To deny the possibility of any account of 
meaning seems analogous to denying any account of colours: it is undeniable that we 
see colours, and thus we are justified in asking for an explanation of that phenomenon. 
By the same token, since it is equally undeniable that expressions are meaningful, we 
are justified in asking for an explanation of that evident fact. It does not matter if, 
in the end, it turns out that there are no colours ‘out there’, or that there are, in 
the final analysis, no meanings in the world. What matters is an explanation of the 
phenomenon independently of the required ontology to explain it.
The dilemma, then, is fatal. But the truth is that Quine does not face it. His 
criticism of analyticity, as it stands and as I have interpreted it, is perfectly consistent 
with a monadic construal of meaning. It is true, however, that it is not consistent 
with a relational account of meaning, since such a construal requires an ontology of 
meanings. But Quine will be happy to reject relational accounts. If Quine is, as 
I argue, consistent, where does Boghossian’s argument go wrong? Or, to put the 
question differently, in which sense does Quine’s account of meaning not commit him 
to accepting the notion of analyticity? In order to get a grip on that crucial issue, it 
is necessary to step back a bit and reflect on the nature and target of ‘Two Dogmas’. 
Quine’s main target was the putative division between statements that are true by 
virtue of meaning alone and those that owe their truth, in addition to what they 
mean, to ‘facts’ (1951: 20). If there is such a division, it follows that there are truths 
that are somehow knowable a priori. These truths have a special status: they are 
not empirical. This supposedly non-empirical status is what Quine is determined, in 
the end, to vilify. His attack on analyticity is merely instrumental to achieving that 
goal. Logical positivists, most notably Carnap, ‘cashed out’ this a priori /  a posteriori 
distinction in terms of the analytic /  synthetic distinction (see Coffa 1991: 272-326). 
Therefore, in order to criticise the cleavage as understood by the logical positivists, 
Quine proceeds through a criticism of analyticity.
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The key point is that Quine attacks the notion of analyticity only insofar as it is 
characterised in such a way as to be able to make sense of a priori loiowledge. It is 
difficult to find an explicit admission of this in his own writings, but it locates the 
argument against analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ in a compelling perspective. Indeed, 
why would Quine be so keen to criticise the analytic /  synthetic distinction if not to 
show the illusion of a priori knowledge? W hat is the value of analyticity in itself, 
without regards to its explanatory power in relation to a priori knowledge? Analyt­
icity for analyticity’s sake is useless. It derives its utility when one is attempting to 
explain a priori knowledge — Boghossian himself admits that, as we have seen above. 
However, I grant that this interpretational standpoint has to be taken as a working 
assumption. On the plus side, this — plausible — assumption affords the interpreter 
of Quine’s philosophy with an enlightening viewpoint. In any case, even if it is hard 
to find an explicit quotation to the effect that Quine’s attack on analyticity is a means 
to destroy the foundations of a priori knowledge, this interpretation is consistent with 
his generally anti-a priori outlook.
This is crucial since even Quine is ready to acknowledge a notion of analyticity 
built from stimulus meaning. That notion of analyticity might be intelligible, but 
it won’t be able to provide a foundation to a priori knowledge. W hat such an ac­
count of analyticity does is merely to specify which sentences a speaker, or at best a 
set of speakers, assent to ‘come what may’ (to be understood as, perhaps clumsily, 
‘come what stimulation may’ (Quine, 1960: 66)). The notion of stimulus analyticity 
might be intelligible, but it is not discriminating enough: indeed, on this account 
of analyticity, the sentence ‘there have been black dogs’ will come out analytic for 
most speakers. But this Quinean construction of analyticity, admittedly, relies on a 
conflation of analyticity with necessity.
At this point one could raise the following objection:
Quine shoots him self in the foot when he puts forward his d ispositional account
64
of meaning. Indeed, the notion of stimulus-synonymy does provide us with a 
suitable right-hand side for (CIM). On this view, two expressions have the same 
meaning if and only if they produce the same pattern of assent and dissent. As 
such, ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ do have the same dispositional pattern 
and so they have the same stimulus-meaning. Therefore, the Quinean model 
provides us with a model for the analyticity of sentences such as ‘all bachelors 
are unmarried men’.
However, this objection betrays a misunderstanding of the scope of the notions of 
stimulus meaning and stimulus-synonymy. Stimulus meaning has to be relativised, 
at best, to a speaker and to a slice of time (the so-called ‘modulo’). It is hard to see 
how we can get a notion of meaning that is appropriate to explain a priori knowledge 
from such a limited notion. According to Quine, the closest we can get to a notion of 
analyticity (one not conflated with necessity) with stimulus meaning is an externalised 
notion:
In Roots of Reference (pp. 70-80) I suggested externalizing the criterion: a 
sentence is analytic if the native speaker learns to assent to it by learning one 
or more of its words. This accounts for such paradigms of analyticity as ‘No 
bachelor is married’, and also for the analyticity of many elementary logical 
truths. (. . . ) But the definition gives no clue to the demarcation between 
analytic and synthetic sentences that has exercised philosophers, out beyond 
where anyone either remembers or cares how he learned the pertinent words.
And it gives no clue, certainly, to a general concept of cognitive equivalence. 
(Quine, 1992: 55)
In a word, externalised analyticity has to be relativised to a speaker and to his 
learning of language. Granted, it is possible to ‘socialise’ this notion of externalised 
analyticity: a sentence is analytic for all members of a speaking community if it is
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externally analytic for each members. But the stimulus meaning associated with each 
speaker is different: the history of stimulations differs in each case. In any case, this 
notion of meaning certainly isn’t a ‘realist’ conception of the kind that Boghossian 
has in mind.
It seems to me, furthermore, that any empirical notion of meaning is bound to 
be unsatisfactory if intended to form the basis of an appropriate model of a priori 
knowledge of the sort intended by Boghossian. This is readily seen when we look at 
his own proposed model for our a priori entitlement to know logical laws. Taking ‘C’ 
as standing for an arbitrary logical constant and ‘A’ as its associated introduction 
and elimination rules, Boghossian (p. 357) suggests the following model:
1. If C means what it does, then A has to be valid, for C means whatever logical 
object in fact makes A valid.
2. C means what it does
3. A is valid
It is clear that this model relies on a strong realism about meaning and unclear 
how it could be otherwise.
Quine’s attack on analyticity, therefore, does not amount to a complete rejection 
of meaning, contrary to what Boghossian’s reductio implies. Quine’s argument does 
go through a criticism of the notion of meaning, understood strictly in its Platonistic 
sense, and this does not amount to a complete rejection of meaning. To put his 
point differently, he is arguing that those, like Carnap, who attem pt to provide a 
foundation for a priori knowledge by using the notion of analyticity must do so on the 
back of a Platonistic conception of meaning. He further maintains that if analyticity 
is explained in terms of that conception of meaning, it is unintelligible since there 
is no prospect of a clear individuation of meanings (as we have seen in connection 
with the identity principle). Therefore, he concludes, Carnap’s conception of the a
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priori collapses. Viewed in that light, Quine’s attack on analyticity does not and 
need not involve a complete rejection of meaning. To be sure, he would accept 
the following version of Boghossian’s argument, taking ‘FM*’ to mean ‘facts about 
meaning understood Platonistically’;
1. FM*1 —> FM*2 Intuitive Premise
2. ~FM*2 ~FM*1 ‘no entity without identity’
3. ~FM*2 No identity
4. ~FM*1 Therefore, no entity
But this clearly does not amount to a rejection of meaning as such.
To conclude, then, Boghossian’s attempted reductio against Quine’s argument 
ultimately fails. Quine’s argument does entail the unintelligibility of a relational 
conception of meaning, but it does not, crucially, entail the unintelligibility of a 
monadic conception, contrary to what Boghossian holds. There is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with monadic construals for Quine since they are basically attempts to reduce 
the troublesome notion of meaning to something else. Now it is possible, of course, 
that the reducing notion turns out to be as unintelligible as the reduced notion. But 
it needn’t be, whereas the central problem for any relational account is to devise a 
satisfactory criterion of individuation for one of the terms of the relation, namely the 
meaning M supposedly attached to an expression E.
1.6 C onclusion
The last three sections have been devoted to study and appraise counter-arguments 
directed to Quine’s Radical Irrealism about (logical) necessity. In section 1.3, we saw 
that Grice and Strawson’s claim that Quine’s demands on explanation are unreason­
able rests on a slight but pivotal misinterpretation of his views. Suitably interpreted.
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Quine is best seen as trying to dissolve a picture of meaning, the Platonist picture 
according to which meanings are objects. In that light, asking for a suitable criterion 
of individuation for such entities appears to be a perfectly reasonable demand on ex­
planation. How can we be taken to understand what a particular object is if we can’t 
identify that very object? This consideration is what allows Quine to maintain that 
meanings are obscure entities. The implicit idea in play here, namely tha t unintelligi­
bility follows from the lack of a clear explanation, is challenged by Grice and Strawson 
and examined in section 1.4. They argue that even if we lack a clear explanation for 
a given notion, it doesn’t automatically follow that the notion is unintelligible. I sug­
gested that a Quinean could accept Grice and Strawson’s criterion of intelligibility 
(non-collusive assent), but all that follows from the satisfaction of their criterion in 
the case of analyticity is that the speakers have a notion of analyticity, not necessarily 
the notion of analyticity that Quine is attacking. Grice and Strawson need to show 
that the notion of analyticity prompting non-collusive assent is relevant to Quine’s 
consideration. Boghossian follows another line of thought and argues that Quine’s 
argument for Radical Irrealism leads to an absurdity, i.e., meaning-scepticism. Again, 
I have defended Quine on the basis of considerations similar to those of section 1.3.
The main upshot of this Chapter can be summed up in two points. The first 
concerns the dialectic of Quine’s attack. We can conclude from our study of the first 
part of ‘Two Dogmas’ that his charge on analyticity goes through a criticism of the 
Platonistic conception of meaning, and not through a rejection of the very idea of 
meaningfulness. This point can easily be overlooked, partly due, no doubt, to Quine 
himself. The second point concerns the main target of his argument. The attack 
on analyticity is meant, in ‘Two Dogmas’, to be against the a priori /  a posteriori 
distinction. Carnap and others attempted to ground a priori knowledge on analyticity. 
Therefore, if what Quine is after is a rejection of the a priori, his criticism must go 
through a rejection of analyticity, in so far as it construed in such a way as to ground
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a priori knowledge. This is exactly what he does, and in order to do so all he needs 
to show is that the Platonistic conception of meaning presupposes an unintelligible 
notion of meaning.
His argument, properly interpreted, is not directed against the notion of meaning 
as such. As I mentioned before, the key for a correct appreciation of Quine’s argu­
ment is to resist the temptation to inflate it. This is the mistake made by Grice & 
Strawson as well as by Boghossian. They took his argument to be, or to imply, the 
rejection of the notion of meaningfulness. They did not stress sufficiently that Quine 
wanted to shake the foundations of logical positivism. The result of overlooking these 
considerations leads one almost inevitably to inflate his argument.
C H A P T E R  2
E R R O R -T H E O R E T IC  IR R EA L ISM : E P IST E M O L O G Y
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2.1 In trod uction
As explained in the Introduction, Irrealism comes in two versions: Radical Irreal­
ism and Error-theoretic Irrealism. Quine’s argument in the first four sections of ‘Two 
Dogmas’ has often been interpreted as having to do with the intelligibility of a cluster 
of notions, and that is the reason why I called it Radical Irrealism. It is in effect a 
very bold claim to hold that a prima facie intelligible notion is in fact meaningless. 
We have seen in Chapter 1 that it is not clear whether Quine really advocates Radical 
Irrealism in ‘Two Dogmas’. We saw that properly interpreted, and notwithstanding 
some of Quine’s remarks to the contrary, the argument’s target is not the notion of 
necessity qua notion, but rather a particular understanding of it — namely, its Pla­
tonistic interpretation. Since I find Quine’s argument, so construed, compelling, it 
follows that I hold that a correct account of logical necessity must avoid Platonism. 
We have thus identified the first constraint for a correct account of logical necessity. 
This is a good example of the kind of positive result that can be achieved through a 
critical study of scepticism.
An Error-theoretic stance, by contrast, acknowledges that the concepts under 
discussion are meaningful. A sentence containing, say, the modal operator of necessity 
does make sense, that is, it makes a meaningful attempt to represent the world. The 
error-theorist will not challenge this. However, she holds that sentences containing 
modal operators are systematically false since nothing in the world instantiates the 
alethic modalities. Tennant offers the following characterisation of error-theory:
(e)rror theoretic irrealism accepts the superficial syntactic appearances of our 
declarative sentences at face value, allows that our prim itive assertions aim at 
the truth, but m aintains that these assertions always miss their target. They  
are false. We can make sense o f the way they represent the world as being; it is 
just that they misrepresent the world. T hey make an intelligible attem pt to tell
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it like it is, but they get it wrong. They picture the world as being thus-and-so, 
but the world is not that way at all. (Tennant, 1997: 68).
An error-theorist about logical necessity, for instance, will hold that ascriptions 
of necessity are meaningful and truth-apt but that there simply is nothing which is 
logically necessary. Quine, it appears, can be interpreted as an error-theorist in that 
sense. W hat he does in the later sections of ‘Two Dogmas’, basically, is to offer a 
theory of knowledge doing without a specific modal notion, namely logical necessity. 
He does not, as is the case with other error-theorists, attempt to explain why the 
world does not instantiate that modal property.^ He goes straight to offer a picture 
of the world and of our cognitive relation to it that has no need for logical necessity. 
At this point, someone could suggest that Quine is not really an error-theorist about 
logical necessity. The argument runs as follows. It would be consistent with Quine’s 
philosophy that there are logical necessities. I t ’s just that there is an account of the 
world doing without them. In other words, the argument goes, Quine does not have 
an answer to the question ‘are there any logical necessities?’ What he has are theories 
that do not, he claims, need them.
However, I think it is clear that Quine is a full-blown error-theorist in the sense 
that he does not believe in the appropriateness of logical necessities. Showing the 
superfluousness of a modal notion amounts, for Quine, to an ontological argument 
showing that nothing instantiates that modal property since ontological questions are 
settled by a theory’s ontological commitments. Given that he offers a theory purged 
of logical necessities and Eussuming this theory to be elegant, explanatory, etc, it 
follows for him that there is no reason to believe in the existence of logical necessities.
^For instance, Blackburn in his ‘Morals and Medals’ (1986), who advocates a so-called ‘expres- 
sivist’ theory of logical necessity, which is also a manifestation of error-theoretic irrealism since it 
starts from the view that nothing in the world instantiates modal properties such as necessity. But 
it differs from Quine’s approach in that it tries to explain and to justify our use of modal notions in 
such a way as to make it compatible with error-theory — Quine in contrast suggests that we should 
abandon the use of alethic modalities altogether.
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Conversely, if it shown that an appropriate theory has to appeal to logical necessity, 
room has to be made for an account of alethic modalities and their place in our 
conceptual scheme.
There are two main ideas in Quine’s philosophy eliciting Error-theoretic Irrealism. 
Firstly, there is his epistemological theory. Holism, he holds, has no need for a realm of 
a priori knowledge and as a result there is no role in this picture for modal notions such 
as necessity. Secondly, there is Quine’s philosophy of logic, in particular his account 
of logical truth and logical consequence. He advocates a substitutional account of 
logical tru th  in which, he maintains, no use of intensional notions such as necessity or 
analyticity are in play. Both theories are manifestations of Error-theoretic Irrealism 
about logical necessity. It is the aim of this Chapter as well as the following two to 
show that Quine is wrong in holding that holism and the substitutional account of 
logical truth are free of logical necessity. More precisely, I want to defend the idea that 
although there are genuine insights associated with holism and Quine’s philosophy 
of logic, it is a mistake to hold that these important and illuminating philosophical 
ideas give rise to Error-theoretic Irrealism.
We’ll proceed as follows. The next section studies the relation between the two 
dogmas and the link between them and holism. Section 2.3 is devoted to expose 
Quine’s holistic picture of knowledge as sketched in sections 5 and 6 of ‘Two Dogmas’. 
Section 2.4 attempts to locate logical laws in Quine’s holism, and identifies a problem 
with this. The next section addresses this problem via Lewis Carroll’s regress. It 
then becomes clear that the problem outreaches the bound of Quine’s philosophy and 
raises a pressing question that has to be answered no matter what your philosophy of 
logic is. Accordingly, various solutions and lines of research are studied. In the end, I 
settle on a Davidsonian solution. In the last section, I examine Shapiro’s claim that 
Quine’s epistemological holism requires that some statements are fundamentally a 
priori in the web of belief, in particular the question whether a Quinean could accept
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that a minimal set of principles be understood as being a priori. This Chapter sets the 
ground for the next, in which Wright’s argument against Quine’s holism is analysed.
2.2 T he tw o dogm as and holism
In this section, I want to clear the ground and clarify some important ideas by 
contrasting them with one another. Here are the pairs that will be put under scrutiny;
• The relation between the two dogmas.
• The relation between holism and the two dogmas.
• The relation between the first dogma and Error-theoretic Irrealism.
• The relation between holism and logical necessity.
Disentangling these ideas proves to be helpful in understanding how, in particular, 
the abandonment of the two dogmas relates to Quine’s philosophy of logic. Firstly, 
though, a word on the second dogma is in order. In section 5 of ‘Two Dogmas’, 
Quine attacks the idea that the meaning of a statement is determined by specifying 
its method of verification. This theory is in effect a reductionist theory of meaning, 
reducing the meaning of an expression to either an expression about immediate ex­
perience (radical reductionism) or to an expression about confirmation or refutation 
(attenuated reductionism). Quine offers an argument to refute radical reductionism; 
but concerning the attenuated form of reductionism he offers instead a theory (holism) 
which does not entail it. Now that we have a ‘working idea’ of the second dogma, 
we are ready to examine the conceptual relations between the notions mentioned 
previously.
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2.2.1 The relation between the two dogmas
The two dogmas attacked by Quine in his paper are, respectively, the analytic 
/  synthetic distinction (first four sections) and the verificationist theory of meaning 
(fifth section). How should we understand the relation between the two dogmas? 
Quine says that the two dogmas are “at root identical” (1951: 41). W hat does he 
mean by that? They appear, on the face of it, to be independent. But he goes on to 
explain that if a statement acquires meaning by relation to its method of verification 
(second dogma), then it is a small step to regard some statements as verified no matter 
what — and these are the analytic /  necessary statements (first dogma) (1951: 41). 
The reasoning here is, presumably, that to hold that it makes sense to speak of 
all meaningful statements being somehow reducible in principle to statements which 
are empirically verifiable renders plausible the idea of a class of statements which 
are always verified — the necessary statements. Notice moreover, as pointed out in 
Chapter 1, that Quine clearly conflates the analytic /  synthetic distinction with the 
necessary /  contingent one — for him these dogmas are in effect one and the same 
dogma. Since he also argues, as we have just seen, that the dogma of the analytic 
/  synthetic distinction is identical to the dogma of verificationism, we have it by 
association that for Quine, the dogma of the necessary /  contingent distinction is 
identical to the dogma of verificationism.
But there are problems with these associations. Firstly, verificationism is com­
patible with the view that there are no statements verified no m atter what — no 
necessary statements in Quine’s sense. That is, it is not clear that espousing verifica­
tionism commits one to believe in a set of necessary statements so that the dogma of 
verificationism entails the dogma of the necessary /  contingent distinction. Indeed, 
it could be the case, for all we know, that all meaningful statements must be capable 
of verification to be meaningful, but that there are no statements somehow always 
verified. On the face of it, verificationism is compatible with the view that there are
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no ‘necessary’ statements, only contingent ones. W hat verificationism allows is the 
mere conceptual possibility of necessary statements, not their existence. Again, if we 
keep in mind that Quine’s target is Carnap, the assumption that verificationism and 
acceptance of necessary statements go hand in hand is understandable — but it is an 
assumption. It requires a further argument to show that verificationism entails the 
existence of such statements.
Secondly, one can easily grant the possibility of statements verified no matter 
what, but resist the claim that such statements are analytic. It is not clear whether 
acceptance of the existence of statements verified no matter what entails a commit­
ment to the analytic /  synthetic distinction. The wanted conceptual connection here 
between ‘verified no matter what’ and analyticity is missing. It takes a special theory, 
such as logical positivism, to spell it out.^ For instance, it seems to be a coherent view 
that ‘Water =  H2 O’ is necessary without being analytic. So it is far from being a tru­
ism that endorsing the necessary /  contingent commits one to endorse the analytic /  
synthetic distinction. The issue is complicated due to the fact that Quine confiâtes the 
analytic/ synthetic distinction with the necessary /  contingent one. Quine’s ‘small 
step’ from reductionism to analyticity is in effect tantamount to a fully developed 
logical positivist philosophy.
Moreover, there is no reason to maintain that the identity between the dogma 
of the analytic /  synthetic distinction and the dogma of verificationism holds. To 
accept the analytic /  synthetic distinction is certainly not to accept ipso facto the 
verificationist theory of meaning. If that were the case, it would be disastrous for the 
contemporary believers in analyticity, such as, for instance, Boghossian. Virtually 
no one today subscribes to the verificationist theory of meaning — we can safely say 
that it is a rare instance of a falsified philosophical theory.
^That is, logical positivism à la Carnap associates analyticity with necessity in a theoretical 
framework, thus explaining and defending the connection between the two concepts.
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To sum up, we have seen that Quine holds that the three dogmas are identical. 
But we have just seen that it is possible that:
1. the dogma of verificationism does not entail the dogma of the necessary /  con­
tingent distinction
2. the dogma of the necessary /  contingent distinction does not entail the dogma 
of the analytic /  synthetic distinction
3. the dogma of the analytic /  synthetic distinction does not entail the dogma of 
verificationism.
The truth of any of the three above renders false the claim that the three dogmas are 
identical. In the end, therefore, the two dogmas (strictly speaking, the three dogmas) 
are clearly not identical despite their close relationship.
2.2.2 The relation between holism and the two dogmas
It is in the fifth and sixth sections of ‘Two Dogmas’ that Quine puts forward a 
picture of our cognitive relation to the world allegedly purged of the notions of ana­
lyticity, necessity, and aprioriticity. These sections articulate a view of knowledge — 
holism — in which use of these intensional notions is supposedly superfluous.^ Quine 
thus holds a holistic theory of knowledge that does without the dogmas. However, 
let us not forget that holism does not imply, taken by itself and independently of the 
rest of Quine’s paper, the unintelligibility of intensional notions. It is in effect clearly 
possible to advocate holism and to acknowledge the intelligibility of analyticity and 
necessity. The holism would be a local holism, with some statements being held true 
come what may (most likely statements of logical consequence and some basic logical
shall have more to say on holism in the next section. For the moment, however, let’s notice 
that the focus in this Chapter will be on epistemological holism rather than meaning holism.
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laws). Quine, of course, advocates a full-blown holism. But it is important to keep 
in mind that holism can come in degrees.
The opening sections of Quine’s paper are mainly concerned to show the unintelli­
gibility of (an understanding of) the notions of analyticity and necessity, whereas his 
paper as a whole consists essentially of two arguments: criticism of the two dogmas 
and defence of holism. How are we to understand the relation between the two main 
arguments? It is certainly not a mere coincidence that holism is advocated right after 
the criticism of the two dogmas. There are two options to consider:
1. Holism ‘follows’ from the abandonment of the two dogmas.
2. The two main arguments are independent.
Interpretation (1) makes too strong a connection between the two arguments. We 
have to keep in mind that Quine is attacking a version of Platonism for necessity, 
meaning, and analyticity (first dogma) and an untenable view about meaning (the 
verificationist conception of meaning). It is hard to see how holism could follow from 
the abandonment of these two highly controversial theories. There is plenty of theo­
rising space for a non-holistic view of knowledge that does without both Platonism 
and the verificationist theory of meaning. At the very least, it would require an ad­
ditional argument to show that holism is the logical outcome of the critical parts of 
‘Two Dogmas’. Interpretation (2) thus has more plausibility. However, to hold that 
the two main arguments of ‘Two Dogmas’ are logically independent need not suggest 
that they are unrelated. Quine’s main target in sections 1-4 of his paper is, as we 
have seen, a priori knowledge. He claims that the notion of meaning inherent in, for 
instance, Carnap’s conception of the a priori can’t do its explanatory job. Instead of 
trying to redefine a priori knowledge on the basis of concepts other than meaning and 
analyticity — as he could conceivably have done — Quine puts forward a view of our 
cognitive relation to the world (holism) which does not make appeal to this kind of
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knowledge. So the two arguments are related: the critique of a priori knowledge can 
be seen as somehow provoking holism without, strictly speaking, entailing it.
If the two arguments are independent in the sense just explained, it follows that 
Error-theoretic Irrealism and Radical Irrealism are also logically independent. On 
this understanding — the one I will adopt here — Error-theoretic Irrealism does 
not, by itself, imply any thesis about the intelligibility of logical necessity. The 
alternative reading (1) would be possible only if Quine was arguing, in sections 1- 
4 of ‘Two Dogmas’, that the notions of analyticity, necessity, and meaning are by 
themselves unintelligible. If he had shown this, then it could be said that in a sense, 
holism follows from the critique of analyticity. Let me explain. The correctness of 
an attack on the very intelligibility of analyticity would show the deep need for a 
picture of knowledge doing without this notion. It could be the case that a picture 
of knowledge purged of analyticity other than holism is appropriate — but at the 
very least Quine’s criticism of the two dogmas, so interpreted, would directly prompt 
a picture of knowledge entailing Error-theoretic Irrealism. We have seen however 
that this is not what Quine does. His main concern in the first four sections of 
‘Two Dogmas’ is to criticise a particular interpretation of this family of concepts, 
not their very intelligibility. As such, this criticism leaves conceptual space for an 
epistemological theory using another interpretation of the concepts involved in the 
criticism (meaning, analyticity, necessity). This explains why, in the end, the two 
main parts of Quine’s classic paper are independent. The key point is to remember 
that Quine’s attack precludes only a picture of knowledge which makes crucial use of 
the notion of the a priori cashed out in terms of meaning and analyticity. Whether 
Quine would accept an alternative view using a differently constructed notion of a 
priori knowledge is another story, which will be discussed in section 2.6.
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2.2.3 The relation between the first dogma and Error-theoretic
Irrealism
In a key passage, Quine tells us that if we drop the analytic /  synthetic distinc­
tion, there will be no principled distinction between contingent statements and those 
that are true ‘come what may’ (1951: 43). This passage appears to contradict the 
claim I made in the previous paragraph, in that it states the inevitability of a picture 
of knowledge doing without necessity. Two comments on this. First, Quine is here 
making an inferential step which he does not justify — he has not shown to us that 
the analytic /  synthetic distinction as such is meaningless, only that a particular un­
derstanding of it is. It can hardly be said — without further explanations — that to 
abandon the Platonistic construal of analyticity entails the annihilation of the neces­
sary /  contingent distinction. Second, it is controversial whether the abandonment of 
the analytic /  synthetic distinction as such (that is, independently of its construal) 
leads directly to the abolition of a principled distinction between contingent and nec­
essary statements. It is often said, for instance, that the fact that water is composed 
of H2O is a necessary one, but ‘water is H2O’ is certainly not an analytic statement — 
rather it is an empirical ‘fact’ that water is constituted of this particular combination 
of molecules.'^ It is therefore a possibility to drop the analytic /  synthetic distinction 
without abandoning the necessary /  contingent distinction. Despite what Quine says, 
Err or-theoretic Irrealism of the kind under investigation in this thesis clearly is not, 
in a strict sense, a consequence of the critique of analyticity.
2.2.4 The relation between holism and logical necessity
Now that we have explained the relation between Error-theory (holism being a 
version of it) and the two dogmas, we now turn to another important relation, namely
'^ See for instance Kiipke (1971: 122-123, footnote 63) and Putnam (1983) for a discussion of the 
relation between necessity and analyticity along these lines.
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the relation between holism and logical necessity. Although we will discuss the content 
of Quine’s holism in the next section, we shall now be interested in the conceptual 
relation between it and logical necessity. We know that holism supposedly ‘does 
without logical necessity’ — this is why it is a form of scepticism. In exactly which 
sense, however, is this locution to be understood? That is, in which sense does holism 
imply Error-theoretic Irrealism about logical necessity? This is a different question 
from the previous one: we just saw how holism and Radical Irrealism are independent, 
and now we’re asking what connects holism to Error-theoretic Irrealism. Holism — 
in its extreme, radical form as exposed in section 6 of ‘Two Dogmas’ — is compatible 
with both Radical and Error-theoretic Irrealism. Quine himself is an epistemological 
holist who advocates a brand of Radical Irrealism and Error-theory about logical 
necessity. To be more precise, the radical form of holism implies Error-theory, but 
does not imply Radical Irrealism, even though they are both compatible with holism.
Quine begins with the assumption that there is no principled distinction between 
contingent statements and necessary ones (we just saw that he has not shown this to 
be the case, but this is another story). This starting point is in effect a manifestation 
of Error-theoretic Irrealism, and holism is Quine’s way of explaining knowledge whilst 
espousing Error-theoretic Irrealism. It is important to remember that Quine starts 
with a strong prejudice against intensional notions. For him, the more we can do 
without them, the better.^ In a sense which will be explained in the next section, 
holism, Quine holds, has no need for the notion of necessity. Holism is therefore a 
natural, if not logical, product of the abandonment of the contingent /  necessary 
distinction — independently of how we are to understand these notions.
In effect, if there is to be no principled distinction between statements such as
^Quine’s dislike of intensional notions is scattered throughout his writings. See in particular 
(1960: Chapter 6 (‘Flight from Intension’); 1995a: Chapter 8). To get a sense of how important the 
principle of extcnsionality is for Quine, see (1953c: 160-161). As early as in his (1941: 16-17), ho 
expressed criticisms of modal notions and of breach of extcnsionality.
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‘the cat is on the m at’ and statements representing a logical derivation, it follows 
that there is no justification for asserting statements such as D(r 1-/, 0). Even a log­
ical derivation — a proof — cannot be ascribed necessity since nothing distinguishes 
it from a contingent statement. It is at this point that holism becomes an attractive 
option. There might be alternative pictures of knowledge entailing Error-theoretic 
Irrealism. But holism clearly is a natural candidate. Quine needs a picture of knowl­
edge in which there is no role for the notions of necessity and analyticity, and holism 
provides just that, together with an empiricist flavour. I think the way to understand 
why holism is so congenial to Quine is a mixture of these two ingredients: repudiation 
of the existence between necessary and contingent statements together with a taste 
for empiricism.
2.3 Q uine’s holistic  p icture o f know ledge
Now that we have a clear view of the place of holism in Quine’s philosophy and 
its relation both to Error-theoretic Irrealism and to the criticism of the two dogmas, 
it is time to examine in what exactly holism amounts to. In ‘Two Dogmas’ Quine 
writes:
The totality  of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the m ost casual m atters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atom ic physics or even of 
pure m athem atics and logic, is a m an-m ade fabric which im pinges on experience 
only along the edges. (Quine, 1951: 42)
The first impression given by this passage is that Quine is here talking about epis­
temological holism, in contrast to meaning holism. The distinction between these 
two kinds of holism is not clear-cut; indeed, they seem very closely related. In a 
nutshell, however, meaning holism is a view explaining how words and sentences get 
their meaning. Meaning holism is the view that understanding a sentence requires
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understanding a chunk of language. How large this ‘chunk’ is will be variable. For 
some holist philosophers, the understanding of a concept requires the understanding 
of the whole language. For others, it requires only understanding of the chunk of lan­
guage related to the concepts involved. By contrast, epistemological holism is a view 
about how our language relates to the world. It is also an attem pt to explain how 
words get their meaning, but the emphasis this time is on the way language interacts 
with the world and how the world has an impact upon the meaning assigned to the 
expressions of the language. To put it simply, meaning holism is a view about how 
words get their meaning; epistemological holism goes beyond that and asks what is 
the relation between language and the world. The answer provided by epistemological 
holism is that our language faces the world as a corporate body. When one is talking 
about meaning holism, one is more concerned about the relation between expressions 
than in the relation between language as a whole and the world. In ‘Two Dogmas’, 
as we shall see, the focus is on epistemological holism. In what follows, this is what 
we shall understand by ‘holism’.
Let us now return to the quotation above. It reveals two important features of 
holism: one, that knowledge is the product of mankind, and second, that holism 
à la Quine is of an empiricist sort. I think the first feature is to be taken in a 
strong sense: Quine wants to convey the idea that what is true has nothing to do 
with ‘correspondence’, but rather solely with explanatory value. This is what makes 
Quine a pragmatist, although he espouses a very different pragmatism than the one 
advocated by the logical positivists. He is also, of course, an empiricist, to the extent 
that for him, all statements bear a relation to experience. It might be illuminating to 
contrast Quine with Carnap at this point. Carnap is also an empiricist to the extent 
that he considers as being meaningful exclusively statements which are somehow 
reducible in principle to directly verifiable statements. But statements about logic 
and mathematics, not verifiable according to Carnap, are necessary and analytic,
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outside the realm of the empirical. Quine does not make such a distinction — his 
empiricism, as well as his pragmatism, differs from Carnap in important respects. For 
Quine, contrary to Carnap, there are no statements ‘outside the realm of experience’. 
Admittedly, logic and mathematics are not along the edges of the man-made fabric, so 
their relation to experience is remote. But nevertheless they are, in the end, hostage 
to experience in the sense that for Quine, the web of belief is an instrument used 
to predict experience — or, to talk more precisely, to predict observation sentences. 
Logic and mathematics owe their ‘tru th ’ to their usefulness in predicting observation 
sentences and organising them into a coherent whole. We thus see how Quine’s 
pragmatism and empiricism are closely related.
It is also important to bear in mind that the point just made, namely that all 
statements bear a relation to experience for Quine, is not to be confused with the 
idea that each individual statement has an individual, isolated empirical content. To 
say this would be to recoil into the verificationist theory of meaning. One of the key 
theses of holism is precisely that “(t)he unit of empirical significance is the whole 
of science” (Quine, 1951: 42) and that “our statements about the external world 
face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” 
(Quine, 1951: 41). This is a straightforward consequence of the abandonment of the 
second dogma. If one is to maintain empiricism whilst denying that each individual 
statement has an empirical content, the natural option is to hold that we must rather 
speak of ‘chunks’ of statements having an empirical content: that seems the only way 
to retain the empiricist insight that experience has a crucial impact on the content of 
our beliefs without embracing the verificationist theory of meaning. To come back to 
the relation between holism and the two dogmas examined in the previous section, it 
appears that a particular aspect of holism — that statements face experience en bloc 
— is somehow entailed by the rejection of the second dogma if we add empiricism as 
a premise.
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But how, precisely, does experience ‘impinge’ on the set of our beliefs? It becomes 
useful at this point to evoke the picture of the web of belief, even if this particular 
metaphor does not surface in ‘Two Dogmas’. In this picture, statements are nodes 
in the web, and they are connected together via their logical interconnections. State­
ments situated near the periphery are more directly related to experience; statements 
near the centre of the web are less related to experience. A statement such as ‘this 
shirt is blue’, for instance, will be peripheral compared to ‘2 -1- 2 =  4’. The fact that 
‘this shirt is blue’ is situated at the periphery of the web merely means that its truth- 
value is more likely to be changed in the face of a recalcitrant experience than ‘2 -H 
2 =  4’ is. Faced with an experience that contradicts ‘this shirt is blue’, we are much 
more likely to change the truth-value of this particular statement than statements 
which are connected to it but are situated at the centre of the web. This is because 
we tend to modify our beliefs in a conservative manner: changing the truth-value of 
a peripheral statement will not disturbingly affect the rest of the web, contrary to 
what happens if we change the truth-value of, say, arithmetical or logical statements. 
To sum up, the difference between an observation sentence and a logical tru th  is one 
of degree, not of kind. According to Quine, the belief in the necessary /  contingent 
distinction is the product of elevating statements situated at the centre of the web 
— as empirical and contingent as the others — to a special status, thus bestowing 
them a privileged standing. This unwarranted elevation of such statements is to be 
explained by a conflation of psychological certainty with necessity: an unjustified 
flight towards intension.
We have to keep in mind that when faced with a recalcitrant experience, what 
is contradicted is not merely ‘this shirt is blue’ or any other individual statement, 
but all the statements logically connected to it — despite the fact that a recalcitrant 
experience sometimes seems to contradict only one statement (the observation sen­
tence). It explains the possibility, in Quine’s picture, of a change in the truth-value
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of any statement, including those at the centre: it is possible, in the first instance, 
because these latter statements are logically interconnected with those at the pe­
riphery and, secondly, because they confront experience together with the peripheral 
ones as a whole. This is the important lesson to draw from the abandonment of the 
verificationist theory of meaning. For Quine, it doesn’t make sense to talk about the 
empirical content of a statement in isolation from other statements.
Under the Quinean picture, what happens in the face of a recalcitrant experience 
is this. The recalcitrant experience contradicts a set of statements that are true 
according to some theory T. It is a set since statements, remember, face the tribunal 
of experience as a corporate body. In ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine writes as if it were 
the whole web of belief that confronts experience at any time. In later writings,® 
Quine espouses a less radical holism (called ‘moderate holism’) — it makes more 
sense to say that it is a set of sentences, rather than the whole web, that confronts a 
given recalcitrant experience (or any experience, for that matter). For our purposes, 
however, this distinction does not matter: all we need is the idea of a set of statements 
confronting experience. A recalcitrant experience is an experience that, by definition, 
does not ‘fit’ a particular set of sentences.^ In order to accommodate that experience, 
changes must be made. That means that there ought to be a redistribution of the 
truth-values of some sentences in the relevant set. For example, one might decide to 
change the truth-value of an instance of ‘this shirt is blue’, or of ‘this is the same 
object as I saw two minutes ago’ in order to accommodate a particular experience 
conflicting with a set of sentences: let’s say that this recalcitrant experience consists in 
one seeing what seems to be the same shirt but in a difl'erent colour. One will naturally 
be reluctant to abandon the law of non-contradiction, such that the shirt could be
®See for instance Quine (1995a: Chapter IV). For further discussion on moderate holism and 
Quine, see Hookway (1988: Chapter 2).
^Tliis picture of what happens when facing a recalcitrant experience will be refined and discussed 
at length in the next Chapter.
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said to be both blue and not blue and thus ‘save the phenomenon’. Abandoning the 
law of non-contradiction would in effect occasion a radical re-evaluation of truth-value 
assignments. According to Quine, it is a matter of conservativeness and simplicity 
that guides us through the redistribution. We are more likely to change the truth- 
value of observation sentences than to change the truth-value of the law of non­
contradiction simply because the former alternative occasions less disturbance inside 
the web.
Quine’s pragmatism is thus of a more extreme kind than Carnap’s; not only is 
the choice of a conceptual scheme (a logic) a matter of choice guided by pragmati­
cal considerations such as simplicity and conservativeness (as in Carnap), but so is, 
ultimately, the truth-value of all statements inside the web — including observation 
sentences. Carnap, for instance, holds that the choice of a logic is a matter of choos­
ing a particular conceptual scheme. For Carnap, choosing a conceptual scheme is an 
external question, and as such it is not an empirical question.® This explains why, 
for Carnap, the reasons for adopting a particular conceptual scheme are pragmatic 
reasons, not empirical ones. Once a conceptual scheme is chosen, experience has no 
import whatsoever on the truth or falsity of logical and mathematical statements 
since they are on this picture analytic and necessary. Internal questions, however, 
are empirical and there is simply no pragmatism involved in deciding their truth or 
falsity. The choice of a conceptual scheme brings with it a set of necessary and an­
alytic truths, and the problem of identifying the necessary statements is reduced to 
the problem of reading off the conceptual scheme and identifying which statements 
are necessary in that conceptual scheme. In Quine’s system, on the contrary, there 
simply is no place for necessary statements — all statements relate to experience and
®See Carnap (1957) on this particular point. For a good discussion of Carnap’s internal /  external 
distinction with regard to scepticism, see Stroud (1984, Chapters 4 and 5). For Carnap, the question 
‘are there logically necessary statements?’ is meaningless qua philosophical question, that is, qua 
external question.
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it is pragmatic considerations that guide us not only in the choice of a conceptual 
scheme but in the choice of the statements all over the web. As Hookway (1988: 50) 
put it: “The closing sections of both ‘Two dogmas’ and ‘On what there is’ are full 
endorsements of pragmatism: Carnap’s pragmatic considerations become relevant to 
all questions once the contrast between external and internal is abandoned” . ®
This is a strong, compelling metaphor for how knowledge is acquired and modified, 
one that has of course proved influential. The crucial question for us is: what is the 
status of statements of validity in this picture? That is, what is the status of a 
statement representing a logical proof in the form (T hi, 0 ) as explained in the 
Introduction? A non-sceptic wants to say that such statements are logically necessary. 
But Quine holds, as we have seen above, that there are no true logically necessary 
statements. However, there are for Quine true simpliciter statements of the form 
(r \ ~ i 0), statements to which a non-sceptic would typically be inclined to ascribe 
necessity — to assert their validity in a strong sense. That is, according Quine there is 
no true statement of the form 0(T  0 ), but there are true, ‘unboxed’ statements of
the form (T l-£, 0 ). For instance, even for Quine it is true that if one starts with such 
and such axioms and rules of inferences, such and such theorem follows. What are 
the place and the role of such statements in the web of belief? We shall be concerned 
with this question in the remaining of this Chapter.^® Let us analyse this crucial 
passage to begin with:
®One can view the situation historically like this. Carnap denied the Kantian idea of synthetic a 
priori knowledge: for Carnap, there is only analytic a priori knowledge. Kant was trying to delineate 
a broad field for a priori theorising, thus vindicating a whole area of philosophical research. Carnap 
restricted the sphere of philosophy to analytic propositions. Quine goes even further and eliminates 
the frontier of a priori knowledge by deconstructing the very concept of an analytic /  synthetic 
distinction. By doing so, Quine can be seen in a sense as leaving no area for specifically philosophical 
theorising. This is coherent with his idea of a naturalized epistemology, in which philosophy is but 
a branch of cognitive science. The present investigation can be regarded as a small but crucial step 
in claiming back the specificity of philosophical research.
^°The next Chapter analyses a related argument by Wright showing that such statements must 
have a special status for one who endorses holism, whereas here we are interested to locate these 
statements in the web.
Réévaluation of som e statem ents entails réévaluation of others, because of their 
logical interconnections —  the logical laws being in turn sim ply certain fur­
ther statem ents of the system , certain further elem ents in the field. Having 
reevaluated one statem ent we m ust reevaluate some others, which m ay be state­
m ents logically connected w ith the first or m ay be the statem ents of logical 
connections themselves. (Quine, 1951: 42)
We can almost see here Quine’s struggle to come to term with the status of the logical 
connections in the web of belief. We can be certain of one thing: for Quine, the 
logical laws are statements in the web, and as such they have the same status as, say, 
observation sentences. The only feature distinguishing logical laws from observation 
sentences is their position in the web: the former are located in the centre, and the 
latter are located at the periphery. This, at least, is the most plausible interpretation 
of what Quine is trying to explain in the quoted excerpt.
However, upon close examination, things are not so clear-cut. It would indeed be 
straightforward to analyse the components of the web according to the metaphor of 
‘distance from the periphery’, with statements typically close to the periphery such 
as observation sentences and others, such as logical laws, situated at the centre. The 
web would be a seamless whole, containing thousands of sentences, all of which are 
logically interconnected. I wish to argue that this web of belief picture has no place 
for logic, contrary to what Quine holds. In particular, Quine’s claim that logical laws 
are merely further statements in the web cannot be sustained. In order to see this, 
however, we will have to take a detour to Quine’s logical system and examine the 
notation he uses in his system as well as the status of the logical laws in this system.
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2.4 T he web and its logical laws
Let us reflect, to begin with, on the following. W hat does Quine have in mind 
when he talks about ‘logical laws’? W hat is a logical law for Quine? When we think 
of a logical law, we have in mind the laws of excluded middle, non-contradiction, 
DeMorgan’s law, and, also, modus ponens (although this one is a special case, as we 
will see later). Logical laws are general: it is in the nature of logic that a logical law 
is uninterpreted. That is to say, logic is about everything conceivable — it is about 
the relations holding between statements of any kind. In other words: there is no 
intended interpretation for logic. The law of excluded middle, for instance, applies 
to all statements. More exactly, we want to say that the fact that every statement 
in the web is either true or false is due to the principle of bivalence via the law of 
excluded middle. The principle of bivalence, of course, is understood today as an in­
terpretation of the law of excluded middle, an interpretation based on truth-functional 
se m a n tic s .Q u in e  advocates truth-functional semantics, so for him acceptance of 
excluded middle is acceptance of the principle of bivalence. Quine himself, however, 
does not distinguish between the law of excluded middle and bivalence (Quine, 1970: 
83).
Now let’s try to locate logical laws in Quine’s holism. We will focus here on the 
law of excluded middle for expository purposes. What would the statement of ex­
cluded middle be like? For Quine himself, it is illustrated thus:
(EM) [0 V -
This way of illustrating excluded middle uses the notational conventions of Mathe-
the generality of logic, see Quine (1995a: 52).
^^For the distinction between logical laws and their corresponding semantic principles, see Dum- 
mett (1978: xix).
90
matical Logic, which I take to be the clearest and most systematic notation by which 
to formalise logic/® The corner quotes are meant to clarify the fact that we don’t 
want to say that it is the statement referred to by quoting ‘0 v ~  0 ’ which is true. In 
effect, ‘0  V  ~  0 ’ is merely another statement, conveying no generality whatsoever. It 
just says that either the inscription ‘0 ’ is the case or the inscription 0 ’ is the case 
— it is meaningless to assert ‘0 v ~  0 ’ if we stick to the usual way of using quotes. 
The Greek letters, in Quine’s notation, serve as names of unspecified statements. 
Quasi-quotation is meant to convey the generality intended when we talk about ex­
cluded middle. (EM ) refers to any statement obtained by substituting uniformingly 
the occurrences of the prepositional variable ‘0 ’ in [0 v ~  0] with sentences.
It is important to recognise that the generality exemplified by the use of the corner 
quotes is crucial here. This generality is intended to capture the insight that logic 
is an uninterpreted theory. More importantly, in connection to holism and the web 
of belief, the generality reminds us that logical laws apply to every statement in the 
web. This, as we’re about to see, is the crux of the problem.
However, we haven’t arrived yet at a proper formulation of the law of excluded 
middle with f0 v ~  0]. This statement refers to any expression obtained by replacing 
uniformly the Greek letters by names of specific statements, such as ‘the cat is on the 
m at’. It does not say that all such substitutions are true — this is what is needed 
for transforming [0 v ~  0] into the law of excluded middle. In Quine’s notation, the 
law of excluded middle is exemplified by:
(LEM) h [0 V ~ 0]
We get this result via the axiomatic metatheorem *100 of Mathematical Logic:
^^The law itself appears in (1940; 51). Quine explains his notational conventions in §§5 and 6 of 
that same book.
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(*100) If 0 is tautologous, h 0.
What (LEM ) says is that any result of admissible substitutions in [0 v ~  0] is 
a theorem (a logical truth). The turnstile, applied to (EM ), transforms it into a 
logical law. (LEM ) — and *100 — is a metatheorem since it governs the condition 
under which a statement can be a logical truth. A logical truth is composed of proper 
statements, in contrast to statements of the metatheory which are bracketed between 
corner quotes. For instance, ‘the cat is on the mat or the cat is not on the m at’ is 
a logical truth, but ‘h v ~  is a metatheorem. The statement ‘the cat is on 
the mat or the cat is not on the m at’ is logically true in virtue of (LEM ). (LEM) 
is therefore a law regulating all statements in the web, policing, as it were, all state­
ments from a privileged, external standpoint. This is ultimately the source of the 
problem.
Let us recapitulate. In Quine’s web of belief, there are many kinds of statements. 
There are for instance:
1. observation sentences — ‘the cat is on the m at’
2. logical truths (theorems) — ‘the cat is on the mat or the cat is not on the m at’
3. tautologous forms — \(j) y (j)\
4. logical laws — h [ç!) v 0]
5. axiomatic sentences —If (p is tautologous, h (p.
Statements such as (4) and (5) settle the logical truths (the theorems) in the web of 
belief. That is to say, the metatheorems state the conditions for being a theorem. 
Therefore, in order to be a logical truth, a statement must satisfy the conditions 
imposed by the metatheorems. It is the metatheory, presumably, which determines
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the logical connections in the web of belief. So there ought to be, it appears, levels 
in the web: it can’t be a seamless whole. Some statements (the metatheorems) seem 
to occupy a special place.
This patent need for a metatheory raises many problems. How does the metathe­
ory relate to the web? What is the relation between the metatheory and the rest 
of the web? Does it make sense to hold that all statements are logically intercon­
nected in the web, including the metatheory? The metatheory is about the ‘rest’ 
of the web — in what way are they logically connected? It looks as if the web has 
to be two-dimensional. On the one hand we have the web as we know it, with its 
observation sentences, its scientific theories, its logical truths. One the other we have 
the metatheory regulating the logical interconnections between these sentences. The 
next two sections investigate these thoughts.
2.5 Q uine and th e  Tortoise
The difficulty we have to address is to assess how the statements of the metatheory 
relate to the other statements, more precisely how the metatheorems relate to the 
logical truths in Quine’s system. This problem will be tackled by studying one of 
the most puzzling problems in the foundations of logic — a problem which, I believe, 
Quine’s philosophy of logic is unable to solve. Lewis Carroll presents the conundrum 
in question in his ‘W hat the Tortoise said to Achilles’. The strategy in the following 
subsections will thus be to spell out this problem as clearly as possible and then 
explain why Quine’s philosophy of logic cannot solve it. Following that, I will survey 
other possible solutions to this problem and subsequently offer a way out.
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2.5.1 The regress 
Let us consider this simple argument:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
(2) Socrates is a man.
(C) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Here, we want to say, intuitively, that you are warranted in drawing the conclu­
sion (C) on the basis that the premises are true and also on the basis of the logical 
law of modus ponens. Indeed, staying at the intuitive level, mere warrant for the 
premises is not enough to draw the conclusion: you must also know tha t the premises 
possess a valid logical form.
How should this knowledge be represented? Well, you must know that modus 
ponens is a valid logical form, that is, you must know:
(W): If an argument displays the logical form of modus ponens, then it is valid.
(W ), then, is to be understood as the warrant enabling you to ‘go’ from the premises 
to the conclusion in our original argument. The question now is: how does knowledge 
of (W ) warrant you in drawing the conclusion (C)? It seems that you need to know 
at least two things. One, that (W ) is correct and second, that the argument above 
is an instance of modus ponens. So what you need to know can be represented like this:
(a) (W): If an argument displays the logical form of modus ponens, then it is valid.
(b) The argument above ((1), (2), (C)) is an instance of modus ponens.
(c) Therefore, the conclusion (C) — that Socrates is mortal — can be drawn.
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The problem is immediate: the step from (a) and (b) to (c) is itself inferential. 
So in order to be warranted in drawing the conclusion (c), you need to possess an 
additional piece of knowledge, namely:
(i) (W): If an argument displays the logical form of modus ponens, then it is valid.
(ii) The argument above ((a), (b), (c)) is an instance of modus ponens.
(iii) Therefore, the conclusion (c) — that the conclusion (C) can be drawn — can be 
drawn.
It seems that this pattern could be repeated indefinitely; if so, it means that claiming 
knowledge of (W ) when drawing inferences leads to a regress of warrants. This in 
turn would mean that explicit knowledge of the validity of the modus ponens schema 
cannot act as a warrant for the conclusion (C).
2.5.2 Internalism, externalism, scepticism
Let us think carefully about the conditions under which there is a regress. It 
seems that in order for the regress to go through, it must be a requirement that the 
inferrer possesses a warrant for drawing the conclusion. In other words, the inferrer 
needs to know that modus ponens is a valid rule of inference. This additional piece of 
knowledge is illustrated by (W ). However, a further requirement is needed. It must 
be the case that claiming knowledge of (W ) is always necessary — that is, it must 
be a reasonable demand to always require, on the part of the inferrer, knowledge of 
the validity of modus ponens. The first requirement amounts to what Wright labels 
‘simple internalism’. It is to be defined thus:^"^
Sim ple in ternalism ; In order to acquire knowledge by inference, the thinker must
^^Tlie formulations of simple internalism and simple externalism are borrowed from Wright (forth­
coming).
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possess a warrant to the effect that the rule used is valid.
The second requirement seems plausible — given that one espouses simple internalism. 
Indeed, if the inferrer must possess an appropriate warrant to acquire knowledge by 
inference in one case, then there seems to be no reason why we should not require such 
a warrant in the other cases. That is, if knowledge of the validity of modus ponens is 
required to draw the inference (C), then it is also required to draw the inferences (c) 
and (iii). There does not seem to be any room for an internalist to stop the regress 
by saying that the warrant is only needed in the first instance but not in the others.
So it seems that the simple internalist position as outlined above is subjected to 
the regress. In contrast, a ‘simple externalist’ standpoint about inference does not 
face the threat of the regress. According to this externalist position, an inferrer does 
not need to know that modus ponens is a valid rule of inference in order to draw the 
conclusion (C): all that is required is that the rule is in fact valid — knowledge is not 
a necessary condition. Simple externalism is characterised thus:
Sim ple ex ternalism : In order to acquire knowledge by inference, the rule used must 
be valid. Knowledge of this rule is not necessary.
It is clear that one who espouses this view will not be bothered by the regress, since 
it is not necessary to be capable of producing a warrant such as (W ) in order to draw 
the inference. All that is necessary is that the rule is indeed valid. In this sense, the 
challenge posed by Carroll’s regress is one that will affect only a broadly internalist 
conception of inferential knowledge.
There is another stance about our inferential practice that is not subjected to the 
regress — namely, scepticism about warrant. According to this view, when one makes 
an inference, there is no warrant in play. That is, on this view, inferring the way we 
do is not governed by any norm. Talk of a rule being ‘valid’ is nonsense according to 
the sceptic. We will come back to scepticism in later subsections, but let us define it:
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Scepticism : Inference is not guided by any kind of warrant (internalist or external­
ist) and there are no norms of correct reasoning.
This is a sceptical view about our normal conception of inferential practice in the 
sense that it purports to show the superfluousness of there being a norm that we 
follow when we draw inferences. Indeed, talk of warrant easily transfers into talk 
about norms. The warrant — say, (W ) — allows me to draw the inference, and 
that warrant is a norm that I follow. So the sceptical predicament is that inferential 
practice is not normative, if we understand norms in the way just suggested. That, 
it seems to me, is a highly unattractive take on the matter.
2.5.3 Setting up the dialectic
Carroll’s regress seems to establish that knowledge of logic (that is, in this case, 
modus ponens) is unable to warrant simple inferences — but this is, arguably, pre­
cisely the role of logic. Invoking one of the most fundamental laws of logic is of no 
help to warrant the logical move from the premises to the conclusion. So according to 
Carroll’s story so understood, it is impossible to be internally warranted in drawing 
inferences. There is an infinite regress of necessary warrants. That is a point deserv­
ing emphasis: what Carroll’s regress purports to show is not, as it is often assumed, 
that the mind can’t move — the mind does move, we have no problem in drawing 
simple inferences. I t’s rather about the ground of the move, about whether (or how) 
logic can make the mind move. We usually assume — in this kind of case — that 
our move from the premises to the conclusion is warranted by appealing to logical 
laws. But Carroll’s example purports to show that this a misunderstanding of our 
inferential practice. The move, if we accept the regress and its conclusion, is not 
warranted the way that the simple internalist model requires .
We can view the dialectic in regard to Carroll’s regress like this. Prima facie, 
we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our
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knowledge of logical laws. This is a fair assumption: we will discuss it in the next 
sections in more details, but its intuitive appeal should be clear. Carroll’s regress 
challenges this assumption by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot 
ground the move from premises to conclusion. These two elements, taken together, 
lead naturally to a repudiation of the internalist assumption and to the espousal 
of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our 
possession of knowledge of logical laws.
Such a standpoint can take two forms. One can adopt a broadly externalist 
model of inference, according to which no internalist warrant is necessary to move 
from warranted premises to a conclusion. The externalist model construes warrant 
in terms other than explicit knowledge of logical laws. An externalist might cash 
out his notion of warrant by appealing to the idea that it is enough, in order to be 
warranted to draw an inference, to be a reliable agent, to arrive at the conclusion 
via appropriate methods, to be in the right circumstances, and so forth. However, 
someone who accepts the conclusion of the regress but wishes to resist the notion of 
an externalist warrant will embrace scepticism — namely, the view that there are no 
norms of inferential practice.
I will attempt, in what follows, to defend an internalist solution to the problem. 
The main strategy is to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying 
standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice, and then to offer an 
internalist alternative.
In the next two sections, Quinean matters will be discussed in relation to this 
dialectic. Firstly, Quine’s critique of Carnap’s conventionalism about logical laws will 
be examined — we will see how Carnap’s conception of logical laws is subjected to 
the regress. Then, Quine’s own philosophy of logic will be assessed in the light of 
the considerations just reviewed. The situation in Quine’s case, as we will see, is 
more ambivalent. However interpreted, though, it is unstable. The sections following
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these Quinean considerations seek to resist the externalist and sceptical standpoints 
by exploring an internalist solution.
2 .5.4 Quine^s critique of Carnap
Quine mentions the regress in relation to Carnap in his ‘Truth by Convention’ 
(1936b). In the last pages of this paper, he discusses Carnap’s idea that logical laws 
are conventions. As is well-known, Quine has no sympathy for such a view — one 
of the reasons being that conventions are, in Carnap’s system, the cornerstone of the 
analytic /  synthetic distinction. Directly connected to our present concern is this: 
Quine argues that the view according to which logical laws are conventions warranting 
inferences falls prey to Carroll’s regress. Indeed, this should not be surprising. In 
Carnap’s view, the conventions stating the truth of the logical laws are general and use 
schematic letters. (W ) is a good approximation of what a convention stating the truth 
of all applications of modus ponens would look like in Carnap’s system. According 
to Carnap, conventions such as (W) declare the truth of an infinity of statements 
— all the statements displaying the appropriate form. In Carnap’s system, we need 
such a general convention since it is impossible to assert individually the correctness 
of every instance of modus ponens due to the infinity of statements displaying this 
form. If it were possible to assert individually the correctness of all instances of 
modus ponens, the difficulty would disappear. To return to our example, we would 
not need to proceed ‘mediately’ through the general convention (W ) in order to draw 
the conclusion (C) and therefore there would be no regress — the further argument 
consisting of (a), (b), (c) would not be needed. The correctness of this particular 
argument would be declared true by convention in advance, maybe an item on a 
long list whose heading is ‘Valid Arguments’. But as it is, in Carnap’s system the 
conventions are what warrant any particular conclusion.
This detour via Carnap reveals Quine’s diagnosis of Carroll’s regress. According
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to Quine, the regress starts when we appeal to the general logical law in order to 
warrant the move from the premises to the conclusion: “In a word, the difficulty is 
that if logic is to proceed mediately from conventions, logic is needed for inferring 
logic from the conventions” (1936b: 97). To put it in another way, the use of the 
convention (W) in Carnap’s system is needed in order to infer, from the convention, 
the correctness of a particular application of modus ponens. If (W ) is needed to infer 
(C) from (1) and (2), then it is also needed to infer the conclusion that the conclusion 
(C) is valid from the claim that; (a) (W ) is correct and (b) the argument consisting 
of (1), (2) and (C) is an instance of modus ponens. It is not an option to hold that 
the law is required in one application and not in the other. It thus appears that 
Carnap’s model is internalist. Quine’s diagnosis, then, proceeds in two steps: if we 
understand (W ) as being a convention (as it has to be, in Carnap’s system, given the 
infinity of their instances) and if logic is to proceed mediately via those conventions, 
then regress ensues.
It is hard to dispute Quine’s criticism of Carnap on this count. Indeed, Carnap’s 
system, as understood here, does not have the resources to resist Carroll’s regress. 
This is because the idea of a convention brings with it the idea of its being a warrant. 
W hat is a convention for if it is not capable of being used as a warrant? Isn’t the 
raison d ’être of a convention just that — being capable of acting as a warrant? Indeed, 
conventions are usually thought of as norms grounding our judgements, norms that 
we follow. If this feature is constitutive of conventions, then their capacity to act 
as warrants seems also constitutive. Moreover, since logic proceeds mediately from 
conventions, this model of logical knowledge is an internalist one. If this is true, then 
it shows that the very nature of conventionalism about logical laws contains the seeds 
of its vulnerability to Carroll’s regress. Accordingly, an easy fix is out of the picture 
— I would go as far as to venture that any fix is bound to disappoint. Let us turn, 
then, to a different philosophy of logic.
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2.5.5 Quine philosophy of logic and the regress
Now what about Quine’s own philosophy of logic? Does it afford the means to 
avoid Carroll’s regress? Given that his diagnosis puts the blame, partly, on the 
fact that in Carnap’s system logical laws are conventions stating the truth of an 
infinity of statements, it appears that it does not. Indeed, in Quine’s logical theory, 
statements of logical laws are metatheorems and those need not be understood as 
conventions. However, a crucial part of Quine’s diagnosis hinges on the need, in 
Carnap’s system, to proceed from  conventions to their applications. Viewed in this 
light, the metatheorem /  theorem distinction fares no better. If the metatheorems 
are needed to warrant an application of a logical law (such an application being 
made to theorems expressing no generality), the regress threatens. In his logic books, 
Quine does write in such a way as to suggest that particular inferences do proceed 
via the metatheorems — as we have seen in section 2.4. The metatheorems establish 
the truth of an infinity of statements and they state the conditions under which 
statements are theorems. All the ingredients are apparently there for the regress. 
Despite the fact that the metatheorems are not understood as conventions, this set 
up is almost enough to generate the regress. The only additional element required 
is the inexorability of appealing to the metatheorems in order to warrant particular 
inferences. This additional element seems to be implicit in the very idea of the 
metatheorem /  theorem distinction. If this is correct, Quine’s philosophy of logic 
fares no better than Carnap’s in relation to the regress of warrants.
On the other hand, consider this. Quine advocates ‘naturalised epistemology’, 
according to which epistemology is but a branch of psychology. Quine starts by 
making a distinction inside foundational studies between conceptual and doctrinal 
s t u d i e s . T h e  conceptual side of a foundational enterprise (epistemology of logic in 
the present case) is concerned with clarifying and defining the central concepts of
^®See Quine (1969a: 69-71) on this distinction.
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the area of discourse in question. The doctrinal side is concerned with truth and 
justification, with warrant and certainty. A main tenet of naturalised epistemology is 
the abandonment of the doctrinal side — the epistemologist need not be concerned 
with notions such as justification, warrant, ultimate truth, certainty, and so on. All 
that is called for is an understanding of how we come to acquire belief — a chapter 
of empirical psychology. The Cartesian quest for certainty should be abandoned. 
Quine said in that paper that ‘the Humean predicament is the human predicament’. 
Hume failed in his project of showing how certainty was possible, how we could avoid 
scepticism about our knowledge of a wide range of statements. In other words, he 
could not propose a satisfying doctrinal side to his epistemology. Quine’s suggestion 
when talking about the human predicament is that such a doctrinal theory is bound 
to disappoint. This is why he put forward his naturalised epistemology:
Epistem ology, or som ething like it, sim ply falls into place as a chapter of psy­
chology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenom enon, viz., a 
physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experim en­
tally  controlled input —  certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, 
for instance —  and in the fullness o f tim e the subject delivers as output a de­
scription of the three-dim ensional external world and its history. T he relation  
between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are 
prom pted to study for the sam e reasons that always prom pted epistem ology; 
namely, in order to  see how evidence relates to theory, and in w hat ways one’s 
theory of nature transcends any available evidence. (1969a: 82-83)
The point of quoting this passage in full is to see how talk of truth, justification, 
and warrant is simply not in the picture of this new conception of epistemology. 
Epistemology, for Quine, might be called a ‘foundational’ science but it does not 
provide any kind of foundation, strictly speaking, for knowledge.^®
^®For a fuller discussion of Quine’s conception of epistemology, see Hookway (1988), especially
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Let us now come back to the topic at hand. Given his conception of epistemology, 
Quine could be understood to be a sceptic about our norms of inferential practice. 
Indeed, what we are trying to do here is to provide a ground for our most fundamental 
inferential practices. But to search for a ground, for what warrants us to go from 
accepted premises to correct conclusions, is an attempt to do the impossible — it’s 
an attempt to transcend our ‘human predicament’. Looking for norms playing the 
role of warrants is a completely misguided project from the perspective of naturalised 
epistemology. We should merely look at what humans actually do, at the input they 
receive and the output they deliver. We recognise the tru th  of a set of premises 
(input); then we deliver, as output, a conclusion. All that can be said is that most 
individuals will be inclined to deliver the same output given similar inputs. And 
th a t’s it — nothing more can be said, except, perhaps, pointing at regularities and 
trying to explain them naturalistically.
So there is an apparent tension in Quine’s writings. On the one hand, he seems 
to be a traditional logician with a foundational, internalist view of logical laws with 
his metatheorem /  theorem distinction. On the face of it, the metatheorems (logical 
laws) warrant the moves in the language-game of inference. On the other hand, 
Quine advocates, via his naturalised epistemology, scepticism about inferential norms. 
Where do matters stand? Is Quine inconsistent?
I don’t believe so — at least not at this stage. There is a way out for the Quinean. 
She can hold that metatheorems — expressing the generality of logic — are a mere 
‘representation’ or ‘systématisation’ of the way we actually reason, and as such we 
do not need to use them when inferring. Such an understanding of logical laws would 
block the regress, since there would be no need, in our example, to invoke a further 
argument having the modus ponens form in order to infer (C). The general logical 
laws would have an expository role, their usefulness being that they systematise how
Chapter 11. Stroud (1984) also contains a discussion of naturalised epistemology.
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inferring is actually practised by us. According to Quine, this is consistent with nat­
uralised epistemology. Indeed, immediately after the passage quoted above, he says 
that this new conception of epistemology allows for a “rational reconstruction, to 
whatever degree such reconstruction is practicable; for imaginative constructions can 
afford hints of actual psychological processes, in much the way that mechanical simu­
lations can.” So logic (understood as the systématisation of inferential practice, with 
rules, logical laws, and so forth), on this view, is a representation of our practice. It 
has no normative force whatsoever. It sole utility is to study psychological processes.
However, is this move available to a Quinean? Under a strict interpretation of 
Quine’s writings, it is not. For sure, Quine, more often than not, writes as if logical 
laws are part of the web and regulate its logical interconnections. If general logical 
laws really have that regulatory role, it means that they are needed — in some sense 
— when performing a particular inference. It would be because of the metatheorems 
that such and such inferences are valid. In other words: if the logical laws have a 
regulatory role, that means, presumably, that they act as warrants.
Moreover, if we understand (W ) in the example of last section as being a metathe­
orem regulating particular instances of it, and if we assign to the notion of ‘regulation’ 
a justificatory role, then we are espousing internalism and there is no way to escape 
Carroll’s regress. It is enough for the regress to start that knowledge of general logical 
laws is required in order to draw inferences. Therefore, if we interpret some of Quine’s 
passages to the letter and put his naturalised epistemology aside, his philosophy of 
logic cannot answer Carroll’s regress.
It is, no doubt, possible to ignore Quine’s own apparent understanding of the 
metatheorem /  theorem distinction and offer a Quinean answer reconciling natu­
ralised epistemology with logic along the lines previously mentioned. Under that 
interpretation, as we have seen, general logical laws — especially rules of inference 
such as modus ponens — are to be understood as theoretical representations of the
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way we actually infer. I will call this the ‘logic-as-representation’ view. Logical laws, 
on this view, need not be considered as norms whose role is to warrant inferences. 
To infer in such and such a way is merely a practice ungoverned by any norms. A 
‘correct’ judgement of logical consequence, on this view, is a judgement that will com­
mand assent by the majority of the speakers of a linguistic community. Since there 
are no general rules under which a given speaker has to proceed when inferring, any 
speaker is free to infer the way he sees fit. Strictly speaking, then, there cannot be an 
‘incorrect’ statement of logical consequence due to the absence of norms. There are 
no logical laws in the web — no statements regulating the logical interconnections 
between statements. A ‘devious’ inferrer is someone whose deductions are at odds 
with what the majority of the speakers in his community would assent to.
How, then, should we understand the role of logic in such a picture? Logical 
laws would be representations of the way the community at large infers, but not 
rules that are followed. The immediate worry here is that this so-called theoretical 
representation does have a justificatory role. Someone pressed to explain why she 
infers in such and such a way could reply that the only norm she obeys is not a general 
logical law but rather a communal norm stated in terms of behavioural assent and 
dissent of particular instances of inferences. The community does, or would, agree 
on the correctness of this inference, and this is what makes it a correct inference. 
Logic, on the sceptical view, is a mere representation of the inferring practice of 
this community, and it has no normative role. But this doesn’t seem to accord with 
practice. Indeed, when someone makes an incorrect inference, we do not merely tell 
that person: ‘what you infer in this case is not correct because this is not what 
the rest of the linguistic community would infer given those premises’. No — we 
would normally tell him: ‘look, what you have done is not right because you have 
not applied this general logical law correctly, and this is the correct way of inferring’. 
Upon realisation that he did not apply the logical law, two options are open to the
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devious inferrer. Either he corrects his inference and acknowledges that, on the basis 
of the logical law, he should infer such and such; or he disputes the validity of the 
logical law. In both cases, the normative role of logic is conceded. It seems difficult 
to reconcile naturalised epistemology with a view acknowledging the importance of 
logical systems.
A stubborn Quinean who feels uncomfortable with the marriage of naturalised 
epistemology with the ‘logic-as-representation’ conception could bite the bullet and 
abandon the latter. That is, such a Quinean could suggest a radical scepticism, doing 
away with logical systems and logical laws altogether. Independently of the credentials 
of that sceptical stance, it is safe to say that it isn’t a Quinean view anymore. Logic
— understood as logical laws formulated in full generality — plays a prominent role 
for any self-respecting follower of Quine. More importantly, the view that there are 
no logical norms is an extreme one for non-Quineans as well as for Quineans. It would 
indeed remove the ghost of Carroll’s regress (since there would be no laws such as 
modus ponens to rely on when making inferences), but at a considerable cost. If it 
were the correct view, then we should throw away all our logic books and eliminate 
logic courses from the philosophy curriculum. Inference being simply what we do, the 
function of logic books would become a mystery. It can’t be replied, of course, that 
in logic books what we find are the norms that the community follows: this would 
not amount to scepticism.
To recapitulate. Quine claims both that logical laws have a regulatory role and 
that epistemology should be naturalised. But these two claims cannot be held together
— naturalised epistemology implies a sceptical view about logical norms and the 
incorrectness of any ‘doctrinal’ studies (that is, studies having to do with justification 
and truth). This shows his position to be unstable. But any attem pt to stabilise it 
leads to undesirable conclusions. Say a Quinean decides to remedy the situation by 
abandoning naturalised epistemology. In that case, the resulting philosophy of logic
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is vulnerable to Carroll’s regress, just like Carnap’s. If, on the contrary, our Quinean 
decides to abandon the regulatory view of logic, the problem becomes: how to make 
sense of logic in that picture? How do we make sense of the logic-as-representation 
conception? It seems that a reasonable position, if one is to take that line, is to 
drop the idea of logic as mere representation. However, doing so leads to an extreme 
scepticism. Such a view is not Quine’s, I believe. So on whatever way of looking at it, 
Quine’s philosophy of logic does not have the resources to answer Carroll’s challenge. 
However, let us now go beyond Quine and see whether sense can be made of the 
resolutely sceptical view.
2.5.6 Logical norms and scepticism
The question that Carroll’s regress forces us to answer is this: given a non-empty 
set of premises and a conclusion, what is the nature of the warrant, if any, enabling 
us to draw the inference and say that the premises entail the conclusion? The regress 
shows conclusively that the warrant in question cannot be one formulated in terms 
of a further argument licensing the adoption of the conclusion in the light of the 
other premises since for this argument to properly warrant the conclusion, appeal to 
(W ) must be made. The solution to Carroll’s regress, accordingly, has to be that the 
addition of further premises licensing the move from the premises to the conclusion 
must be restricted in some way. There are three general forms such a solution might 
take. The first is to acknowledge the existence of logical norms but to deny that 
they must be appealed to when making inferences — this is externalism. The second 
is to advocate a sceptical stance and dispense with norms altogether. The third is 
to allow a normative role for a restricted class of logical laws but to deny that they 
have to figure as further premises forming an additional argument; it corresponds to 
a modified internalism. This section investigates the prospect of scepticism whilst the 
next section will be occupied with externalism. The remainder explores the possibility
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of a modified internalism.
Dispensing with norms is to embrace the sceptical stance, namely that when we 
infer, there is no warrant in play — we do not, and should not, appeal to logical laws 
when inferring. To espouse scepticism is to repudiate the apparent fact that there are 
norms that we follow in our inferential practice. This strikes me as a highly revisionist 
claim. On this view, logic (by that I mean logic as exposed in logic books, logical 
systems, and so forth) is a mere representation, a ‘rational reconstruction’ of inputs 
and outputs. This reconstruction has absolutely no normative force: we can’t use the 
reconstruction as a warrant, otherwise we wouldn’t be embracing scepticism anymore. 
Indeed, scepticism does seem to be, on the face of it, committed to repudiating norms. 
W hat is the place of logic in such a picture? Is there a place for it? Here we seem to 
face a dilemma. The first horn has it that logic is a mere representation, a rational 
reconstruction. But it has to claim that this representation has no normative force. 
This strikes me as implausible. I t’s comparable to claiming that maps represent a 
country (say) while holding that the map has no normative status. Of course not: the 
whole point is to use the map as a normative (if conceivably flawed) tool. Similarly, 
the point of devising a representation of how we infer is to guide our inferential 
practice. This is what logic books are for! The point I ’m making can accommodate 
the idea that logic represents the way we (rational humans) actually infer. The norm, 
then, is the way we actually infer. If that much is conceded, the sceptical standpoint 
is abandoned: when inferring, we appeal to norms such as (W ).
Before turning to the other horn of the dilemma, I want to examine a possible 
reply by the sceptic. Here she could claim that we use the representation as a guide, 
but we don’t  have to. It is not necessary for correct inferential practice to appeal to 
norms. When we do refer to logic books, we are merely taking a shortcut instead 
of going through the process ourselves. W hat makes an inference correct is not its 
compliance with norms, but something not normative (whatever that may be). To
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corne back to the map analogy, it is not the map that makes true which road to take, 
but rather the actual road system, out there in the world. But it is precisely at this 
point that the map analogy threatens to break down; what corresponds to the ‘right’ 
road, out there in the world, when we talk about inference? This reply by the sceptic, 
as it turns out, amounts to an expression of externalism about inference, and we will 
come back to that in a minute.
The other horn of the dilemma is to repudiate the logic-as-representation view 
and hold that the function of logic books and logical systems is by no means clear. 
The problem here is immediate: what have we been doing all these centuries? Were 
we just wrong in devising logical systems? Were we wasting our time? Obviously 
not. W hat are students learning in logic classes, if not norms of correct reasoning? 
It seems that if we are to be consistent sceptics about the normativity of logic, we 
should follow a paraphrase of Hume’s advice and ‘commit logic books to the flames, 
for they contain nothing but sophistry and illusion’. If this is not radical revisionism, 
I do not know what is.
The dilemma, then, is this. If the sceptic endorses the logic-as-representation view, 
then it’s hard to avoid the recognition of the normativity of logic. If, on the other 
hand, the sceptic decides to do without logic altogether, the view is extreme. In a 
nutshell, the sceptical conclusion just seems to be inconsistent with the way we infer, 
since we do, as a matter of fact, reason according to rules of inference and we justify 
our inferences on the basis of them, etc. It is committed to the view that such talk 
is illusory, and this is, I believe, intolerable. I acknowledge that the sceptic, however, 
may just be unmoved by such arguments — the considerations just advanced give us 
reasons to resist the sceptical conclusion, but they do not refute it.
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2.5 .7  The externalist proposal
Let us now turn to externalism. The idea would be to claim that we infer the 
way we do because this is what the world requires of us. Faced with appropriate 
premises whose truth we recognise forces the acceptance of the conclusion without 
any process of self-reflection involved in the way the regress demands — without, that 
is, any ‘internalised’ warrant being necessary. Indeed, the regress goes through only 
if one has to recognise that the premises fulfil a certain condition, and then, on one’s 
recognition that they do fulfil those conditions, one is licensed to infer the conclusion. 
But if it is claimed that inferring the way we do is simply a m atter of recognising 
the tru th  of the premises and that the conclusion will ‘force’ itself on us because 
of externalist considerations, such an appeal to the required condition (the warrant) 
doesn’t play any role — it becomes superfluous. Thus, upon’s one recognition that 
all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, the conclusion that Socrates is mortal 
forces itself on us — in terms of input and output, given the input of the premises, the 
natural output is the conclusion. Of course, the problem here is to make sense of the 
metaphor in play when talking about the conclusion ‘forcing’ itself on us. To make 
matters clearer, think of the parallel here with a famous case, that of the recognition 
of chicken sexes. Just as it can be said that recognisers of chicken sexes are able to 
do so without being able to justify their capacity by appealing to a criterion, one 
could hold that we infer correctly without appealing to a rule of inference — all that 
matters is that the rule is valid. Exposure to chickens over a period of time will 
somehow instil the capacity to distinguish between their sexes: similarly, exposure 
(so to speak) to appropriate premises will, for any competent speaker, prompt the 
capacity to infer correctly — and th a t’s it, nothing more is required, strictly speaking.
The immediate problem with such a solution is that there is an apparent dissim­
ilarity between the two cases. It is uncontroversial that there is a fact of the matter 
about chicken sexes — the controversial externalist thought is the offered explanation
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of the capacity to discriminate between the sexes (no need for internalised warrant), 
not whether there is a fact of the matter or not about the sex of chickens. But if we 
push the parallel further, it appears that in order to be able to offer an externalist 
explanation of our capacity to infer correctly, there has to be a fact of the matter 
about logical inference. The externalist offers an explanation of the route between an 
external fact and the capacity of a cognitive agent to recognise that fact. In the case 
of inferential practice, a proper externalist explanation will have to proceed along 
these lines — namely, that the inferring agent is in contact with something over and 
above the recognition of the tru th  of the premises, and that this something is what 
enables the agent to draw the inference. This ‘something’ would have to be a valid 
rule of inference. But this seems to involve an ontological commitment which is puz­
zling. W hat is it that we recognise when we infer correctly? W hat are we responding 
to, and how? Are we somehow in contact with the rules of inference — the same way 
that the chicken sexes discriminator is in contact with the relevant features? The ex­
ternalist thought about chicken sexes has some credibility since the ontological issue 
is not in dispute. No one disputes the existence of chicken sexes. But what is external 
about a rule of inference? What does it mean to say that we are in contact with rules 
of inference and that we ‘unconsciously’, as it were, track these rules? These are 
wide-ranging questions. Even if it were possible to answer them, they would lead us 
too far from the topic discussed. It suffices, at this stage, to identify these questions. 
A more plausible solution to Carroll’s regress will be offered in the next section, a 
solution not embodying such a strong ontological commitment.
In the last two sections, I have reviewed a general claim that has to be endorsed 
by the proponent of scepticism (the denial of norms) and an externalist account of our 
inferential practice. It is notoriously difficult to counter-argue in a decisive manner 
against the externalist and the sceptic. The situation here concerning scepticism 
is the following: any form of the scepticism appears to be committed to denying
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that there are norms that we follow in our inferring practice. Scepticism just seems 
to be inconsistent with the way we infer, since we do, as a matter of fact, reason 
according to rules of inference and we justify our inferences on the basis of them, 
etc. It is committed to the view that such talk is illusory, and this is, I believe, 
intolerable. If one prefers to embrace externalism, the difficulty is to malœ sense of 
the non-internalist warrant that we follow when inferring correctly. No matter how 
difficult — if possible at all — it is to actually show that all externalist and sceptical 
standpoints do not work, there still is a way to argue for an internalist solution. The 
idea is to keep in mind how the sceptical thought does not accord with what seems 
to be, prima facie, how we, as a matter of fact, infer, and then to suggest a non­
externalist account which is not prey to Carroll’s regress. If it is possible to show:
(1) the plausibility of an account of our inferring practice doing justice to the idea 
that knowledge of (W) and the like is required to draw inferences, and (2) that this 
proposed account does not fall into the regress, then, I believe, the non-internalist 
standpoints will prove to be much less attractive.
2.5,8 Constitutive norms
There is another line of thought available as a response to Carroll’s regress which 
is more congenial to an internalist outlook. It draws on Davidsonian ideas about 
the nature of practical reasoning. In order to see how those Davidsonian ideas can 
be exploited in the present context, it is necessary to distinguish between rules of 
inference that are constitutive of our practice of inferring and those that are not 
constitutive. The focus has so far been on modus ponens and not on other logical 
laws. This very fact points towards a special feature of this logical law. I will argue 
in what follows that if a satisfying internalist proposal is to be possible, then the 
constitutive role of modus ponens has to be recognised.
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that logical laws have a normative
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status in the sense that once we accept (implicitly or explicitly) those laws, we are 
bound to infer according to what they prescribe — pending their possible revision. 
It is not incoherent — even if it might possibly be a mistake — to abandon the law 
of excluded middle or (more radically) the law of non-contradiction. But as long as 
we accept those laws, we are bound to infer according to them. In this sense, logical 
laws are norms. Modus ponens is also a norm of inferential practice, but it is also a 
constitutive norm in the sense that the very practice of inferring presupposes modus 
ponens. Carroll’s regress, in my opinion, reveals this interesting fact about inference. 
To see why, let us take this simple inference, an inference not using modus ponens:
(20) Socrates is mortal and Aristotle is Greek.
(C*) Aristotle is Greek.
On an internalist account of our inferential practice allowing for justificatory norms 
understood in the usual sense, this inference is subject to the regress. Indeed, to 
be able to draw the conclusion (C*), you must be credited with the knowledge that 
the argument above displays a valid argument-form, that is, you must know that the 
rule for ^-elimination is valid. How does this knowledge warrant you to draw the 
conclusion (C*)? Well, this warrant must be represented like this:
(a*) (W*): If an argument displays the logical form of the ^-elim ination rule, then 
it is valid.
(b*) The argument above ((20), (C*)) is an instance of the ^-elim ination rule.
(c*) Therefore, the conclusion (C*) — Aristotle is Greek — can be drawn.
But this is another inference, an inference justifiable only if one is warranted to 
accept modus ponens. So in order to be warranted in drawing the conclusion (c*).
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you must be credited with the knowledge that:
(i*) (W): If an argument displays the logical form of modus ponens, then it is valid, 
(ii*) The argument above ((a*), (b*), (c*)) is an instance of modus ponens.
(iii*) Therefore, the conclusion (c*) — that the conclusion (C*) can be drawn — can 
be drawn.
And so on. Whatever rule of inference is used in the original argument, an ulti­
mate appeal to (W ) must be made. This is because no m atter which rule is appealed 
to in the first place, it is possible to construe an argument having the form (a), (b), 
(c) or its starred equivalent. Any such argument will be warranted, ultimately, on the 
basis of modus ponens since for any instance of any logical law, to know that the con­
clusion follows from the premises requires grasping an argument which has a modus 
ponens form — namely, it requires two thing: (1) that if  the argument displays such 
and such a logical form, then it is valid, and (2) that the argument displays such and 
such a logical form.
In the end, once appeal to (W ) is required, the regress is unavoidable. It is because 
all rules of inference presuppose, for their warrant, a further argument having the 
modus ponens form that Carroll’s regress will go through for them. More precisely, 
it is because any explicit appeal to any rule of inference when justifying a particular 
move from premises to conclusion is itself dependent on another rule of inference — 
modus ponens — that there is a regress.
One could say, then, that modus ponens is constitutive of our practice of inferring 
in the sense that inferring requires a warrant involving this logical law. In other 
words, no warranted inference is possible for us without using modus ponens. In 
contrast, the law of excluded middle does not seem to be constitutive, in the sense 
just mentioned, of our practice of inferring. Indeed, it is not required when inferring
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using the law of conjunction or the law of modus ponens, as can be seen from the 
examples of the previous three sections. It has to be acknowledged that nothing 
in this argument excludes that there might be other constitutive logical laws. It is 
enough for our purposes that there is one such law.
2.5.9 An internalist proposal
Now how does the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive logical 
laws help us in solving Carroll’s regress? Taking my lead from Davidson’s ideas 
about akrasia, I will argue that we can draw a parallel between his proposed solution 
of this problem of practical reason and the present difficulty. Akrasia occurs when an 
agent’s action does not conform to what she recognises as the right action to take. 
For instance, someone is offered a cigarette. She arrives at the conclusion that since 
smoking is bad for health, causes cancer, etc., the right action to do is to refuse the 
offer. Nevertheless, she accepts the offer and lights the cigarette. She acts contrary 
to what her own practical reasoning prescribes her to do — she is an akratic agent. 
How can we explain the phenomenon of akrasia? It seems irrational to accept the 
offered cigarette, the agent recognises that it is irrational, but still she accepts it. 
The situation could be schematically put like this. The agent’s reasoning could be 
pictured thus;
(PRl) Cigarette causes cancer.
(PR2) I am being offered a cigarette.
(OPR) Therefore, I should refuse the offer.
However, she does not do what her practical reasoning tells her to do: she acts 
contrary to it — and she is fully aware that she does. How should we explain that? 
Akrasia is a challenge for anyone interested in clarifying the nature of practical rea­
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soning, just as CarroU’s regress is a challenge for those interested to get a clear view 
of the nature of our inferential practice.
According to Davidson (1970; 1982), the explanation is the following. The agent 
is simply acting irrationally. The irrationality of the act resides in the fact that 
the agent ignored a central maxim of practical reasoning, that of the principle of 
continence;
P rin c ip le  of continence: One ought to act on what one regards as the best option, 
everything considered.
This principle, in the case we are interested in, prescribes acting in accordance with 
(CPR) — this is what she regards as the best option, everything considered. But 
she does not act on it. She is acting irrationally. Davidson’s analysis contains many 
twists and subtleties that need not concern us here, but let us focus on the status 
of the principle. In practical reasoning, one cannot choose to accept or to reject the 
principle of continence since any instance of practical reasoning presupposes use of 
the principle. The very idea of ‘consciously’ rejecting the principle would involve 
use of the principle itself. Therefore, one cannot rationally reject the principle — it 
cannot be rational to abandon the principle since it is impossible to give a reason 
for the rejection. This is the crux of Davidson’s analysis of akrasia: the akratic 
agent is irrational since she acts contrary to the principle of continence. Moreover, 
and crucially, according to Davidson the principle of continence “is not just another 
premise to be accepted or rejected. It is constitutive of the concept of a creature with 
prepositional attitudes capable of practical reasoning” (Davidson, 1999, p.404). So 
the principle is constitutive of practical reasoning and is no ordinary premise to be 
added freely when justifying a particular judgement. Arguably, one of the reasons 
why it cannot be added as a further premise has to do with considerations similar 
to Carroll’s regress: adding the principle to justify an instance of practical reasoning
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would, it seems, generates a regress similar to Carroll's
Similarly, we can say that since modus ponens is constitutive of our practice of 
inferring, it is impossible to reject it on rational grounds. The fact that it is impossi­
ble to rationally reject it reminds us of its special status: in contrast, it is possible to 
reject the law of excluded middle without being irrational. The validity of excluded 
middle can be discussed on rational grounds in a way that is not possible for modus 
ponens. Indeed, one can reason without using excluded middle as a logical law — 
intuitionists do it all the time. However, no one sharing our inferring practice — in­
cluding intuitionists and others — can infer without using modus ponens. To dispute 
modus ponens is not rational since any discussion about its validity presupposes its 
use. Since modus ponens is constitutive of inferential practice, it cannot appear as 
an ordinary warrant when justifying a particular inference. A warrant, it could be 
argued, is something that can be debated. But the validity of modus ponens cannot 
be debated, as we have just seen. So when justifying an inference, modus ponens is 
not merely another premise to be added in support of the inference. It is still irra­
tional not to reason according to modus ponens — a virtue of my proposal, as will 
we see, is precisely that it manages to explain the rationality of reasoning according 
to modus ponens without falling into the regress.
If this is right, then Carroll’s regress is blocked: (W) is not to be added as a 
further premise fulfilling a justifying role. Remember that in the exposition of the 
regress, it started when knowledge of (W ) had to be added as a further premise, 
namely the premise (a). But if modus ponens, because of its constitutive status, does 
not figure as an extra premise, then there is no regress. W hat happens when we 
are faced with an argument displaying the logical form of modus ponens is this: we 
recognise that the argument is of a certain form, and we draw the conclusion — and 
th a t’s it, nothing more needs to be said.
i?8ee Blackburn (1995) and Lazar (1999) for a discussion of this point.
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However, there is a worry to be addressed; doesn’t the proposed solution boil 
down to externalism, or worse, to scepticism? Indeed, if the recognition of the truth 
of the premises is sufficient for the drawing of the conclusion, then it appears that 
knowledge of (W ) is not necessary — and this seems to be exactly what a non­
internalist would want to say. I wish here to give two reasons to defend this criticism 
of the solution suggested here. First, modus ponens as understood in the proposal 
does have normative force — so the solution is resolutely non-sceptical. Indeed, one 
who does not reason in accordance with modus ponens is deeply mistaken. One has 
to infer according to this law, that was the whole point of showing its constitutive 
status. It is a norm that has to be followed, but which cannot be given, explicitly, 
as a warrant such that it would appear as a regular premise. If someone asks me 
why, faced with an argument with the modus ponens form, I draw the conclusion, I 
can point to modus ponens — but if my interlocutor does not understand and keeps 
asking for justification, at some point I can only say ‘but can’t you see?’. Most of the 
time (probably always, in fact), pointing to the modus ponens schema is sufficient for 
the interlocutor, he is likely to react as if saying ‘oh yes, right, I get i t ’. The fact that 
the interlocutor is being shown the law and nods his understanding shows that modus 
ponens is a norm. But to appeal to it in the regular manner will lead to a regress 
if the interlocutor is stubborn — at some point, the step has to be made without 
adding (W) as a further premise. But that does not mean that modus ponens has no 
normative force whatsoever. So my proposal is to be distinguished from scepticism.
Secondly, externalism concerning logical laws is committed to the claim that 
knowledge of logical laws is never necessary. The proposal I am putting forward 
does not entail that. Indeed, that proposal has it that logical laws other than modus 
ponens keep their ordinary, fully internalised status. A virtue of this proposed solu­
tion is that it ‘saves’ the ordinary status of other logical laws. Very often we debate 
about logical laws: we put them as premises in arguments, we discuss them, try to
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justify them, etc. This solution arguably excludes this kind of debate where modus 
ponens is concerned, but it leaves that possibility open for the other laws. They act 
as ordinary warrants, nothing is changed. The only difference is with the constitutive 
logical law. In its case, it is true that something seems conceded to the externalist — 
namely, knowledge of the norm followed need not be spelt out in the way the regress 
demands. But does that mean that knowledge of the norm is not required? Perhaps. 
But let’s assume, for the sake of the argument, that under my proposal something 
is conceded to the externalist, namely: the move from premises to conclusion in the 
case of arguments displaying the modus ponens form is to be explained by a purely 
externalist account. If this is the case, then it is still a far cry from the externalist 
excesses criticised previously, where knowledge of all logical laws becomes superfluous.
2.6 Shapiro’s d iscussion  o f Q uine
Stewart Shapiro, in his paper ‘The Status of Logic’ (2002), also discusses the 
problem of locating the principles of inference in the Quinean web of belief. Shapiro’s 
main concern is with the a priori: he addresses the question of whether logic is a priori 
or not. Since it seems to be the case that if logic is a priori then it is also necessary, 
Shapiro’s claim — that even the Quinean has to accept that (part of) logic is a priori 
— is relevant to our to p ic .B e fo re  examining Shapiro’s argument, however, we need 
to introduce one of the notions he develops in the paper.
Shapiro points out that, as remarked in previous sections of the present Chapter, 
the principles of inference governing the logical connections in the web cannot be 
statements in the web itself. Taking this problem seriously, Shapiro suggests a way 
out for the Quinean by pointing to an equivalence between validity and logical truth. 
The key idea is that an inference from a sentence p to a sentence q is valid if, and
^®Note that this connection between a priori and necessity docs not always hold. For instance, it 
is a priori that ‘I am here’ is true, but it is not necessary that I am here.
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only if, the sentence ‘if p then g’ is a logical truth. That is, let’s say that q follows 
from p in the web. It seems that, as we have seen, there is no conceptual space in 
the web for such statements of logical consequence (statements connecting two (sets 
of) sentences with idioms such as ‘logically follows from’, ‘is a logical consequence 
of’, ‘the inference between A and B is valid’). Quine cannot give an account of this 
kind of statement, mainly because of the regress discovered by Carroll. Shapiro’s 
idea offers a way out by reducing the problematic statement of validity (impossible 
to locate in the web) to a logical truth which is part of the web. The reduction is 
done through what he calls the transfer principle, which has this form:
(T P) Inference (F h 0 ) is valid =  the sentence ‘F —> 0 ’ is logically true.
The transfer principle gives us a means to reduce talk about validity (logical conse­
quence) to talk about logical truth. The notion of logical truth, in turn, is explained 
away by Quine’s own substitutional account. Quine claims that his account of logical 
tru th  and of logical consequence does not involve modal notions, thus completing the 
reduction and, in effect, eliminating any modal notion. Quine’s account of logical 
truth and logical consequence — effectively another manifestation of Error-theoretic 
Irrealism — is examined in Chapter 4.
The transfer principle gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for an inference 
to be valid. Let’s illustrate the workings of the transfer principle by way of an exam­
ple. Take the familiar valid inference:
(1) If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal
(2) Socrates is a man
(C) Therefore, Socrates is mortal
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So what we have is a left-hand side looking like this: ‘the inference from (1) and
(2) to (C) is valid’. This statement is in turn true by virtue of a logical law of in­
ference — modus ponens — which is in effect a metatheorem. This logical law is 
the problematic statement, the one seemingly impossible to locate in the web. This 
statement is in effect a statement of logical consequence, one — to anticipate on what 
follows — of the form W  studied by Wright in the next Chapter. Statements of this 
form regulate the logical connections in the web, i.e., they describe how to move from 
sentences to sentences, and this is why they are problematic. Shapiro’s move is to 
reduce such statements to something like this (keeping with our example): ‘the sen­
tence “if (1) and (2), then (C)” is a logical tru th ’. Now this statement does not say 
anything about logical consequence; it is couched in terms of logical truth. It is about 
a particular statement in the web, not about how some statements relate to other 
statements. W hat the transfer principles do, in the final analysis, is to reduce the 
consequence relation (the relation of logical implication, holding between statements) 
‘h ’ to the material implication (holding between the content of statements) and 
add the predicate ‘is logically true’.
Let us note that the reducing sentence is part of the web since logical truths are 
neither metatheorems (difficult to locate in the web) nor statements of logical conse­
quence (subjected to Carroll’s regress). It should go without saying that Quine would 
applaud such a move. Reduction of a problematic notion to an unproblematic one 
is a manoeuvre which is constantly done in philosophy, and Quine himself certainly 
can be counted as a reductionist in many respects {Word and Object can virtually 
be read as a book performing mainly reduction after reduction — or even more rad­
ically, elimination after elimination). However, it should not be forgotten that even 
the reducing sentence is true in virtue of a metatheorem, since it is a logical truth.^^
Quine is aware of this equivalence between the relation of implication and logical truth. See his 
(1940: 5, especially p. 28).
will argue in Chapter 4 that Quine’s account of logical truth and logical consequence is irre-
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As Shapiro himself points out, the transfer principle limits the range of what is to 
count as an inference and what is to count as a logic. For instance, it is impossible to 
reduce infinitary inferences — such as the w-rule for arithmetic — to a Quinean logical 
truth since such inferences are not reducible to s e n te n c e s .B u t such inferences are 
clearly valid, at least from an intuitive point of view. How can a Quinean make sense 
of that? Another case in which the transfer principle fails is when the logic under 
the consideration does not have a deduction theorem (such a theorem has the form 
‘if F h ©, then F 0 ’, that is, the left-to-right direction of the transfer principle). 
In some modal logics, Shapiro points out, the deduction theorem does not hold. Of 
course, Quine dislikes modal logic: but he certainly does not require, as an a priori 
criterion for a correct logic, a deduction theorem. In any case, Quine is a staunch 
advocate of classical logic.
But let us ignore these problems for the time being, since the prospect of such 
a reduction would represent an important advance on the issue of locating validity 
in the web. Shapiro then considers the status of the transfer principles (that is, 
statements instantiating the form (TP)). Are they problematic for a Quinean? Put 
in the framework of the next Chapter, the question is: can they be treated as mere 
hypotheses without fear of regress? To treat the transfer principles as hypotheses 
means to be able to envisage the possibility of revising them. If the Quinean can 
make a convincing case to that effect, she seems to have found a definitive way out 
of the problem we are investigating in this Chapter, i.e., to make sense of validity 
(logical consequence) while espousing Error-theoretic Irrealism. If she cannot show 
that the principles are révisable, then, similarly to Wright’s point in the next Chapter,
diicibly modal. If my arguments in that Chapter are correct, it follows that the attempt to reduce 
what is supposedly the irreducibly modal (according to Wright, as we will see in the next Chapter) 
and impossible to locate (according to the argument in the previous sections) statements of logical 
consequence to a less problematic statement of logical truth via the transfer principles is bound to 
fail before it starts. But let us here assume that Quine’s treatment of logical truth is, as he thinks, 
purged of modalities.
^^We shall have more to say about the w-rule in Chapter 4.
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it will show that the appeal to the transfer principles cannot save the Quinean from 
the charge that his picture of knowledge makes an implicit appeal to modality.
To say that the transfer principles are révisable is tantamount to say that after 
all, logical truth and validity do not coincide. That is, to revise a transfer principle is 
in effect to recognise that something is a valid logical inference but cannot be reduced 
to a logical truth, or vice-versa. So we are left with a ‘valid’ logical inference whose 
status is not explained by the reducing account outlined above, and we are back to 
the problem of making sense of validity. Or conversely, we have a logical truth stating 
an implication which is not capable of being transformed as a statement of validity: 
but then, in which sense is it a logical truth? It looks as if the Quinean cannot hold 
that the transfer principles are révisable. They would therefore be unrevisable and 
a priori: that is, necessary. This should come £is no surprise. Remember that the 
equation of validity with logical truth is a provable theorem in some logical systems. 
This assimilation of validity to logical tru th  only works provided that it is possible 
to prove that it holds. The correctness of the transfer principles, therefore, depends 
on the validity of a certain proof. The proof is a metalogical one, or metatheoretic, 
and now the question becomes: what is the status of that proof? The problem is 
similar to the one encountered in previous sections, where doubts were raised about 
the intelligibility of a logical metatheory in the web.
Interestingly, Shapiro defends Quine and holds that the unrevisability of the trans­
fer principles might not be as problematic as it appears in Quine’s philosophy. Shapiro 
maintains that the transfer principles are fundamentally a priori. A sentence is fun­
damentally a priori, for him, “if it has an a priori warrant, and the reliability (or 
legitimacy) of this warrant is a priori, and the reliability of that is a priori, etc. 
— with the process continuing until we come on something that needs no warrant” 
(Shapiro, 2002: 11), He goes on to argue that Quine needn’t  be worried about the 
fact that his own system requires merely a weak set of fundamentally a priori logical
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principles since the conception of the a priori that he was attacking in ‘Two Dogmas’ 
was much more embracing. So the idea seems to be that what is crucial here is a 
matter of degree: whereas the logical positivists needed a lot of a priori principles, 
Quine needs only a few of them in order to avoid regress. This restricted set of princi­
ples not being enough to cover the needs of the logical positivists, Quine can embrace 
them as a priori without selling out his argument in ‘Two Dogmas’. However Shapiro 
(2002: 11) also notes that “(t)he notion of fundamental a priority is of a piece with 
traditional foundationalism” . So Quine, forced to embrace a (weak) set of fundamen­
tally a priori principles, is best viewed as a traditional foundationalist after all. If 
Shapiro is right, Quine’s main target is not foundationalism as such, but merely its 
logical positivist version.
But would that be congenial to Quine? That is, would Quine be happy to be 
viewed as a traditional foundationalist? Many writers interpret him as attacking 
precisely traditional foundationalism. On this reading, Quine’s attack on the logical 
positivists serves as a typical example of the kind of views he is ultimately challenging, 
namely traditional foundationalism. This latter reading gives wider scope to Quine’s 
attack, and explains why it has been so influential. If Quine were, on the contrary, to 
be interpreted as attacking only the logical positivists, it would be hard to make sense 
of the tremendous influence of his argument. Quine challenges — as seen in Chapter 
1 — the a priori /  a posteriori distinction in ‘Two Dogmas’ in a way that leads one 
to believe that he is criticising the viability of the distinction as such, and not only 
as appropriated by the members of a philosophical movement. It is uncontroversial, 
however, that his attack applies and undermines logical positivism. The point I am 
trying to make is simply this: Quine is doing much more — he is in effect attacking 
the notion of a priori knowledge by espousing holism. Aware that the syndrome of the 
a priori is not completely dispelled by his critique of the two dogmas, he goes ahead 
and shows how we can do without it via holism. It is indubitable that he attacked
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only a priori knowledge as manifested in the logical positivist’s writings, but we must 
not lose sight of the fact that an alternative picture of knowledge in which the a priori 
plays a central role would certainly not be to Quine’s taste, even if he did not put 
forward arguments against it. Even if the realm of the a priori which he would be 
forced to embrace would be restricted compared to the logical positivists, he would 
still owe us an account of a priori knowledge — but that would be inconsistent with 
his concept of naturalised epistemology. In a nutshell: the fact that Quine argues 
for the untenability of the logical positivist’s version of a priori knowledge does not 
entail that he would accept another conception of the a priori.
Another problem with Shapiro’s interpretation has to do with the conception 
supposedly advocated by Quine. There is first the question of how many principles 
will be a priori. Are we talking about a complete logic here, with axioms and rules of 
inference? Or should we rather have in mind only a few principles? The first option 
raises the worry that Quine’s conception will be indistinguishable from the logical 
positivist’s conception of the a priori. The second option brings to mind the worry 
that whilst the set of a priori principles will be smaller than the positivist’s, this new 
set will be subjected to Quine’s own criticism of the a priori. Another worry with this 
option is: how are we to determine these principles without developing a full logic? 
Can we have only a few logical principles without a full-blown logic with axioms and 
rules of inference? This is crucial, since if talk of ‘a few principles’ commits one to 
talk of a full-blown logic, then the advantages of restricting the realm of the a priori 
seem to fall apart.
To restrict the realm of the a priori also raises the question of how to determine 
which principles are necessary and sufficient to regulate the logical interconnections 
in the web. One suspects that modus ponens and a few rules regulating negation 
will be part of the set. But what about the rules governing conjunction? Should we 
include them? And if this minimal set of rules entails a lot of other rules, in what
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sense can it be said to result in a sort of ‘minimal’ logic? The spectre of inflating the 
minimal set of principles to a full-blown logic appears again.
2.7 C onclusion
In this Chapter, we have studied Quine’s holism and its relation to error-theoretic 
irrealism. After disentangling various notions playing a key role in Quine’s picture 
of knowledge and its relation to his attack on analyticity, the question of how to 
locate logical laws in a holistic theory of knowledge was addressed. By studying 
the question via Carroll’s regress, we have seen that Quine’s holism does not have 
the resources to contain a satisfying philosophy of logic. Moreover, it was pointed 
out that Carroll’s regress does not merely create a puzzle for holism. Indeed, the 
regress raises deep questions about the prima facie justificatory role of logical laws. 
The problem affects any perspective in the philosophy of logic acknowledging such a 
role to at least some logical laws. Since this justificatory role seems to be a normal 
feature of our understanding of inference, it appears that an argument purporting to 
show that logical laws do not and cannot have a normative status prompts an urgent 
need for a solution. After studying various possible solutions, I took a lead from 
Davidson’s ideas on akrasia and suggested a possible way out. The main advantage 
of the proposed solution is that it retains the justificatory role of logical laws without 
falling prey to the regress. Finally, we studied Shapiro’s attem pt to reconcile the 
spirit of Quine’s holism with an acceptance of Carroll’s regress. His solution commits 
holism to making a restricted place for a priori knowledge. We concluded that such 
an attempt would still leave unexplained the status of this kind of knowledge; in 
particular it was pointed out that it is not clear whether holism has the resources 
to accommodate it. The next Chapter will be devoted to examining a well-known 
argument attacking Quine’s philosophy of logic from a different perspective. This 
will, once more, lead us to look at issues going beyond the scope of Quine’s scepticism
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about logical necessity — issues forcing us to think hard about the very foundation 
of logic and inference.
C H A P T E R  3 
W R IG H T ’S A R G U M E N T
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3.1 In troduction
In the last Chapter, I argued that Quine’s web of belief picture couldn’t give a 
satisfying account of the logical interconnections inside the web. The problem raised is 
an internal one; it has to do with the logical structure of the web. Quine’s holism does 
not have the resources to explain the crucial role of the laws governing the relations 
between the sentences in the web and to explain the relation between the metatheory 
and the rest of the web. Wright, in his well-known paper on logical necessity (1986), 
also argues that the Quinean picture suffers from a problem having to do with the 
role of statements of logical necessity. His argument is intended to show that contrary 
to what Quine holds, the web of belief picture makes an implicit use of statements of 
logical necessity. That is, Quine claims he can do without logical necessity; Wright 
argues that the very intelligibility of Quine’s picture requires logical necessity.
This Chapter examines Wright’s argument. Section 3.2 explains the argument 
in detail, and in the following section a Quinean objection to Wright’s argument is 
studied and rebutted. I then appraise what exactly is establish by Wright’s argument. 
As we will see, there are doubts as to whether the argument, even if valid, establishes 
what it purports to establish, namely the necessity of logical necessity. Sections 3.4 
and 3.5 answer these doubts by showing how the gap in Wright’s argument can be 
filled.
3.2 W right’s argum ent
Wright tells us what happens in Quine’s picture when a theory is faced with a 
recalcitrant experience. The Quinean picture, according to Wright, goes as follows. 
There is a theory, call it 0 , from which we can derive conditionals of the form /  —> P, 
where I  stands for a set of initial conditions and P  for a prediction. Let us call such 
statements observational conditionals. /  ^  P  is obtained from 0  via a logic L. We
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thus have, corresponding to each derived statement I  P, another statement, W, 
which describes the derivation in 0  of the observational conditional. Such statements 
have the form ‘0  \ ~ l  {I —^ P ) ’. It says, in effect, that given a basis (a theory) and 
a logic L along with rules of inference, such and such theorems follow (in this case, 
observational conditionals). W  has exactly the form (F hx, 0 ), a statement we would 
be inclined to say is logically necessary. (See Introduction for more on (F hx, 0)).
According to Quine, the main virtue of a theory is that of maximising the fit 
between the theory and the data — in this case, since Quine is an empiricist, the 
data consist, presumably, of sentences that we are inclined to assent to on the basis 
of experience.^ In the holistic picture of knowledge, the scientist is constantly revising 
her web of belief in the light of experience (more precisely, in the light of statements 
we are inclined to assent to on the basis of experience). She tests her observational 
conditionals on the tribunal of experience and modifies the web accordingly. The idea 
is clear: when the theory does not sufficiently fit the tribunal of experience, we should 
change — modify — the theory so that it maximises fit with the data.
Wright explains in detail what exactly is going on when one is making changes in 
the web. The main impetus for making such changes clearly resides in the occurrence 
of recalcitrant experience. Let us take an arbitrary observational conditional, obtained 
from an arbitrary theory. A recalcitrant experience E  is an experience inclining us 
to dissent from P  but to assent to I. That is to say, the initial conditions described 
by I  are obtained but the prediction P  does not occur — something else happens. 
W hat exactly is involved in describing an experience as recalcitrant? Let us construct 
an example of a recalcitrant experience, by way of a simple theory.^ The theory 0  
consists of, amongst other things, the following ‘eternal sentence’: ‘Copper oxide is
^Note here that we can’t say that the data consists of perceptual experience per so. In the web, 
there are only sentences. Saying that the theory confronts the ‘pure’, unconceptualised perceptual 
experiences would be to fall into the myth of the given. See Sellars (1956). Thanks to Stewart 
Shapiro for drawing my attention to this important point.
I^ borrow the example from Quine himself. See Word and Object, pp. 10-13.
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green’. An observational conditional, derived from 0 , goes as follows: ‘if two test 
tubes containing, respectively, substance A and substance B are mixed, then we get a 
green stuff called copper oxide’. The phenomenon of recalcitrance is to be imagined 
as follows. The scientist prepares the tubes, mixes them, and has an experience E 
to the effect that the stuff does not turn green. In other words, to stick to Quinean 
terminology, the scientist dissents from the sentence ‘the stuff is green’ — her stimulus 
response to this sentence is one of dissent. But the theory predicts that the stuff would 
be green. So there is an experience which is recalcitrant.
It is clear that the recalcitrance of an experience is a function of many factors, 
including the theory 0 . E is recalcitrant only because we are working under the 
framework of a given theory, such a theory implying the observational conditional. 
An experience is not recalcitrant per se. It is recalcitrant because it contradicts an 
observational conditional. The scientist works under the hypothesis that her theory 
is true, and that the observational conditional is a correct prediction. The sentence 
assented to on the basis of experience E  is also held to be veridical. But one cannot 
hold all of this to be true at the same time, since the sentence assented to on the 
basis of E  (that is, {I & ~R )) contradicts the observational conditional I  P. 
Unless one is prepared to accept such basic and blatant contradictions, one has to 
change something in the theory. To be more precise, recalcitrance requires three main 
elements. First, there has to be an observational conditional I  —r P, obtained from 0  
via a logic L. Without such a conditional, there would be nothing to be recalcitrant 
about. Second, there has to be an experience E. And thirdly, this experience must 
prompt assent to /  and ~ P . To recap, we need for recalcitrance:
1. W: 0 h L  ( /  -^ P).
2. An experience E.
3. E  prompts assent to ( /  & ~ P ).
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Strictly speaking, it is the conjunction of (1) -  (3) which leads to a particular judge­
ment of recalcitrance. That is, to say of an experience that it is recalcitrant is to 
say that (1) and (3) seem to be true and (2) seems veridical but that they lead to 
a contradiction. They are contradictory since the theory predicts P (in virtue of (1) 
and the fact that E  prompts assent to I  in virtue of (3)), but E  prompts assent to 
not-P (in virtue of (3)). We end up with (P  &; ~ P )  in the web. P  is held true on 
the basis of the theory along with its logic and the experience E, and not-P is held 
true on the basis of experience only. It is the contradiction which puts the scientist’s 
beliefs in tension and forces her to make changes in the theory.
Faced with a recalcitrant experience, the scientist has many options. In Quine’s 
picture, every statement, or chunk of the web, is révisable. The goal, when faced with 
a recalcitrant experience, is to revise at least one of some of these statements in order 
to get rid of the recalcitrance. Let’s enumerate a few obvious candidates for revision:
O l: Changing the theory so that it does not yield the problematic observational 
conditional ( /  P) anymore. (Getting rid of the eternal sentence ‘Copper 
oxide is green’).
0 2 : Changing the underlying logic L so that we cannot deduce the observational 
conditional whilst keeping the original theory. (Changing for quantum logic, 
say).
0 3 : Rejecting the experience E  by pleading hallucination or by simply ignoring it. 
(Denying that the stuff actually turned green).
0 4 : Claiming that the initial conditions I  were not strictly observed. (Claiming that 
one of the mixing tubes did not contain the appropriate substance).
Performing a revision along the lines of options (01) to (04) can indeed remove the 
recalcitrance. But Wright points out that one option is missing from that list, namely
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the option to deny that E  is recalcitrant in the first place by denying that I  P 
follows from © via L. Without the observational conditional, the experience E ceases 
to be recalcitrant. That is to say, it is at least a possible option to reject W  (namely, 
to reject ‘0  hi, ( /  P ’)). To reject W  is not to reject the underlying logic, and it
is not to reject the theory. It is rather the plain denial that /  —> P  follows from the 
theory via the logic L.
There is a prima facie difficulty with this. One could say: how can we reject 
that /  —> P follows from the theory via L if all the steps leading to /  -^ P  are 
P-accredited steps? At first blush, it does seem that rejecting a statement of the 
form W  amounts to rejecting P, so that the option of rejecting W  is not a distinct 
option. But this is missing the point. The fact that I  P follows from the theory 
via P simply is another sentence like the others. That is, it is possible that one 
did not follow the P-accredited steps correctly, that there was, say, a mistake in the 
application of the rules of P. The Quinean must acknowledge that as a possibility. As 
it stands, W  is révisable. If it were not, that would mean that there would be, in the 
end, unrevisable statements in the web — that is, necessary statements, statements 
immune to revision. So the Quinean is clearly committed to the revisability of W 
— every judgement, every sentence in the web is révisable. This is the case despite 
the undeniable fact that it seems hard to see how one could revise such statements. 
A further option by which to get rid of the recalcitrance is thus simply to deny that 
there is recalcitrance in the first place, not by pleading hallucination or by accepting 
a contradiction, but rather this time via a rejection of W:
0 5 : Denying that E  is recalcitrant via a rejection of W. That is, denying that /  
—> P  follows from the theory-with-its-logic. (Denying that the observational 
conditional ‘if two test tubes containing respectively substance A and substance 
B are mixed, then we get a green stuff called copper oxide’ follows from the 
theory-with-its-logic).
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In sum, in the situation we have imagined, the scientist faces a range of options in 
order to accommodate the recalcitrant experience. This seems to be a fair reconstruc­
tion of what actually happens in science.^
After setting up this Quinean picture of science, Wright invites us to consider the 
following question: when is it reasonable, under this picture, to believe a statement 
such as W? To put the question differently, what could compel the scientist to dis­
card option (05)? In order to get a clear view of the situation, let us first ask how, 
in the Quinean methodology, the scientist is going to decide between (01) -  (05). 
Presumably, Wright says, the main consideration must be the degree of further re­
calcitrance associated with each option. It is sound scientific methodology to choose, 
amongst (01) -  (05), the option which will provoke less further recalcitrance. We 
just can’t pick randomly, on pain of having to cope with possibly disastrous results. 
We must test the options in order to make the best hypothesis. The notion of ‘best 
hypothesis’ — the expression used by Wright — is to be understood this way: for 
Quine, every statement in the web is, in a sense, a hypothesis since they can all be 
revised. This is especially true of (01) -  (05), since these options are put forward 
as possible options, i.e., they are put forward tentatively and the idea is to find the 
best one amongst them. Therefore, when choosing amongst (01) -  (05), the scientist 
wants to choose the best hypothesis between the options — this is in effect the point 
of the methodology. So the task of the sound scientist at this point is to assess the 
consequences of adopting each of (01) to (05), and then, on the basis of these results, 
to choose amongst them. To assess the consequences means, in this context, to assess 
the degree of recalcitrance associated with rejecting, say, the theory 0  and replac­
ing it with another theory. Assessing the degree of recalcitrance of a given option 
presupposes a means to calculate this degree. How this is done precisely might vary, 
but there has to be such a means. In any case, to assess the degree of recalcitrance
^Although it has to be conceded that (02) is a very rare case and (05) has surely never happened.
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involves assuming, for the sake of the argument, that the web has been changed in a 
particular way (one of (01) -  (05)) and to test that hypothesis against experience. 
Therefore, for each of (01) -  (05), we make new judgements of recalcitrance.
Let us now ask again, when is it reasonable to discard the option of rejecting W? 
In order to assess the viability of keeping W, we have to determine the degree of 
recalcitrance attached to it, i.e., we have to evaluate the ‘cost’ of discarding it. If 
the price is too big — if abandoning W  provokes a lot of recalcitrance — it’s better 
to keep it. The cost is determined by comparing (05) with the other options. Let 
us say that our scientist arrives at these results (the number represents the degree of 
recalcitrance) :
Adopting 01: 8 
Adopting 02: 25 
Adopting 03: 12 
Adopting 04: 4 
Adopting 05: 17
The situation seems straightforward. On the basis of these results, the scientist has 
to adopt the fourth option on the list — she has to claim that the initial conditions 
described by the observational conditional were not followed correctly (since (04) 
contains the least degree of recalcitrance).
But despite appearances, it is not that straightforward. Wright asks us to examine 
what exactly the scientist is doing when reasoning from hypotheses — when, that is, 
she is determining the degree of recalcitrance of each option. She is, we have just seen, 
making new judgements of recalcitrance. In other words, she is making judgements 
of the form (1) -  (3). These new judgements are, of course, révisable statements 
just like the others. The question arises at this point: how do we know that option.
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say, (03) has a degree of recalcitrance of 12 is the best hypothesis? That is, how 
do we know that the proposition ‘rejecting the experience E  results in a degree 12 
of recalcitrance’ is the best hypothesis? It is a possibility, after all, that instead of 
holding such a statement true it would be better to ignore the experience(s) involved 
in this judgement, or to reject the W  involved, or to deny that the initial conditions 
were observed, etc. This is because assessing the degree of recalcitrance of a given 
option must involve particular judgements of recalcitrance — must involve, that is, 
particular judgements (of the form (1) -  (3) above) to the effect that adopting a given 
option occasions a certain number of recalcitrant experiences. In order to know which 
judgements of recalcitrance to keep and which to reject amongst those judgements, 
the scientist has to see how every judgment of recalcitrance fares in comparison with 
the other options. This again invites a new query as to see which hypothesis is the 
best, and the scientist makes new judgements of recalcitrance, and so on infinitely.
In the end, we can never know when it is reasonable to hold true statements such as 
W. This is because in order to assess the viability of W, we have to make judgements of 
recalcitrance, which are further hypotheses. But are they the best hypotheses? Since 
recalcitrance is always a hypothesis, we have to make sure that a particular judgement 
of recalcitrance is the best hypothesis to hold — otherwise believing in a judgement 
of recalcitrance would amount to believe in a hypothesis without rational grounds. 
This subtle argument invites many comments and reflections. In what follows, I shall 
be concerned, first, to examine one possible Quinean counter-argument, and second, 
to identify what exactly is undermined by the argument, if successful.
3.3 A  Q uinean reply
The regress in Wright’s argument begins when it is observed that the new judge­
ments of recalcitrance made in the course of deciding the best hypothesis are them­
selves révisable hypotheses. This means that the Quinean must then decide whether
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these new judgements of recalcitrance form the best hypothesis (whether these judge­
ments of recalcitrance form the best option to hold), and regress ensues. One imme­
diate way to stop the regress is to appeal to a pragmatical maxim stipulating that 
for the sake of being able to make changes in the web, the scientist must regard the 
new judgements of recalcitrance as fixed and unrevisable for the time b e i n g To use 
Neurath’s metaphor, the idea here is that while the scientist is fixing her boat, she 
need only worry about the immediate task at hand, i.e., fixing the damage. What 
happens next might be cause for further worry, but right now the scientist has to 
focus exclusively on her main job. In other words, she must take the new judge­
ments of recalcitrance as unrevisable at least for a while. She does not need to check 
whether they are the best hypothesis or not in order to resolve the recalcitrance that 
caused the problem in the first place. According to this line of thought, the presup­
position that Wright makes — that each judgement of recalcitrance must be shown 
conclusively to be the best in hypothesis in order to hold it true — is unwarranted. 
The scientist can, in fact, stop the regress by accepting the new judgements of re­
calcitrance as they are. W hat justifies this move is a consideration of a pragmatic 
nature: the scientist has to do her best to solve the problem at hand. To come back 
to our example, she is justified in adopting option (04) on the ground that even if 
she does not know whether the judgements involved in choosing (04) form the best 
hypothesis, they look like they are the best (since she arrived at these results), and 
that is enough for the task at hand.
This seductive argument, however, misses the point of Wright’s argument. Re­
member what happens at the first stage of recalcitrance — when the first experience 
E  occurs that leads the scientist to make the best possible change in the web. We 
have an established theory, together with its logic and its predictions. Something 
goes wrong — an experience occurs and conflicts with the prediction. Now it is a
^This Quinean defence has been brought to my attention by Gerry Hough.
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crucial step in Wright’s argument to recognise that recalcitrance itself is a hypothet­
ical matter (that is, that judgements of recalcitrance are themselves révisable). That 
means that it is possible, in principle, to solve the problem by denying that there is 
recalcitrance (a conflict between experience and prediction) in the first place. So it 
is still a matter to be decided whether there is recalcitrance or not. In other words, 
recalcitrance might not be the best hypothesis. To identify the best hypothesis is 
clearly a central methodological principle that a Quinean will accept. This is what 
happens when the scientist ponders on which option to choose between (01) and 
(05) — all these new judgements of recalcitrance are made to determine which op­
tion is the best hypothesis. So far, the Quinean will accept all this. But she demurs 
when we point out to her that she must also make sure that these new judgements 
of recalcitrance are the best hypothesis. This is where the regress begins in Wright’s 
argument. The Quinean suggests that we should stop there, that there is no need to 
justify these new judgements for the purposes of the task at hand.
But what warrants this sudden refusal to find the best hypothesis? If we were so 
concerned in finding the best hypothesis in the first place (when choosing between
(01), (02),.. .,(05)), how can one justify the move that we have to take the new 
judgements of recalcitrance without checking whether they are the best hypothesis or 
not? I want to point out two things here. First, taking the new judgements of recal­
citrance as they first come out is a risky business. Let us imagine that our scientist 
chooses (04) since she accepts the prima facie result that this will occasion only a 
degree four of recalcitrance. She proceeds to make the changes in her web. But it 
turns out that these new judgements of recalcitrance concerning (04) were not the 
best hypothesis. In fact, it turns out, let’s assume, that instead of holding that this 
change would occasion a degree four of recalcitrance, it would actually occasion a de­
gree forty-two, since upon examination it so happens that she made a mistake in the 
original judgement of recalcitrance or else she neglected to take some considerations
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into account. The crucial point is that she took her original judgement of recalci­
trance at face value, but it turns out that had she revised it, she would have realised 
that in fact, opting for (04) is disastrous. Let’s explain the m atter differently. The 
scientist is now at the stage in which she is revising (04) — upon realisation that 
something is wrong, after having adjusted the theory, etc. In doing so, she makes new 
judgements of recalcitrance, and picks the best one. Now let us imagine that when 
she was making these further judgements of recalcitrance, she arrived at these results:
(01)* 56
(02)* 42
(03)* 75
(04)* 45
(05)* 99
According to these results, she ought to choose (02)* (let’s assume that this op­
tion consists of ignoring the experience causing the recalcitrance). But this is clearly 
a serious problem for the theory. Whereas in the very first instance of recalcitrance 
we had to choose amongst options containing between a degree four and a degree 
twenty-five of recalcitrance, we now face a situation where we have to choose between 
42 and 99. The theory ends up very badly as a result of having choosing option (04) 
in the first place. But this situation happens because the scientist took her prelimi­
nary judgements of recalcitrance at face value. If she had studied the consequences 
of adopting (04) more carefully, she wouldn’t find herself in that situation. The 
situation is potentially highly problematic since effecting a change in the web may 
occasion, in the long run, many other changes. Thus, it might become very difficult 
to accommodate all the new changes prompted by the realisation that she in fact 
occasioned a lot of recalcitrance without realising it immediately. The point here is
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that taking judgements of recalcitrance without checking whether they are the best 
hypothesis amounts to a step in the dark — assuming, as a good Quinean should, 
that judgements of recalcitrance are hypotheses.
3.4 W h at exactly  does W righ t’s argum ent establish?
These considerations bring me directly to my second point. Pushing the situation 
I have just described a bit further, we find that the Quinean never has a firm grasp 
of the notion of recalcitrance. This point was actually brought up by Wright in his 
paper, although he did not expand on it. The Quinean, forced to accept the prima 
facie results of judgements of recalcitrance to avoid a regress, never can be sure that 
an experience is recalcitrant. The only means she has to decide whether a given 
experience is recalcitrant is by accepting it without checking whether it is the best 
hypothesis or not, by stipulating that the chain of justification has to come to an end 
somewhere. But we have just seen that it is not sound scientific practice to proceed 
this way — one cannot say both that judgements of recalcitrance are hypotheses 
and that they are not subject to appraisal like other hypotheses. The Quinean can 
never know whether a particular experience is or is not recalcitrant. This is a serious 
defect. The notion of recalcitrance figures at the heart of the web of belief; it is the 
very notion around which the success of a theory is to be assessed. If there is no way 
to tell whether an experience is recalcitrant — whether it is the best hypothesis or not 
— then the whole foundation of Quine’s system collapses. As Wright says, Quine’s 
system can’t explain the requisite notion of success (1986; 193). Indeed, it cannot 
explain it since success is, for a Quinean, to be explained in terms of a theory’s degree 
of recalcitrance — yet there is no way to tell whether an experience is recalcitrant or 
not if we follow Quine’s methodology scrupulously (if we accept the claim that every 
statement is révisable in the light of empirical evidence).
One way to avoid the regress is to hold judgements of recalcitrance ‘true come
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what may’ — unrevisable. Indeed, a natural solution is to regard at least some of the 
ingredients of such judgements as being necessary in the sense of being unrevisable. 
Remember that those ingredients consist of (1) -  (3):
1. W : Q \ - l I  P-
2. An experience E.
3. E  prompts assent to ( /  & ~ P ).
We can’t hold an experience to be necessary or a priori. Experiences are unconcep­
tualised events, they just happen. So it can’t be a reasonable option to hold that
(2) is the necessary or a priori ingredient. Looking at (3), we find that the fact that 
E  prompts assent to I  and is determined by the very content of the experience. 
Again, that E  prompts assent to I  and can’t be held to be necessary, since assign­
ing a content to an experience depends on many factors — it is clearly a contingent 
matter. For instance, one can have an experience prompting assent to the sentence 
‘this is red’, but it is always possible that the same experience would have prompted 
assent to a difference sentence given different circumstances (if the speaker knows 
he’s hallucinating, or knows that the perceptual conditions in which he finds himself 
are not standard). We are left with (1), the statement of logical consequence. This 
amounts to saying that, given the veracity of the content assigned to the experience, 
under the present proposal the Quinean — or anyone — must regard statements of 
logical consequence as being unrevisable. To do so allows judgements of recalcitrance 
to have the role they are intended to play in the Quinean picture, namely to act as 
regulators of the web and as measure of success. If such judgements can be taken to 
be true in virtue of the necessity of statements such as (1), the regress stops. That 
is, if revising statements of the form W  is not an option, then there is no need to 
test judgements of recalcitrance indefinitely. It is true that we have to discard the 
possibility of rejecting the experience involved before holding the judgement of recal-
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citrance as being definitely true. But unless one is ready to espouse a naive scepticism 
about experience, there has to be a point where hallucination can reasonably be dis­
carded. In other words, it is true that we can never be sure, in a sense, that the 
content assigned to an experience is veridical: it is always possible in principle to 
plead hallucination. But hallucination is the exception, not the rule. Once sufficient 
tests have been made to rule out the plausibility of rejecting the second ingredient in 
judgements of recalcitrance — the assent to 7 & — the necessity of W  seems to
provide the foundation needed to avoid the regress. This is a very tempting argument
— it does fix the Quinean boat.
However, what is the notion of ‘true come what may’ in play here? What does 
it amount to? The correctness of the argument above equates logical necessity with 
unrevisability. This is a natural thing to do. Indeed, it seems that the problem identi­
fied by Wright with regards to the Quinean methodology is the following: the regress 
occurs because every statement is a hypothesis, and as such each one is révisable. If 
that is the source of the regress, then it is overwhelmingly tempting to stop it by 
declaring statements of the form W  as being unrevisable, that is, as being ‘true come 
what may’ and thus necessary. But it is a mistake to equate logical necessity with 
unrevisability. This equation stems from an ambiguity in the expression ‘true come 
what may’ (an expression used by Quine repeatedly when talking about necessity). 
To be ‘true come what may’ can mean two things:
1. Whatever happens, I will hold the statement true because its tru th  is inviolable.
2. I am prepared to hold the statement true no matter what happens because its 
tru th  does not depend on the configuration of the world, broadly conceived.
This is a subtle distinction.^ The first formulation does not amount to logical necessity
— it merely amounts to treat the statement as having a very high degree of certainty.
®For which I am grateful to Crispin Wright.
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I might be very certain of the truth of a statement without that statement being 
logically necessary. For instance, I am highly certain that I am right now in the 
postgraduate Hut situated behind Edgecliffe, but it’s obviously not logically necessary. 
I am also highly certain that there are other minds, but despite the amazingly high 
probability of that being the case, it is not necessarily so. This first sense of ‘true come 
what may’, is to be equated with unrevisability, namely the idea that the statement 
will never be revised, no matter what happens. A logically necessary statement is, on 
the other hand, révisable. As a matter of fact, we do not often revise our judgements 
of logical necessity; but the possibility to do so is not discarded from the outset. We 
can get a proof wrong. We can make a mistake when computing a proof. Some 
mathematicians have made mistakes in their proofs that have been discovered years 
later. And we allow for that — a correct proof is logically necessary even if we allow, 
in principle, the possibility of revising it. Thus, the truth of our judgements of what 
is logically necessary is not inviolable. Locating the source of the regress to the fact 
that in the Quinean methodology every statement is révisable results in trying to fix 
the problem by treating W ’s as unrevisable. But doing so amounts to interpret the 
notion of necessity in the first sense; and that is a confusion.
W hat about the second sense of necessity? Does it correspond better to our 
intuitions about the notion? If so, how does it relate to Wright’s argument against 
Quine? In the second sense, to be ‘true come what may’ means to be prepared to 
hold the statement true no matter what happens in the actual world, no matter how 
it changes.® The world is thus-and-so — my holding a statement as necessary means 
that it does not matter how the world is; it could be different and I would still hold 
the statement true. In fact, no matter what the configuration of the world is, I cannot 
foresee myself changing, on its basis, my judgement of necessity. This differs from
®One is tempted to say: To hold the statement true in all possible worlds, but this is a formulation 
I would prefer to avoid in the present thesis.
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the unrevisability claim: nothing is said, in this formulation, about unrevisability as 
such. All that is maintained is that I cannot envisage the possibility of revising the 
truth-value of the statement in the light of how the empirical world is. That means 
two things: firstly, that even if I cannot envisage the possibility of doing so given 
my state of information about how the world is and could be, I can still envisage 
the possibility of new information coming in, requiring me to revise the judgement. 
Secondly, it means that I can revise the statement in the light of things other than 
the way the world is. For instance, as mentioned before, I could be prompted, by a 
mistake in a proof, to revise my judgement. But this is not a change prompted by 
the way the world is or could be. This seems to be a more reasonable conception of 
what it is to hold a statement as being logically necessary.
Now, how does this understanding of logical necessity relate to Wright’s argu­
ment against Quine? If we take Wright’s argument as establishing the point that 
a methodology in which every statement is révisable leads to a regress, we will be 
tempted to stop the regress by declaring some statements as unrevisable. But we can 
also view the argument in a different perspective: the argument might be taken to 
show that there are statements which must be evaluated not in the light of further 
recalcitrance but according to a different methodology. More precisely, one can di­
agnose the problem in Quine’s methodology in the following way. There is a regress 
since all statements relate to experience. Because they all so relate to experience, 
the truth of each statement has to be evaluated in relation to their empirical recalci­
trance, so to speak. This need to evaluate every statement in relation to their degree 
of potential recalcitrance is what causes the regress in final analysis.
If this is the right way to look at it, the source of the regress has nothing to do 
with revisability, but rather with the fact that all statements are révisable in the 
light of experience. This would call for allowing a class of statements to be evalu­
ated outside this arena. Since the source of the regress lies in making judgements of
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recalcitrance, the diagnosis is that such judgements must be evaluated outside the 
Quinean methodology. That is precisely what Wright concludes: ‘So the reasonable­
ness, or otherwise, of judgements of recalcitrance must be exempted from appraisal 
via the Quinean methodology. And that must go for the ingredients in such judge­
ments, including statements like W ’ (Wright, 1986: 194). He then claims that they 
are to be understood in terms of proof and that this shows that we “possess some 
sort of concept of logical necessity” (Wright, 1986: 195). Much has been read into 
that claim: Ian McFetridge (1990) and Hale (1999) argue that Wright is not entitled 
to draw that conclusion from his argument. Hale writes:
It is one thing to accept that we have to regard a proof as establishing a 
statem ent (such as IF) in a way that is not subject to  holistic appraisal, and 
quite another to  hold that a statem ent thus established is necessary. W hat 
the argument shows, at best, is that we have to accept such statem ents as 
established, by suitable proofs, as true\ nothing in the argument dem ands their 
acceptance as necessarily  true. (Hale, 1999: 46)
Hale, who also defends logical necessity, uses Wright’s argument in conjunction with 
an argument of McFetridge to show the necessity of logical necessity. According to 
Hale, both McFetridge’s argument and Wright’s are incomplete. However, Hale claims 
that McFetridge’s argument can be made to work with a little help from Wright’s 
argument. His strategy is convincing — it seems to convincingly show the necessity 
of necessity. In what follows, however, I shall pursue another approach based on the 
considerations just reviewed.
3.5 Prom  p roof to  necessity
Now that the notion of logical necessity has been clarified and the source of the 
regress identified, we can proceed to show how it is possible to fill the gap in Wright’s
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argument. Wright claims that since some ingredients in our judgements of recal­
citrance must be exempted from Quine’s empirico-holistic methodology, that shows 
that we possess ‘some sort of concept of logical necessity’. We have just seen how Hale 
and McFetridge dispute this inferential step. In this section, I shall defend Wright’s 
contention and try to justify the inferential step. Wright, McFetridge, and Hale all 
agree on one important point: that Wright’s argument establishes that statements 
such as W’s are arrived at by proof. So what has been established is that there is 
a fundamental difference between a proof and an experiment. This is crucial. It is 
a recurrent empiricist thought that logic and mathematics are as ‘empirical’ as any 
other field and that the apparent difference in kind is merely one in degree. Thus, 
to put in another way, Wright’s argument shows that there is a class of statements 
which is not empirical.^
An empirical statement is one whose truth is determined by, roughly speaking, 
‘the way things are in the world’. That means that if Wright’s argument is correct, 
and if the interpretation given in the previous section is also correct, then the truth 
of statements of the form W  is not determined by the way things are in the world. It 
is a small step to connect these considerations with the second interpretation of ‘true 
come what may’ given above, namely: I will hold the statement true no matter what 
happens because its tru th  does not depend on the configuration of the world, broadly 
conceived. A judgement about the truth of a statement of the form W  is made via 
a proof. Such a proof, it has been suggested by Wright, lies outside the empirical 
arena. So when I form a judgement by way of proof, the truth of this judgement will 
not be affected by the configuration of the world. I will hold it true ‘no matter what’ 
— not in the sense that it will be unrevisable, but in the other sense. A revision 
of the statement is still possible, but such a revision will proceed through the proof
^For more on the proof /  experiment distinction see Wright (1980: Part Three, esp. Chapter 
XVII).
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methodology. Therefore, there are statements whose truth is not affected by the way 
the world is, contrary to what Quine’s holism implies. Such statements are logically 
necessary.
3.6 C onclusion
This Chapter was concerned to study Wright’s argument against the holistic pic­
ture of belief advocated by Quine. This picture of our relation to the world is in 
effect a manifestation of Error-theoretic Irrealism, since Quine claims it has no need 
for true statements of the form □(E \~l 0 ). Wright’s argument purports to refute 
Error-theoretic Irrealism by showing that the Quinean methodology suffers from an 
important problem: it can’t explain what it is for a theory, or a change in a theory, to 
be better than another one. But as such, it does not establish without doubt the need 
for a notion of logical necessity, as pointed out by Hale and McFetridge. However, 
once we reflect on what Wright’s argument establishes and on what we mean by a 
judgement of logical necessity, it is possible to bridge the gap in Wright’s argument. 
In the next Chapter we study another form of scepticism about logical necessity, 
namely the substitutional account of logical consequence.
C H A P T E R  4 
E R R O R -T H E O R E T IC  IR R EA LISM : LO G ICAL  
C O N SE Q U E N C E
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4.1 In trod uction
Error-theoretic Irrealism about logical necessity is the view that the notion is, in 
some sense, disposable. We have seen that Quine takes holism to be a picture of our 
cognitive relation to the world which entails Error-theoretic Irrealism. However, our 
assessment of Quinean holism led to the conclusion that this epistemological picture 
does on the contrary require a notion of logical necessity. It is needed both to make 
sense of the logical interconnections between statements in the web of belief and to 
make sense of the very idea of recalcitrance. However, there is another standpoint 
from which Quine espouses Error-theoretic Irrealism. Quine, qua logician, owes us an 
account of logical truth and logical consequence. That is, he must explain in which 
sense these truths are logical, as opposed to being non-logical truths. What, then, 
according to Quine distinguishes logical truths from the other truths? This is the 
question with which we shall be concerned in this Chapter.
This is a crucial question for Quine the logician, even though his epistemological 
theory seems to imply that nothing distinguishes logical truths from other kinds of 
truths. There is indeed a prima facie tension between Quine’s epistemological views 
and his concern to explain what it is that makes logical truths ‘special’. I shall 
not attempt to diagnose the source of this tension. Rather, I will examine Quine’s 
account of logical tru th  and logical consequence as it stands on its own. In any case, 
his account — to be faithful to Error-theoretic Irrealism — must avoid any notion of 
logical necessity. His task is to make sense of the strong intuition that logical truths 
are somehow ‘different’ from the other truths without invoking the most plausible 
reason to believe the intuition — without, that is, saying that these truths are special 
because they are logically necessary.
The Chapter is structured as follows. The next three sections discuss and examine 
Quine’s account of logical truth. Strawson’s objection to the account is scrutinised 
and I show how a Quinean can answer that objection. In section 4.4, I put forward
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an argument to the effect that the notion of meaning has to figure at the core of 
the account, contrary to what Quine holds. The remainder of the Chapter (sections 
4.5-4.12) looks into Quine’s substitutional account of logical consequence, in effect 
an extension of his account of logical truth. Tarski’s account of logical consequence 
is also examined in relation to Quine’s. The main strategy in these sections is, firstly, 
to show that Quine is committed to the Tarskian account; and then to argue that the 
Tarskian account has to be interpreted in terms of representational semantics, which 
is an irreducibly modal account of logical consequence. The main purpose of these 
sections, then, is to show that Quine (indeed, everyone) is committed to a modal 
account of logical consequence — a non-modal account simply does not work.
4.2 Q uine’s account o f logical tru th
Quine (1951) divides analytic truths into two classes. The first class consists in 
the logical truths proper, truths such as ‘no married man is unmarried’. The second 
class consists of statements reducible to logical truths proper by putting synonyms for 
synonyms, such as ‘no bachelor is a married man’. In section 1 to 4 of ‘Two Dogmas’ 
Quine focuses on the second class. The special characteristic of the first class is that 
their logical form is valid. That is, putting appropriate variables in place of the names 
and predicates, we get a valid schema. For instance, ‘no unmarried man is a married 
man’ can be analysed like this (taking ‘<7’ for ‘is a man’ and ‘F ’ for ‘is married’):
~  3æ((Ga;) & {Fx & ~  Fx))
By contrast, if we perform the same operation on ‘no bachelor is a married man’, we 
get (taking ‘iF  for ‘is a bachelor’):
-  3æ((Ga;) & (Fa; & ffæ))
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This is not a valid schema. The sentence ‘no bachelor is a married man’ will be 
interpretable as yielding a valid schema only if we can show that in this particular 
case, ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous expressions, so that we can 
transform the sentence into ‘no unmarried man is a married man’ by way of putting 
synonyms for synonyms. This latter sentence exhibits a valid logical form — it is 
a logical truth proper. The reducibility of the second class to the first class clearly 
depends on the notion of synonymy. As we have seen in Chapter One, Quine holds 
that synonymy can’t be used satisfactorily to perform the reduction, and this is his 
main argument to the effect that sentences such as ‘no bachelor is a married man’ are 
true simpliciter, on the same level as ‘the cat is on the m at’.
Whilst in the first Chapter we were concerned with the status of the reductive 
class (statements reducible to logical truths), the focus of this Chapter will be on 
the logical truths. In Chapter One, we saw that Quine argued in ‘Two Dogmas’ that 
the so-called analytic statements of the second class were not analytic — that is, 
true by virtue of meaning. Were this kind of statement reducible to the first class, 
it would show that they are, in some sense, logical. This division of analytic truths 
into two mutually exclusive classes enables Quine to attack the standard notion of 
analyticity without endangering logical truths: if logic is not analytic in the sense of 
‘true by virtue of meaning’, that means that his attack on analyticity does not affect 
the status of the logical truths. But then, what is so special about the statements 
of the first class? In which sense are they analytic? It is undeniable that there is 
something special about ‘if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is a man’, in contrast 
with ‘Socrates is Plato’s teacher’. Clearly Quine also believes that logical truths 
proper have a special status. After all, he is the author of five introductory books 
on logic and the philosophy of logic. ^  His account of logical truth and of logical
^Mathematical Logic (1940), Elementary Logic (1966a), Methods of Logic (1950), Philosophy of 
Logic (1986), Set theory and Its Logic (1969b). He is of course the author of many logical papers, 
some of which assembled together in his Selected Logic Papers (1995b).
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consequence is therefore crucial with regard to Error-theoretic Irrealism, since if he 
can explain the special status of logic without invoking logical necessity or, for that 
matter, any intensional notion, he will have succeeded in steering between the Scylla 
of intensionality and the Charybdis of the assimilation of logical truths into ‘regular’ 
truths.
Let’s now introduce Quine’s account of logical truth. In a nutshell, a statement 
is logically true, in Quine’s sense, if it is not merely true but remains true under all 
uniform substitutions of its component expressions other than the logical constants.^ 
Let us call this a substitutional account of logical truth. This account was first 
suggested by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre (1837).^ To get a clear idea of the 
structure of the account, let’s consider first an example of propositional logic. Take 
for instance:
If Socrates is moral, then Socrates is mortal (4.1)
That sentence is clearly a logical truth, if anything is. The substitutional account 
explains its logicality via the ideas of valid schema and substitution. The logical form 
of an expression is obtained by replacing its non-logical components with variable 
terms. Taking, as we are analysing (4.1) under propositional logic, ‘Socrates is mortal’ 
as an atomic expression, the logical form of (4.1) is:
<f\ (4.2)
The central idea of the substitutional account is that (4.1) is a logical truth since its
^Quine (1951: 22). Quine actually uses the word he-interpretations' instead of ‘substitutions’. 
But since the former has semantical connotations, I prefer to use ‘substitution’, a term he does use 
elsewhere.
^Partly translated into English under the title Theory of Science (1972). Bolzano’s account is 
framed in terms of propositions and ideas, contrary to Quine who uses statements and expressions. 
But the central idea of substitution to account for logical truth and logical consequence is clearly 
Bolzano’s. It is easy to recast Bolzano’s account in terms of sentences and expressions.
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logical form will produce only truths when the propositional variables are substituted 
with appropriate expressions of the object language. That is, whatever one substitutes 
for ‘Socrates is mortal’ in (4.1), the result will be true since (4.1) is an instance of 
(4.2), and the latter is a valid schema. Quine understands validity of schemata in 
terms of metatheorems: a schema is valid if it is a metatheorem. In the case of 
a tautology of propositional logic such as (4.2), its corresponding metatheorem — 
h \(j) (j)\ — says that whatever you may select, if (j) then (f). Of course, there are
constraints on substitutions — more on that later. An example of quantihcational 
logic is:
No unmarried man is a married man (4.3)
This is a logical truth at the subsentential level. That is, it is the internal ‘structure’ 
of the sentence, so to speak, which is logically true, rather than a combination of 
sentences. To explain the logicality of (4.3), we need a mode of logical form which 
‘goes into’ the logical form of sentences. Quantificational logic is just such a mode. 
Taking for instance ‘G’ for ‘is a man’ and ‘F ’ for ‘is married’, we get the logical form:
~  3x{{Gx) & {Fx  & ~  Fx))  (4.4)
The idea here is the same. Whatever permissible substitution is made for ‘F ’ and 
‘( j’, the result will be a true statement.
So one of the key ideas of the substitutional account of logical tru th  is that of 
logical form. The following distinction will help to put the account into a wider 
perspective. There are broadly two kinds of account of logical truth, those that make 
central appeal to logical form, called interpretational accounts, and those appealing 
to modality, called representational accounts. A representational account is one that 
uses modal notions such as necessity and impossibility. It often exploits possible 
world semantics. It will, for instance, say that (4.3) is logically true since it is true in
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all possible worlds. It is clearly in Quine’s interest to put forward an interpretational 
account.'^ The contrast between interpretational and representational accounts will 
be discussed further in section 4.7.
As mentioned, there are constraints on permissible substitutions. The first con­
straint is that of sameness of grammatical category. For instance, we cannot perform 
a substitution on (1) so that we get:
If is a horse is mortal for, then is a horse is mortal for, (4.5)
by substituting ‘is a horse is mortal for’ for ‘Socrates is mortal’. Such a substitution 
does not result in a true statement. The reason for that is clear enough: ‘is a horse is 
mortal for’ simply isn’t a well-formed statement. The same applies to logical truths 
of quantificational logic. Names must be substituted by names, and predicates by 
predicates. It is important to see that this constraint does not rely on intensional no­
tions. In effect, the constraint of grammatical category says that you have to respect 
the grammar of the terms you substitute. For the sake of simplicity, let’s say that 
we’re dealing with these three categories: statements (‘^ ’), names (‘z ’), predicates 
(‘F ’). W hat we have to assume here is a language with formation rules and a stock of 
expressions to serve as names and predicates, as well as a stock of logical operators 
(more on the latter below). Formation rules and the grammatical partitioning of ex­
pressions between statements, names and predicates are part of the syntactical part of 
the language. We need know nothing about either the meaning or the reference of the 
names and predicates of the language when performing a given substitution. All we 
have to know is the grammatical category of both the expressions we’re substituting 
and the substituted expressions. Therefore, the constraint of grammatical category 
does not presuppose the notion of meaning.
'^Tarski’s account, of which more in section 4.7, is also an interpretational account.
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The second constraint on substitution is that of uniformity. If a substituted ex­
pression occurs more than once in the original statement, we must substitute all 
occurrences of that expression with the same substituting expression. For instance, 
since the component expression ‘Socrates is mortal’ appears twice in ‘if Socrates is 
mortal, then Socrates is mortal’, one has to substitute both occurrences of ‘Socrates 
is mortal’ with the same expression. Otherwise, ‘if Socrates is mortal, then Aristotle 
is the King of Prance’ would count as a permissible transformation of ‘if Socrates is 
mortal, then Socrates is mortal’ and therefore the latter would be disqualified as a 
logical truth. The same consideration applies to the logical truths of quantificational 
logic: like names must be replaced by like names, and like predicates by like predi­
cates. Otherwise, the account will break down. Again, the constraint of uniformity 
seemingly has nothing to do with meaning. All it says is that the substitutions have 
to be performed in a uniform manner. That is to say, if you perform a substitution in 
a given expression, you have to make sure you make the same substitution if the com­
ponent expression you substituted occurs more than once in the original statement. 
This is a mechanical task, involving simply a recognition of grammatical category 
and identity of expressions — apparently no meaning in play here.® We will see in 
the next section how Strawson disputes this claim.
There is a third very important feature of the substitutional account, one that 
has been much discussed in recent literature. Quine’s account presupposes a set Of 
of fixed terms, that is, terms that we cannot substitute. For instance, when consid­
ering ‘if Socrates is mortal then Socrates is mortal’, only the non-logical terminology 
(‘Socrates’, ‘mortal’) is substitutable. We cannot substitute the words ‘if’ and ‘then’, 
otherwise we could arrive at a falsity. It is of course intended that Q will consist in 
the logical terminology — these are the terms that are usually held fixed. Given a
®The issue is complicated by so-called category mistakes, for instance ‘if 6 is funny then 6 is funny’. 
It seems that in these cases meaning must be taken into account, even if grammar is respected. But 
we will ignore this complication in what follows.
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set of logical constants, we want to say that the substitutions must occur among the 
non-logical terminology of the language. This way of proceeding has been implicit 
since the beginning of the section. We took for granted a correct division of terms 
into logical and non-logical. For instance, and were implicitly part of Q. We 
did not substitute them. But it is beyond question that under the substitutional 
account, what counts as a logical truth will depend on what one takes O' to be.® How 
to distinguish the logical terms from the non-logical terms is much debated. It is 
clear that in order to obtain the ‘right’ set of logical truths (whatever that means), 
we have to include appropriate terms in Cr. We have an idea of what the logical terms 
are: we want ‘&’. We don’t want: ‘Socrates’, ‘is blue’. However, there is no
consensus on how to divide logical terms from non-logical terms, and no consensus 
on whether such a division is desirable or even feasible. Worse, there are borderline 
cases, such as identity and set membership.
For his part, Quine takes for granted the obvious class of logical terms, and he 
discusses at length whether or not we should accept the borderline cases (identity 
and set membership) amongst the logical terms. He offers no method to distinguish 
precisely between logical and non-logical terminology.^ For the time being, we will 
assume that there is some kind of pragmatically justified distinction. That is, I will 
take the class of logical terms to consists in what are generally considered to be logical 
terms in logic books. The list includes some or all of these: conjunction, negation, 
the conditional, disjunction, equivalence, the quantifiers. This alone shows that we 
know intuitively what a logical term is, since we know what the list must include. 
Concerning the borderline cases, we will have more to say on them in sections 8
®Bolzano was aware of the fact that a different set ù  produces different logical truths: ‘It is 
obvious that the validity of one and the same proposition must turn out differently depending on 
whether we look on this or that, just a single one or several ideas within it as variable’ (Bolzano, 
1837: §147, p.l91).
^Tarski offers a criterion in a posthumously published paper (1986). Shapiro (1998; 145) holds 
that the fact that there is no objective way of classifying terms into logical and non-logical is enough 
to discredit an exclusively formal approach.
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and 10. For now, we shall assume that even if we don’t know where to draw the 
distinction, it does not necessarily mean that there is no such distinction.®
4.3 S traw son’s argum ent against th e  su b stitu tion a l account
Strawson (1957) discusses Quine’s account of logical truth. His paper centres 
on the criteria for suitable substitutions. Quine holds that in order to make the 
substitutions, no intensional notions are required. Substitutions have to meet the 
requirements of sameness of grammatical category and of uniformity, and observance 
of these does not, at first blush, involve use of intensional notions. In his paper, 
Strawson argues that mere observance of these two requirements, unsupplemented by 
the notion meaning, is not enough. To make the account work (le ., to make it produce 
the logical truths we want it to) the notion of ‘meaning the same as’ is required. If 
Strawson is right, it follows that Quine either has to accept a notion of meaning or 
else has to abandon his account. Since, arguably, the substitutional account is the 
most economical one in terms of sparseness of intensional and metaphysical notions, 
it is hard to see how Quine could abandon it. Strawson’s criticism thus represents a 
serious threat to Quine.
Strawson’s main point is that Quine’s account cannot rule out that an ambiguous 
expression such as ‘he is sick’ threatens to turn ‘if Socrates is mortal, then Socrates 
is mortal’ into a non-logical truth. The reason is this. The expression ‘he is sick’ 
has, according to Strawson, two interpretations (1957: 16). One the one hand, it 
may mean that a male person is physically ill. On the other hand, it may mean that 
a male person is mentally ill. On this view of the matter, substituting uniformly 
‘he is sick’ for ‘Socrates is mortal’ in ‘if Socrates is mortal, then Socrates is mortal’ 
will result in the statement ‘if he is sick, then he is sick’, which may be either true
®See Shapiro (1998: 145) and Tarski (1935: 418-420) for a discussion of this topic.
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or false (it is a contingent statement) since it is possible that one is physically ill 
without being mentally ill, and vice-versa. There is no a priori assurance that the 
substitution will result in a true statement. So it seems that merely observing the 
uniformity constraint is not enough. Replacing like expressions by like expressions 
can reduce what seems to be an uncontroversial logical truth into a ‘mere’ truth, thus 
devoiding it of its apparently ‘special’ status that the account is supposed to explain. 
Strawson goes on to discuss a number of possible constraints formulated with the 
aim of ruling out the permissibility of substituting the two occurrences of ‘Socrates 
is mortal’ with ‘he is sick’ understood in one occurrence in the ‘physical’ sense and 
understood in the other occurrence in the ‘mental’ sense.
The upshot of his enquiry is that such a criterion is possible only if we make use 
of the notion of meaning (Strawson, 1957: 22-23). That is to say, in order to block 
the unwanted substitutions, we have to stipulate that the substituting expressions 
must have the same sense, or the same meaning, or, in the case of statements, express 
the same proposition. This stipulation has the effect of ruling out our problematic 
case since in order to produce a ‘contingent’ statement from ‘if Socrates is mortal, 
then Socrates is mortal’ by substituting ‘he is sick’ for both occurences of ‘Socrates 
is mortal’, the two occurrences of ‘he is sick’ must have a different meaning. If they 
have a different meaning, the substitution is not permitted under the new constraints, 
thus preserving the logicality of ‘if Socrates is mortal, then Socrates is mortal’.
Strawson is right in that the existence of ambiguity in a language, as such, forces 
us to take into account the meaning of the expressions to ‘save’ the status of ‘if 
Socrates is mortal, then Socrates is mortal’ as a logical truth under the substitutional 
account. Let’s state at the outset that we do not wish here to dispute the soundness or 
validity of Strawson’s reasoning. The problem with this objection to Quine’s account 
is that it does not identify its target correctly. Ambiguity exists only in natural 
languages. According to Quine, the phenomenon of ambiguity results from the fact
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that sometimes a word has two different applications (1960: 129-30). For instance, 
the predicate ‘is sick’ has two extensions. It applies both to a mental condition and 
to a physical condition. Because of that, failure of communication sometimes results 
and a remedy is in order — in this case, paraphrase (Quine 1960: 157-61). It is clear 
that Quine, when discussing logical truth and logic in general, is concerned with a 
regimented language in which ambiguity is removed through suitable paraphrase. The 
Quinean remedy to the ambiguity of ‘sick’ would be to paraphrase it by distinguishing 
between ‘physically ill’ and ‘mentally ill’. The idea is to eliminate the ambiguous word 
‘sick’ in the regimented language and replace it with both ‘mentally ill’ and ‘physically 
ill’, thus removing the ambiguity. The ambiguity is detected and eliminated without 
invoking intensional notions. In other words, the first step is to realise that the word 
has two extensions, and this step involves no intensional notions. The second step is 
to defuse the ambiguity by paraphrasing the ambiguous expression into two distinct 
expressions, each of which is to be applied to one of the two extensions detected 
previously. Again, no intensional notions are needed to perform this step.
This move clearly answers Strawson’s worry in a neat way since in the regimented 
language there simply isn’t the expression ‘he is sick’. Quine wants, in effect, to study 
logic as it is manifested in the sciences and also in a properly regimented everyday 
language. If everyday language is filled with ambiguous expressions, we must regiment 
it first and then study its logical properties. Since ambiguity is a defect of natural 
languages and that the languages he is concerned with do not contain ambiguous 
expressions, it follows that his account of logical truth is not subjected to Strawson’s 
criticism.
It is clear that there is no winner nor loser in this debate. We are rather faced with 
a clash between two conceptions of philosophy. Strawson, at the time, was an advocate 
of ‘ordinary language philosophy’, whereas Quine is a direct descendant of logical 
positivism whose main preoccupations were with science and artificial languages.
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Quine, it is true, is more interested in natural languages than his predecessors. But 
we must not lose sight of the fact that Quine’s natural languages must be regimented 
before being given a full-fledged philosophical analysis. For all of Quine’s criticism 
of logical positivism, it is safe to assert that he shares the interests of his teachers 
in this respect. But despite these differences with Strawson, it can nonetheless be 
maintained that the clash in question is a methodological one and that Strawson 
and Quine both share an interest in more or less the same philosophical problems. 
For Quine, paraphrasing and, more generally, departures from ordinary language are 
“aids to understanding the referential work of language and clarifying our conceptual 
scheme” (1960: 158). Compare this with what Strawson says in Indmdwa/s: “my aim 
is to exhibit some general and structural features of the conceptual scheme in terms 
of which we think about particular things” (1959: 15). Viewed from this perspective, 
it appears that the main difference with Strawson is, after all, one of method rather 
than one of overall philosophical interests. Indeed, Individuals and Word and Object 
can be seen as two different attempts to come to grip with the same question — that 
of how language relates to the world.
We have seen in this section how Quine’s regimented approach to the study of 
our conceptual scheme contains the means to answer the Strawsonian objection to 
his account of logical truth. I now wish to present another argument against the 
Quinean account which is in the same spirit as Strawson’s but different from it.
4.4  T he need for m eaning
The argument levelled by Strawson against the substitutional account was to the 
effect that it makes an implicit use of the notion of meaning, contrary to what Quine 
claims. We have just seen how a Quinean has the resources to answer Strawson’s 
objection. In this section, I present a different argument purporting to show that 
the notion of meaning is required. Strawson’s target was one of the requirements for
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suitable substitutions (the constraint of uniformity). Here, however, we will focus on 
the set 0= of fixed terms. Remember that under the substitutional account of logical 
truth, the logical constants form a fixed set 3  of non-substitutable expressions. A 
statement’s logical tru th  is thus a function of this set of logical constants. Tarski 
(1935: 418-20) and Bolzano (1837: 191) were acutely aware of this.® Quine, on the 
other hand, does not go into elaborate discussion about Q — in fact, he is strikingly 
silent about the whole topic, seemingly taking for granted an appropriate choice of 
O'. His only suggestion about the nature of the logical constants is, as far as I can 
see, that they are basic to all discourse (see for instance (Quine, 1940: 2)).^ ® He 
would certainly be sympathetic to the approach we adopted, that is, to consider as 
members of Cr those terms which are considered logical constants in logic textbooks, 
and to discuss the borderline cases individually.
It is clear that under the substitutional account, what will be considered a logical 
truth depends crucially on the choice of Were proper names or predicates members 
of Cy, we would have different logical truths. I would like to go further and suggest that 
what is to count as a logical truth depends not only on the choice of Cr, but also, and 
importantly, on the interpretation given to the members of O' — namely, the logical 
constants. The reason is this. Let’s assume that the fixed set includes ‘not’ and ‘or’. 
Now let’s consider ‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal’. Under the Quinean 
account, this is a logical truth (of propositional logic) since whatever statement you 
correctly substitute for ‘Socrates is mortal’, it will produce a true statement. But 
how do we know that? That is, how do we know that all permissible substitutions 
will produce true statements? It is important to note that the substitutional account 
does not answer that legitimate question. To get a sense of the importance of that
®So are, of course, all contemporary writers on the topic, such as Etchemendy (1990), Shapiro 
(1998), Sher (1996), and others.
‘^^ In his (1986: 62), Quine also talks about the universality of logical constants. This universality 
is what malces it tempting to accept identity in the class of logical terms. But he does not elaborate 
on this, nor does he recommend adopting universality as a criterion of logicality.
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question, consider the statement ‘every even integer greater than 3 is the sum of two 
prime numbers’. To say that ‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal’ is a logical 
truth under the substitutional account, the statement ‘every even integer greater than 
3 is the sum of two prime numbers or every even integer greater than 3 is not the sum 
of two prime numbers’ must be true as well. But such a statement might not be taken 
to be true by the proponents of intuitionistic logic, therefore threatening the status of 
‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal’ as a logical truth, and, more generally, 
threatening the validity of the schema \4> v 4>~\- Quine, a proponent of classical 
logic, will of course consider all instances of the schema as logical truths — that is, he 
thinks (to use his terminology) that [0 v ~  0] is a metatheorem. Proponents of, say, 
intuitionistic logic do not consider fç) v ~  as being a metatheorem. How should 
one explain this divergence?
I take the example to show that what is regarded as being a logical truth under the 
substitutional account depends on how we interpret the set of fixed terms consisting 
in the logical constants. In other words, it depends on the meaning assigned to 
the logical constants. The proponent of intuitionistic logic will be able to find an 
appropriate substitution to render the supposedly logical truth ‘Socrates is mortal or 
Socrates is not mortal’ into a statement she will not assert since, according to her, 
it is plainly not the case that every statement exemplifying \(f) v ^  (f)] is assertible. 
And that is so because for her, negation and disjunction are respectively assigned 
different meanings from those assigned by the classicist. This, in any case, is what I 
shall defend in the following paragraphs.
It is an undeniable fact that classical logic and intuitionistic logic do not share 
the same stock of logical truths. Under the substitutional account, this is made clear 
by the fact that the two logics will arrive at a different set of logical truths — the 
extension of their accounts differ. Let us take two logicians, one classicist, Carl, and 
one intuitionist, Igor. Let us assume that both subscribe to the substitutional account
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of logical truths. Remember that Quine’s account of logical tru th  merely consists in 
‘cashing out’ the idea that a sentence is a logical truth if it is true and remains true 
under any substitution of its non-logical components. Carl and Igor likewise proceed 
to cash out this idea, by laying down the constraints of sameness of grammatical 
category and of uniformity and by determining what the set 0  of fixed terms consists 
in: for instance, they might agree to include So far, their description of
the theory is exactly the same on both sides: when Carl and Igor present their account 
of logical truth, there is absolutely no way to distinguish between them. Let us say 
that they both present it for first-order logic, and that they choose, as members of O, 
negation, implication, and disjunction. It is clear and incontestable that there is no 
way to distinguish between the two accounts as described so far. In both cases, the 
theory will say that a logical truth is a sentence which is true and remains true under 
all substitutions of their non-logical components. Both theories of logical truth, at 
this point, will be identical, and make use of absolutely no intensional notions (they 
are staunch Quineans),
However, we know that despite the descriptive identity of their account, Carl 
and Igor will not agree with each other on the extension of logical truths — that is, 
on which statements pass the substitutional test and are declared as being logical 
truths. They will argue over the logicality of, say, ‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates 
is not mortal’. For Carl, it is a logical truth; for Igor, it is not. Nothing in their 
theory of logical truth can account for this difference in extension. This is the crucial 
point: it is impossible, by simply ‘reading off’ their theory, to predict the divergence. 
The primary goal of a theory of logical tru th  is, presumably, to generate the ‘correct’ 
extension of logical truths. However, the account as described by Carl and Igor offers 
no guarantee that it will produce their favourite stock of logical truths. Something is 
missing from the account — an additional feature that will ensure that each logician 
arrives at his favourite set of logical truths. And it is this extra feature over which
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Carl and Igor will argue.
The missing component in the account is the interpretation of the set Q of fixed 
terms. This, or so it seems to me, is the only way to explain the extensional diver­
gence between Carl and Igor. The substitutional account has to be supplemented 
with an explanation of how the logical constants are to be interpreted — and this is 
something that is lacking in Quine’s description of his theory. One way to understand 
the divergence between classical logic and intuitionistic logic is by appealing to the 
introduction and elimination rules assigned to the logical constants — the so-called 
logical schemata. Carl will say that negation is governed, partly, by double-negation 
elimination. Igor will balk at this. Differences of this kind are at the basis of the 
divergent output of substitutional theories. To be fair to Quine, it should be men­
tioned that he does explain validity in terms of schemata, conceived as giving the 
forms of logically true sentences. For instance, he makes it explicit that since \(p v 
~  0] is a valid schema, it follows that every statement exhibiting its form is logically 
true. But for Quine, schemata are mere pedagogical aids.^^ That is why he does not 
use them in Mathematical Logic. But even in that book, when he talks about, say, 
[ 0  V  ~  ç!>] (not a schema, remember, but a metatheorem in ML),  what makes it a 
valid metatheorem? In the system of Mathematical Logic, there is no answer to that 
question. The natural answer would be that the ‘tru th ’ of [0 v ~  0] hinges on the 
meaning of ‘v’. But this answer is not available to Quine.
In view of this, another way of fleshing out the disagreement between Carl and 
Igor is to point out that a crucial feature of the substitutional account is often missing 
in Quine’s description, namely the reference to valid schemata. For Carl, [0 v ~  (/>] 
is a valid schema, whereas for Igor it is not. The point here is the same; the reason
Methods of Logic proceeds in terms of schemata. Mathematical Logic, however, avoids their 
use. He says, in the 1981 preface of Mathematical Logic, that ‘schemata and even open sentences 
are technical aids’. He does not use them in Mathematical Logic because he fears that readers will 
consider sentence letters — such as ‘p ’, ‘ç ’ — as taking propositions as values, whereas for Quine 
we can only talk about sentences (see Quine (1940: iv-v)).
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why one accepts the validity of the schema and the other resists it has to do with the 
meaning attached to the sign There seems to be no way to escape the following 
conclusion: the meaning of the set of fixed terms has to be stipulated in the account 
itself. It has to be built in. There is therefore an irreducible notion of meaning at 
play in Quine’s account of logical truth.
This is where the deep issue with the substitutional account lies. It takes for 
granted an underlying interpretation of the logical constants. That is to say, it takes 
for granted the interpretation — the meaning — of the set of fixed terms. Given the 
logic, given the interpretation, the substitutional account certainly can be made to 
work to a certain extent, once problems such as ambiguity are resolved in a Quinean 
spirit. But let’s not forget that the substitutional account requires these assumptions, 
and because of that, it does, ultimately, rest on the notion of meaning. The statement 
‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal’ is logically true for the classicist by virtue 
of the meaning of negation and disjunction. That is, it is logically true because of the 
introduction and elimination rules assigned to negation and disjunction. Once you 
are equipped with that interpretation of negation and disjunction, every substitution 
(performed under the constraints mentioned above) will result in a true statement — 
even the substitutions that result in the statement ‘every even integer greater than 
3 is the sum of two prime numbers or every even integer greater than 3 is not the 
sum of two prime numbers’. One who prefers to give an intuitionistic interpretation 
of negation will not consider ‘Socrates is mortal or Socrates is not mortal’ as a logical 
truth if he subscribes to the substitutional account.
One of the net effects of this argument against the substitutional account is that 
Quine’s division between two classes of analytic statements collapses. Both kind of 
analytic truths, the logical truths and the statements reducible to logical truths, are 
after all dependent on the notion of meaning. If, as I have argued in this section, 
the substitutional account is committed to the view that logical truths are analytic
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in the standard sense (that is, true by virtue of meaning), it follows that Quine’s 
attack on analyticity is also an attack on his own account of logical truths. It does 
not show that the notion of meaning in play has to be a Platonistic one, but it shows 
at the very least that Quine, if he wants to retain his account of logical truth, must 
presuppose a notion of meaning. And that in turn might be problematic.
The issue of how Quine should handle this problem goes beyond what can be 
discussed in this thesis. But what I take it to show is that Quine is committed 
to the view that logical truths are analytic: so he is, or so it seems, committed to 
the view that there is a notion of necessity in play in his account, and this for two 
reasons. Firstly, Quine has it that analyticity and necessity go hand in hand, as seen 
in Chapter One. Secondly, even if we acknowledge a conceptual distinction between 
analyticity and necessity, it remains that if a sentence is analytic in the sense of being 
true by virtue of meaning, it follows that it is necessary. That is, if a true sentence 
owes its truth to the meaning of the logical constants appearing in it, that sentence 
has to be true.
These considerations make it plain that Quine’s account of logical truths does 
not do without intensional notions. More to the point here, it seems that Quine’s 
account presupposes a notion of necessity. If that is correct, then it is not the case 
that Quine ‘can do without necessity’ — that he can be an Error-theoretic Irrealist 
about necessity. Perhaps the only live option for a Quinean who wishes to ‘save’ the 
substitutional account is to acknowledge the requirement of analyticity and to cash it 
out in a conventional manner — to ‘go conventionalist’. It is well-known that Quine 
himself has no sympathy for conventionalism.^^ Another option for Quine is to drop 
the notion of logical truth altogether: but this is not an option he entertains at any 
point.
the very least, he has no sympathy for conventionalism of the Carnapian kind. See in 
particular Quine (1936b and 1963).
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4.5 Q uine’s account o f logical consequence
Now that we have explained and discussed Quine’s account of logical truth, we 
have to explain its natural extension, namely his account of logical consequence. It is 
clear that the topic of this thesis is related in an important way to logical consequence 
(see Introduction). W hat concerns us here, in effect, is the status of logical inference, 
not of logical truth. However, an account of logical truth can easily be adapted to yield 
an account of logical consequence, so that all the criticisms raised about the former 
apply to the latter. In fact, as we will see, logical truth can be seen as a limiting case 
of logical consequence. In this section, I will explain how Quine’s account of logical 
truth extends to an account of logical consequence, and in the following sections I will 
raise some problems related to this new account, problems which are better discussed 
in relation to logical consequence than in relation to logical truth.
It is often heard that Quine does not consider logical consequence to be the main 
topic of logic, that for him the study of logic is the almost exclusive study of logical 
truths. But I think this is an oversight. Quine himself repeatedly stresses the primary 
importance of inference in logic. For instance, in his ‘Introduction’ to Methods of 
Logic, he writes: “The chief importance of logic lies in implication, which, therefore, 
will be the main theme of this hook. Techniques are wanted for showing, given two 
statements, that the one implies the other; herein lies logical deduction” (1950: xvi, 
my italics). Other passages display a similar view.^^
Let’s now describe Quine’s substitutional account of logical consequence. As I have 
said, this theory is to be viewed as an extension of his theory of logical truth. Both 
theories make central use of the ideas of substitution and logical form. To begin with, 
let us state some intuitions about the concept under study. Logical consequence is a 
relation holding between a non-empty set of statements (the premises) and another
i^See also (1950: 33; 1940: 7). In Philosophy of Logic, Quine does seem to restrict his attention 
to logical truth, but this is simply for the sake of convenience (see (1986: 48-49)).
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statement (the conclusion). The idea is that a statement ‘logically follows’ from a 
non-empty set of statements if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the 
conclusion to be false. This way of wording logical consequence, however, is very 
un-Quinean since it makes use of modal notions — it is equivalent to saying that 
given the premises, the conclusion necessarily f o l l o w s . T h e  objective of Quine’s 
account is to arrive at the ‘correct’ extension of logical consequences — we want any 
account to get the extension right — without using intensional notions. The case 
here is entirely parallel to logical truth: in that case also, Quine wanted to give a 
purely extensional account. He was only concerned with getting the extension right 
and avoiding intensional notions. For Quine, the ‘correct’ extension consists of those 
logical consequences that can be arrived at via classical logic.
The substitutional account of logical consequence is designed to meet these desider­
ata. According to this theory, a statement follows from a non-empty set of other 
statements provided that whenever permissible substitutions are performed on the 
non-iogical terms, the conclusion will be true provided the premises are.^^ The main 
difference between the account of logical consequence and that of logical truth is that 
in the former case, there has to be talk of relation between sentences, whereas in the 
latter case we are only focusing on the status of a single sentence. In an account 
of logical consequence, we want to know the status of a conditional consisting of a 
set of sentences as antecedent and a single sentence as consequent. If it shown that 
any permissible substitution of the components in the conditional results in a true 
conditional, we will have shown that this conditional displays a valid logical form. 
For instance, consider the following inferential judgement: ‘All men are mortal and 
Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.’ We clearly want to say that the 
conclusion follows from the premises, and any decent account of logical consequence
^^The equivalence is seen by the fact that <>(r& ~  A)’ is intuitively equivalent to '0 ( r  —> A)’. 
Notice that there is no intensional idiom used in that definition.
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must explain that. As we did with logical truths, the first step is to exhibit the logical 
form of the argument;
((Va:(Fæ Gæ)) & Fa) b Ga (4.6)
Now it is clear that whatever we put for ‘F ’, ‘G’, and ‘a ’ the statement formed at 
the right-hand side of the turnstile will be true provided that the statements forming 
the antecedent are also true.
4.6 T he requirem ent o f persisten ce
In this section and the following ones, I will discuss the main criticisms brought 
against the substitutional account of logical consequence as well as the counter­
arguments offered by Quine. There are basically four lines of objection against the 
Quinean account of logical consequence. They have to do with:
• The dependence of the account on the richness of the language.
• Worries about the restriction on first-order logic.
• The status of identity — logical or non-logical constant?
• Worries about the size of the intended domain.
I will take up these objections and worries one by one. My strategy will be to show 
that Quine is forced, on the basis of these arguments, to embrace a stronger, less 
austere account of logical consequence to meet the objections and worries raised. As 
the objections are discussed, it will become clear that he is committed to a version 
of the Tarskian account, a version irreducibly appealing to our modal intuitions. If 
this is right, my argument will show that Quine cannot embrace a purely extensional 
account of logical consequence.
The criticism raised in the present section reveals the main drawback of talking 
in terms of substitution, namely that the account will be hostage to the expressive
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resources of the language. Let us consider the following language. It contains only, as 
extra-logical terms, the names ‘Lincoln’ and ‘Clinton’ and the predicates ‘is President’ 
and ‘is American’. Consider now the sentence:
Lincoln is President (4.7)
The problem is immediate: under the language specified, every permissible substi­
tution will result in a true statement. Therefore, (4.7) will be declared a logical 
truth. But clearly, (4.7) is not a logical t r u t h . T h e  same difficulty appears when 
we consider logical consequences such as:
Clinton is American |= Lincoln is President (4.8)
The substitutional account of logical consequence will declare ‘Lincoln is President’ 
to be a logical consequence of ‘Clinton is American’ in this language, since for any 
permissible substitution on these two statements, if the former is true so will the 
latter. Obviously, however, it is not an intuitively valid argument. Passing the 
substitution test might therefore not be a sufficient condition for logical truth and 
logical consequence. The substitutional account overgenerates in this case; that is, it 
counts as valid what should not be declared valid. What these examples show is that 
the correctness of the account is dependent on the richness of the language examined.
It has to be admitted that the language just defined is not a very interesting 
language. But the point is general. Consider, for instance, the vaguely defined semi- 
scientific language used to talk about the world and to make sense of it. Presumably, 
the universe treated by this language extends what can be expressed by it. We don’t 
have a word for every object in the universe. If we consider any logical consequence 
— for instance, the one in the previous section — the account declares that ‘Socrates
course, Lincoln isn’t a President right now, same for Clinton. But we ignore this detail.
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is mortal’ is a logical consequence of the premises, and this is what we want. It will 
tell us (via the logical form exemplified by (4.6)) that whenever permissible substi­
tutions are performed on the non-logical terms, the conclusion will be true provided 
the premises are. However, the account does not take into consideration the expand­
ability of language. That is, it offers no guarantee that were a new term to make its 
appearance, the result of operating a substitution with this new term will not render 
invalid a substitution performed in accordance with (4.6). It appears, in contrast 
with the examples discussed in the previous paragraph, that the substitutional ac­
count offers no guarantee that it can undergenerate\ that is, there is no guarantee 
that the substitutional account will count as valid what should be considered valid.
In sum, as Tarski put it, the substitutional account will work “only if the desig­
nations of all possible objects occurred in the language in question. This assumption, 
however, is fictions and can never be realized” (1935: 416). Of course, we know that 
any instance of (4.6) is valid, and we know that the addition of a new term will 
not invalidate it under the substitutional account (given an appropriate choice of 9f). 
This problem, in effect, is just a different side of the same difficulty encountered with 
the limited language of the previous paragraph. In the case of a restricted language, 
the account clearly overgenerates, and in the case of our more inclusive language, it 
has the potential to undergenerate. The central point here is that Quine’s theory 
cannot account for a central feature of logical consequence, namely that an instance 
of correct logical consequence persists through expansion of the language — logical 
consequence should not be hostage to the expressive power of the language under 
study.
The upshot is that a correct account has to meet what Etchemendy (1990: 30-31) 
calls the requirement of persistence. It can be stated thus:
(R P ) If © is said to be a logical consequence of F under an account of logical con­
sequence, that theory must guarantee that it will continue to be so through
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expansions of the language.
The substitutional account does not meet this requirement, since it is confined to 
the actual expressive resources of the language. The reasoning here is that Quine’s 
account offers no guarantee that a given logical consequence will remain valid (under 
the account) if we expand the language. This is because expanding the language 
means that there will be new substitutions — and the account offers no guarantee 
that these new substitutions will not transform what was considered a valid argument 
into an invalid one.
At this point one might raise the following objection. It is true that Quine’s ac­
count does not meet the persistence requirement, but that needn’t worry Quine since 
he isn’t after a characterisation telling a story about what could happen were the 
language to expand. He is only concerned, the objection goes, with circumscribing 
the actual extension of logical consequence, that is, with what are in fact the valid 
inferences expressible in the language. Viewed in this light, it seems that the sub­
stitutional account has got the extension right, given an appropriate choice of fixed 
terms. Even if Quine’s account is not completely faithful to our intuitive notion of 
logical consequence (since the requirement of persistence is part of this intuition), it 
does not matter because he thinks that what matters in a definition of this sort is to 
get the extension right, not to be one hundred percent faithful to our vague intuitions. 
Indeed, it is a virtue, from Quine’s point of view, that the theory does not contain 
any notion that can be interpreted as a modality, such as what could happen were 
the language to expand. At this point Quine can appeal to his holism and say that 
the substitutional account is true as far as it goes, that it is the best hypothesis we’ve 
got, etc. If an unfortunate expansion of the language occurred, a Quinean could say, 
we would perhaps have to revise our theory, but we can be pretty confident it won’t 
happen.
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However, a Quinean cannot rest content with this reply. A definition of logical 
consequence would hardly be worthy of its name if it captured only those consequences 
that actually occur in the language under study. It is obvious (given the intended 
domain, i.e., the ‘external world’) that there are other logical consequences that are 
inexpressible so far and even more that will never be expressed. An account of logical 
consequence failing to meet the requirement of persistence does more than merely 
conflict with our intuitions; it’s not an account of logical consequence proper, but 
merely an ‘anthropological’ account — in the sense that it tells us what follows from 
what for us given the actual history of our language. Besides, the Quinean needn’t 
worry much about the modality in play here since it is a minimal kind of modality: 
to recognise the possibility of the expansion of language is not an endorsement of the 
necessary /  contingent distinction as it is understood by, say, the logical positivists. 
To say that the language might expand involves the same sense of modality as to say 
that it might rain tomorrow. It is certainly not this sense of possibility that Quine’s 
philosophy of logic is trying to avoid.
The Quinean, therefore, must confront the challenge brought about by the re­
quirement of persistence. Two options are possible for the Quinean: she can either 
convince us that the substitutional account does meet the requirement despite what 
Tarski and Etchemendy claim, or she can modify the account so that it satisfies the 
requirement. In his Philosophy of Logic, Quine addresses this matter, albeit not in 
these terms. However, to get a clear view of the issue, we have to make a detour 
through Tarski’s account of logical consequence.
4.7  Tarski’s account o f logical consequence
Tarski’s account, developed in his much-discussed (1935), was designed specifically 
to meet the requirement of persistence. W hat we need in order to overcome this
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difficulty is an account similar^^ to the substitutional one but which uses, instead of 
the notion of substitution, the notions of satisfaction, sequence, and model For the 
purposes at hand, we need only an intuitive characterisation of these notions. Let 
us talce the open sentence 'x is the capital of y \  The sequence of objects (Paris, 
France) satisfies this open sentence, whereas the sequence (Tokyo, Spain) does not. 
The notion of a model can be characterised thus. Keeping with the same example, we 
say that the sequence (London, Great Britain) is a model of the sentence ‘Paris is the 
capital of France’ via the open sentence ‘x is the capital of y’ and this same sequence 
((London, Great Britain)) satisfies the open sentence. It is important to notice that 
sequences here have a dual role: they satisfy open sentences and they model closed 
sentences. With this intuitive terminology at hand, we can define Tarskian logical 
consequence thus:
(TLC ) © is a logical consequence of F if and only if every model of the sentences in 
F is also a model of ©.
The idea here is similar to the substitutional account in one important respect: in 
both cases, a sentence follows from another if and only if the whole argument exhibits 
a valid logical form.
One could say that the Tarskian theory represents our intuitions about logical 
consequence more faithfully, since it respects the requirement of persistence (RP). 
Indeed, the notions of sequence and satisfaction, in contrast to those of substitution 
and truth, generate an account of logical consequence that is independent, as Tarski 
put it, of the richness in concepts of the language being investigated. The notion of 
substitution is hostage to the expressive power of the language: we can only substitute 
with expressions that are available. The notion of satisfaction, on the other hand, 
deals directly with objects in the universe of discourse, independently of whether
say ‘similar’ since both accounts are what Hanson (1997: 366-67) calls ‘formal accounts of 
logical consequence’ and what Etchemendy (1990: 51) refers to as ‘interpretational semantics’.
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these objects are named or not in the language under study. It deals with the whole 
domain of discourse, in contrast with the notion of substitution which deals only with 
the objects of the domain that are provided with a name in the language.
Tarski’s account, then, meets the requirement of persistence. It shares with 
Quine’s account the emphasis on logical form, and it does not appear to involve 
modalities.^® These facts should make the account attractive to a Quinean. Nev­
ertheless, Quine makes it clear that he favours his own account over the Tarskian 
model-theoretic one (1986: 53-56). This is because the model-theoretic account is 
committed to an ontology of sets, whereas the substitutional account requires only 
a minimal ontology composed of expressions in the language. The Tarskian account 
is indeed committed to an ontology of sets since the sequences are, in effect, ordered 
sets, and the account quantifies over these sequences. This commitment to sets was 
to be expected. If we want to go beyond the names and predicates that are express­
ible in the language in order to take into consideration the objects and the properties 
that are not named in this language, we will inevitably have to make reference to the 
objects of the domain as such, not only the named objects. It is this unavoidable 
reference to objects, via the concept of a sequence, that commits one to sets when 
putting forward the model-theoretic account. In the Quinean account, expressions 
are substituted; in the Tarskian one, sequences of objects are satisfied.
At this point one could raise the following ob j e c t i o n . Wh y  is Quine making such 
a big fuss over the commitment to sets? After all, he embraces set theory and is the 
author of an introduction on the topic (1969b). Maybe the young Quine had some 
reservations about set theory and its ontological commitments, but the post-fifties 
Quine is certainly happy with set theory and its commitment to sets. Indeed, Quine 
is a Platonist concerning mathematics. But this objection misses the point. Quine is
relies only, as Hanson (1997: 370-71) puts it, on truth simpUciter. More precisely, in the 
Tarskian account, on satisfaction simpUciter.
Graham Priest raised this objection in a seminar.
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trying to define logical consequence. It is a logical notion, and as such it should be 
definable without using non-logical notions. If, when defining logical consequence, we 
are forced to acknowledge a commitment to sets, we are not doing logic anymore but 
rather set theory. There is nothing wrong with set theory; but i t ’s not logic. More 
on the relation between set theory and logic in section 4.9.
Another important feature of Tarski’s account as defined here has to do with 
domains. To make that feature clear, I will now explain a crucial distinction that has 
been alluded to in previous sections. According to Etchemendy (1990), there are two 
ways to understand model theory. One is to say that the models are an interpretation 
of the language. Under this understanding of models, the domain stays fixed and 
what varies is the meaning (the interpretation) of the terms. When we say, under 
this understanding of models, that every model of a non-empty set of premises is also 
a model of the conclusion, what is said is that every true interpretation of the non- 
logical terms in the premises will result in a true interpretation of the conclusion. For 
example, under the interpretation that ‘man’ means ‘whale’, ‘mortal’ means ‘mammal’ 
and ‘Socrates’ means ‘Jamie’, the models thus formed from (4.6) will result in a valid 
logical consequence. Notice here that nothing has been mentioned about variation 
of domain. Under this understanding of the notion of model, the domain stays fixed 
while it is the interpretation assigned to the non-logical terms that changes. In effect, 
to use a less technical language, what is happening here is that we are testing for 
validity by enquiring whether the premises and the conclusion of the argument are 
true and remain true no matter which interpretation (extension) is assigned to its 
non-logical terms. If it remains true under all interpretation, then it corresponds 
to a valid logical form. If it corresponds to a valid logical form, the interpretation 
assigned to the non-logical terms can vary at will. According to Etchemendy, this 
understanding of models is the one implicit in Tarski’s celebrated paper on logical 
consequence. It is also consistent with the exposition of Tarski’s account as given
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here, since in this exposition no talk of variation of domain is mentioned, nor does 
it need to be. This understanding of what models are is called the interpretational 
view of models.
It is clear that Quine’s account is also a brand of interpretational account. This 
is seen by the fact that the substitutional account, just like Tarski’s, makes crucial 
use of the notion of logical form. It is also seen, more conspicuously, by the fact 
that Quine’s account is also concerned with what happens if the interpretation of the 
non-logical terms is changed. In Quine’s case, of course, we are not talking about 
varying meanings but only expressions. However, the idea is the same: an argument 
is valid if it is true and remains true under all substitutions of its non-logical terms — 
if it remains true no matter which interpretation we assign to the non-logical terms.
The other understanding of the notion of model is the representational one. In this 
case, the models represent possible configurations of the world. This is the familiar 
notion of model currently used in contemporary model theory. To put it simply, 
when we are saying that ‘All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates 
is mortal’ is a valid argument under this understanding of model, we are in effect 
saying that, for instance, in every possible world where Socrates is a man and all men 
are mortal, Socrates is mortal. We are not varying interpretations here, neither are 
we using the notion of logical form, but, rather, are considering what happens in a 
particular possibility: we are considering a possible world. This kind of account is 
uncongenial for a Quinean, since it is clearly modal. We will have much more to say 
about representational accounts of logical consequence later on in this Chapter.
To recapitulate, there are two broads kinds of account of logical consequence: in­
terpretational and representational accounts. Tarski (1935) uses the notion of model, 
though not the contemporary notion. It is best understood as an interpretational 
account. Quine’s account is also an interpretational account, but it does not use 
models. In contrast, the current, model-theoretic account of logical consequence is a
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representational account. Quine, in a nutshell, has no choice but to avoid any kind of 
representational account. Concerning the Tarskian account as exposed in the (1935) 
paper, Quine wants to show that his account has the same explanatory power as 
Tarski’s but is more economical since it contains no ontological commitments. We 
will now address this matter.
4.8 M eetin g  th e  requirem ent o f p ersisten ce
Let us now return to the question that prompted this detour to the Tarskian 
account. What is Quine’s attitude towards the fact that his preferred account does 
not meet the requirement of persistence? He is well aware of the potential discrepancy 
between his theory and Tarski’s: “there is no assurance that each class of objects in 
our universe corresponds as extension to some open sentence constructible from the 
words of our language” (1950: 95). He then goes on to explain that the question of 
whether we should choose open sentences (required by the substitutional account) as 
suitable interpretations of schemata or classes of objects (required by the Tarskian 
account) “depends on our choice of universe, and also on how rich a vocabulary we 
assume there to be at our disposal” (ibid). This means that if the vocabulary is rich 
enough, there is no need to appeal to classes of objects and we save on ontology. 
So it is not as if Quine first put forward his account and then realised that it does 
not meet the requirement of persistence. He was always aware that his account has 
the potential to undergenerate. The main reason to repudiate the Tarskian account 
had to do, as early as in his (1950), with ontology: “(i)t is sound policy to confine 
the assumption of philosophically contested entities, in particular abstract entities 
such as classes, to those portions of theory which need them” (1950: 95, footnote 1). 
The maxim of ontological economy is in play here. Don’t make appeal to Tarski’s 
account, Quine warns us, unless you have to. The argument studied in this section 
is that according to Quine, we do not need Tarski’s account to make sense of logical
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truth and logical consequence — the substitutional theory suffices.
Quine recognises the limits of his account when he says that it assumes “a fully 
interpreted object language with no option left open as to range of variables” (1986: 
52). But, he points out, the substitutional account will work in such a fully interpreted 
language. Elementary number theory is expressible in such a language: first-order 
logic (LI), with or without i d e n t i t y . I n  this particular language and universe, 
all the logical consequences that are captured by the model-theoretic account are 
also captured by the substitutional account. That is, the two definitions coincide in 
extension when restricting our attention to first-order logic with or without identity. 
In other words, the following principle of equivalence holds for L I:
(EQ ) (0  is a Quinean logical consequence of F) =  (0  is a Tarskian logical conse­
quence of F).
The left to right conditional is provable via the downward Lowenheim — Skolem 
theorem:^^
(DLS) If a schema in L I is satisfied by a model, then it is satisfied by a model whose 
domain is at most denumerably infinite.
Now, how do we get from (DLS) to our desired result? Let’s notice first that the 
antecedent of (DLS) makes no reference to a domain. The antecedent, more pre­
cisely, is about satisfied schema independently of the domain. The consequent is 
about satisfied schema in a particular kind of domain, that is, those that are at most 
denumerably infinite. The positive integers form such a domain. So (DLS), in effect, 
reduces Tarskian validity in any domain to Tarskian validity in a denumerably infinite 
or finite domain. In view of the fact that the positive integers form a domain of the
Quine, of course, prefers the version without identity, where it is paraphrased in terms of pred­
icates.
B^See e.g. Quine (1986: 54) and Shapiro (1991: 80).
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latter sort and that for such a domain the substitutional account is applicable (since 
all the objects of the domain are expressible in the language), we get from (DLS):
(T l)  If a schema is satisfied by a model, then it becomes true under some substitution 
of sentences of elementary theory.
By contraposing (T l), we obtain:
(T2) If a schema is false under all substitutions of sentences of elementary number 
theory, then it is satisfied by no model.
If, instead of talking of a schema in (T2) we talk about its negation, we get our 
left-to-right conditional:
(T3) if a schema is true under all substitutions of sentences of elementary number 
theory, then it is satisfied by every model.
The right-to-left conditional of (EQ) is proved via Godel’s completeness theorem:
(C O M ) If a schema of L I is satisfied by every model, it can be proved deductively.
The idea, presumably, is that if © is a Tarskian logical consequence of F, then we can 
prove it. If we can prove it, that means that the language has the expressive resources 
to perform the proof, so that we will be able to carry out the substitution test.
(EQ) is an important principle for Quine. The fact that it holds for first-order 
logic shows that if we restrict our attention to it, we can do without modalities and 
without an ontology of sets. Saving on ontology and avoiding intensional notions 
are of course two important methodological principles for Quine. No wonder that he 
says that the provability of (EQ) for first-order logic is ‘a remarkable fact’ (1986: 53, 
55). Quine’s objective, we have seen, is to provide an account of logical truth that 
is exclusively extensional and that avoids any dubious ontological commitments. By 
putting forward a brand of interpretational account, he claims to have achieved the
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first objective. By resisting the Tarskian interpretational account and by sticldng to 
his substitutional account, he claims to have achieved the second. In the next section, 
I want to examine whether Quine succeeds in resisting the Tarskian account.
4.9 Incom p leten ess and second-order logic
Remember that for (EQ) to hold, we have to restrict our attention to languages 
which are formalised in first-order logic. The immediate reason for this restriction has 
to do with the fact that we cannot prove completeness and the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorem for higher-order languages. This means that we cannot prove the crucial 
theorem (EQ) mentioned earlier:
(EQ) (© is a Quinean logical consequence of F) =  (© is a Tarskian logical conse­
quence of F).
An obvious counter-example to (EQ) for second-order logic are the Godel sentences. 
Such sentences are Tarskian logical consequences when we interpret mathematics un­
der second-order logic: in every model satisfying the axioms and the rules of inference 
of the theory, there will be a Godel sentence which will also be satisfied (under the as­
sumption that the axiomatic set theory is consistent). But, since the Quinean account 
will be applicable only to languages for which we have a complete proof-procedure, 
it follows that in this account there is no way to capture the fact that the Godel 
sentences are consequences of the theory. In other words, when focusing on second- 
order languages and when equipped only with Quine’s account, we don’t get the right 
extension of logical truths and logical consequences. When applied to second-order 
logic, Quine’s account can only capture consequences that are syntactically deducible. 
Godel sentences are not syntactically deducible. This is because in second-order logic, 
truth exceeds provability — assuming classical logic and a realist framework.
1 8 1
The substitutional account, then, does not work when applied to elementary num­
ber theory formalised in second-order logic — contrary to the Tarskian account. But, 
as is well-known, this needn’t worry Quine since for him, second-order logic is not 
logic: it is set theory in sheep’s c l o t h i n g . T h e  main reason for viewing second-order 
logic as set theory in disguise is that in second-order logic we quantify over predi­
cate letters — in second-order logic, expressions such as '\fF3G ix{G x  V ~  G z)’ are 
well-formed sentences. Once this is admitted, it is tempting to see quantification 
over predicate letters as ranging over attributes. But for Quine, attributes are not 
well-defined objects, as is the case with propositions and meanings; since we have no 
clear identity-criteria for attributes, we can’t accept them in our ontology.^® Now the 
natural option to avoid this objection would be to view quantification over predicate 
letters as ranging over sets, which are well-defined entities. But this is, again, a de­
plorable move to make according to Quine. Predicate letters, to paraphrase Quine, 
do not name unspecified sets, they rather stand in place of names of unspecified sets. 
For instance, when writing 'Fx', we do not thereby mean that ‘a: belongs to F” (such 
talk commits one to an ontology of sets in second-order logic), but we are rather 
talking about an unspecified name of a set. The ‘F ’ denotes neither a specific set 
nor an arbitrary set: it is a name of an arbitrary set. And one can’t quantify over 
schematic predicate-letter, one can only quantify over objects in the universe of dis­
course (similarly, we don’t normally quantify over the ‘p ’ ’s and ‘g’ ’s of propositional 
logic). For that reason, if one admits sets in one’s ontology (as one should, since they 
are well-defined entities), one has to quantify over them by using the terminology of 
set-theory, in which sets are objects over which we can quantify. But if one does that, 
one is not doing logic as such, but set theory. This is because one is dealing with a
^^See Quine (1986: Chapter 5). For a full discussion of this issue, see Shapiro (1991). 
23See Chapter One, section 1.5 for a discussion on identity-criteria.
^Quine (1986: 66).
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specified domain of discourse, and logic is supposedly ‘topic-independent’.^ ^
This argument to the effect that second-order logic is set theory in disguise has 
been widely discussed. Here is not the place to discuss whether Quine’s argument 
is successful — a separate thesis would be needed in order to do that.^® But we 
can assess the consequences of accepting and of resisting his argument in the context 
of examining Quine’s account of logical consequence. If we are to accept Quine’s 
argument, there is no proper second-order logic. There is only first-order logic and 
set theory. When we are doing set theory, we use the axioms of set theory coupled 
with first-order logic, and we get the results we want.
Now if we are to resist Quine’s argument instead of accepting it, the situation is 
straightforward. If second-order logic is logic, then it is clear that the substitutional 
account does not work. There will be sentences that logically follow from the axioms 
of second-order logic but not captured by Quine’s account. That means the substitu­
tional account does not get the extension right in this case. In sum, the justifiability 
of restricting the account to first-order logic depends on this controversial argument 
about the status of second-order logic. If one accepts Quine’s argument, the substi­
tutional account survives. But if one does not accept the argument, Quine’s account 
collapses. Suffice to say, for the present purposes, that Quine’s argument against 
second-order logic is highly controversial.^^
^^This exposition of Quine’s argument against second-order logic is somewhat sketchy. But for 
the purposes at hand, it is enough since I am not going to dispute the argument.
^®The interested reader should be directed to Shapiro’s Foundations without Foundationalism: A 
Case for Second-Order Logic.
2?See Shapiro (1991) and Boolos (1975; 1984) for a defence of second-order logic against Quine’s 
arguments.
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4.10  O bjections relatin g  to  size o f th e  dom ain
I would now like to consider another objection that has been put forward against 
the substitutional account. The objection purports to show tha t there is an intuitively 
invalid inference that comes out valid according to the substitutional account. That 
is, it purports to show that Quine’s account hasn’t got the extension right. Let’s 
consider the following inference:
(3æ)(3y)(a; ^  y) h  (3z)(3i/)(3z)((æ y) k { y  ^  z) k { x  ^  z)) (4.9)
This sentence says, in effect, that if there are two things then it follows logically that 
there are three things. On the assumption that ’ is a logical term and that the 
universe contains three or more objects, (4,9) will be declared valid by Quine’s and 
Tarski’s accounts since it is true and all the expressions in it are logical — there is 
nothing to substitute, nothing to model. In fact, this argument will be considered 
valid by any interpretational account.
The problem, of course, is that intuitively the conclusion does not follow from 
the premise in (4.9). From the fact that there are two things, it does not follow 
logically that there are three things. It is after all a possibility that there are only 
two things. The problem faced by the interpretational account in this case is that 
what is considered valid will vary in function of the size of the domain. In a universe 
containing exactly two objects, the account will consider the argument invalid. In a 
universe containing three or more objects, it will consider the argument valid. Thus, 
the account makes validity dependent on such contingent facts as the size of the 
universe.
One way to escape this objection is by appealing to an axiom of infinity. If such an 
axiom is assumed, then it will logically follow that if there are two objects then there 
are three objects. Quine seems to regard the axiom of infinity as merely a hypothesis.
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to be assumed only when needed to prove theorems requiring i t3® He would certainly 
not regard it as a logical axiom, and even less as a necessary one. It just isn’t a 
logical ‘fact’ that there are infinitely many objects — logic doesn’t involve itself in 
the way the universe is. It might be a mathematical fact that there are infinitely 
many objects, but even that is disputed. The appeal to the axiom of infinity is not, 
simply put, an available answer for Quine to the problem raised by (9).
Another line of response available to a Quinean would be to point out that in 
the language under consideration and its domain (first-order logic used to formalise 
elementary number theory, in which the domain is denumerably infinite), there is no 
problem to account for the fact that under the interpretational account, (4.9) is valid. 
The universe under consideration is infinite — given that it is, it does follow that if 
there are two objects then there are three objects. The idea here is to assume the 
infinity of the domain and then to say that under this assumption, it is correct to 
say that the argument depicted above is a valid one. The assumption about the size 
of the domain does not involve a necessary claim such as postulating the axiom of 
infinity. It can be seen either as a working hypothesis or as a fact. The success of 
this ploy, however, comes at a price. Remember that intuitively, we don’t  want (4.9) 
to be valid. Assuming infinity, or working with an infinite domain, has the result 
that the conclusion in (4.9) follows but at the price of being counter-intuitive. In this 
sense, the resulting definition of logical consequence will fail to capture what we mean 
by logical consequence. W hat is logically valid shouldn’t depend on the size of the 
domain — however, it seems that the Quinean has to put forward a view that forces
^®For instance: “The axiom has been decried on the ground that the question whether there are 
infinitely many individuals is a question rather of physics or metaphysics than of mathematics, and 
that it is incongruous to make arithmetic depend upon it. Whitehead and Russell were apologetic 
about the axiom, as they were about the axiom of choice; they entered both of them as explicit hy­
potheses in the theorems that required them, just as I did with most comprehension assumptions...” 
(1969b: 280-281). Also, from a logic paper in the thirties: “In particular the multiplicative axiom 
and the axiom of infinity are as requisite to (Quine’s system) as they are to Zermelo’s system; I 
follow P.M. (Principia Mathematica), however, in suppressing these as postulates and requiring their 
statement rather as explicit hypotheses wherever necessary" (1936a: 85, my italics).
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the recognition that what follows from what depends on the size of the domain. As 
a last resort, Quine could retort that he is not concerned with getting our intuitions 
right, only with getting the extension right. Given the infinity of the domain, he 
could say, (4.9) is valid. The other immediate problem with this, of course, is that 
such a definition depends on non-logical truths such as the size of the domain. If sets 
are not allowed in the definition on the basis that they are not logical, why should 
contingent facts be allowed? Their inclusion in such a theory is even more contentious 
than sets. On this view, logical form is not sufficient to assess the validity of a logical 
consequence: it has to be supplemented with extra premises. This seems unfortunate.
Quine’s most effective response to the problem generated by (4.9) is to avoid it 
by treating identity as a non-logical term. If ‘= ’ is not a logical term, then there will 
be substitutions (interpretations) making the argument false, thus stripping it of its 
validity. Again, the effectiveness of this strategy comes at a price. Quine himself is 
aware that identity does seem to belong more to logic than to mathematics (1986: 
64). He nevertheless proceeds to reduce statements involving identity to statements 
involving only truth-functions and quantification (1986: 63-64). The price to pay 
is to regard what seems to be a logical constant as a non-logical term. Quine’s 
arguments that identity is non-logical are highly disputed, and it is fair to say that 
most logicians nowadays regard it as a logical constant. It is enough to point out, 
here, that Quine’s way out of (4.9) depends again, as is the case with second-order 
logic, on a contentious, highly disputed argument.
In sum, we see that Quine faces counter-examples that have to do with the size 
of the domain. This is related to his clause according to which the language must be 
interpretable under the domain of the natural numbers, an infinite domain. Quine 
is explicit about this. His proof of (EQ) will succeed only if that clause is accepted. 
W hat we are doing here, amongst other things, is assessing the price of this restriction. 
We are about to see how that clause takes central stage.
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4.11 Size o f th e  dom ain: P art II
One might be tempted to think that Quine, by appealing to his argument against 
the logicality of identity and by stipulating that the domain is infinite, gets out of 
trouble (even if his argument is contentious). But matters are not so simple. Shapiro 
points our attention to a sentence of first-order logic not involving identity which 
again puts the interpretational account in difficulty. Consider, Shapiro (2002) tells 
us, the following sentence:
{Wx){\fy){\/z){{Rxy & Ryz) R xz) & ijix){3y){Rxy) [= {3x)(Rxx) (4.10)
The sole non-logical term in this sentence is the binary predicate ‘i?’. This sentence, 
in effect, says that if an arbitrary relation is transitive and that every object stands 
in this relation with another object, then there is an object for which this relation 
is reflexive. Now in a finite universe, every substitution performed on (4.10) is true, 
rendering it into a logical truth according to the account. Think for instance of the 
relation ‘> ’. In a universe containing, say, only the numbers from 1 to 5, the relation 
‘> ’ is transitive but not every object stands in this relation (the number 5 is not 
greater than any other number in this universe). So the antecedent is false, making
(4.10) true. A similar point applies to other transitive relations. But if the domain 
is infinite such as the domain of the natural numbers, such a sentence is not a logical 
tru th  under the substitutional account (or, for that matter, any interpretational ac­
count) since when we interpret ^Rxy^ as ^x< y\ it comes out false. That is, the relation 
‘< ’ is transitive and every object stands in this relation (for any number, there is a 
smaller one), but no number is smaller than itself. Here again, we have a formula 
whose logicality under the Quinean account depends on the size of the universe. And 
this time, Quine cannot rely on the status of identity.
Just as (4.9) is intuitively not a valid logical consequence, (4.10) is clearly not
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either. The point is the same as before: an account that would render it as a logical 
truth would be an incorrect account. The only resource available to Quine, again, 
is to rely on his condition that the account works for the language and, even more 
crucially, for the domain specified. If the universe is interpretable in terms of the 
denumerably infinite series of the natural numbers, then sentences like (4.10) will not 
be considered logical truths, thus ‘saving’ the extension. This is because the natural 
numbers form an infinite domain. Again, Quine has to fall back upon considerations 
to do with the size of the intended domain.
So, to effectively solve the problems caused by (4.9) and (4.10), the Quinean (and 
Tarskian) must make assumptions about the size of the universe — she must say that 
the account works in infinite domains, and that these are the interesting domains. 
But — apart from the reservations expressed previously — another potential counter­
example threatens the workability of this ploy. Let’s grant to Quine that the universe 
under consideration is infinite and that there is a way to accommodate (4.9) and
(4.10). There still remains the issue about infinitary inferences, such as the so-called 
w-rule. This rule says that if a formula A is true of every natural number, then the 
formula ‘for every number n, A (n)’ is true. The natural numbers form an infinite 
domain. So here we have arguments consisting of an infinite set of premises and a 
conclusion. Intuitively, we would think that the w-rule is valid: if something is true 
of every natural number, then we should be able to infer validly the proposition ‘for 
every number n, A (n)’. But the compactness of first-order classical logic blocks this 
intuitively valid logical consequence. A consequence relation is said to be compact 
if “any consequence of an infinite set of propositions is a consequence of some finite 
subset of them” (Read, 1995: 43). The problem is that the premises of an application 
of the w-rule cannot be reduced to a finite subset. Since it cannot, it follows that in 
first-order classical logic the w-rule cannot be considered to be a valid rule of inference. 
The validity of the w-rule is a contentious issue, highly disputed. But intuitively, it is
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hard to see why someone would like to repudiate the validity of infinitary inferences. If 
something is true of all objects, isn’t it then logically correct to infer that every object 
has that property?^® Why reject infinitary inferences? The only reason to reject it 
seems to be that it is not compact. But this is not, in itself, a good justification. We 
see here how Quine faces a potential counter-example even if we grant to him the
restriction on the size of the domain.
4.12 V arying dom ains
Now that we have looked at all these objections to the interpretational account 
and their replies, it is time to take stock and look at the situation from a broader 
perspective. To avoid problems having to do with second-order logic (for instance, 
Godel sentences), Quine has to restrict the applicability of his account to first-order 
logic. We have seen that he offers an argument to the effect that second-order logic
is not logic. So the first condition for the workability of his account is:
(C l)  Restriction on first-order logic.
We have also seen that Quine, to meet objections involving arguments containing 
identity (see (4.9)), has to convince us that identity is not part of the set O’ of fixed 
terms. Doing so enables the account to declare as invalid arguments which.would 
otherwise be declared, counter-intuitively, valid. So Quine has to:
(C2) Treat identity as an extra-logical term.
In view of statements such as (4.10), which are intuitively invalid but declared valid 
under the substitutional account in a finite domain, Quine has to stipulate that the 
account is applicable only in an infinite universe, such as the natural numbers:
totally share Read’s attitude on this issue. See, again, his (1995: 45). Etchemendy (1990) also 
holds this rule to be valid. Hanson (1997: 396, see also footnote 42) discusses it in relation to our 
topic, and so does Shapiro (2002: 6), but they do not take a stand on this issue in their papers. 
Tarski discusses the issue in his classic paper on logical consequence (1935: 410-412) and has more 
to say about it in his paper on truth (1933a: 258-261). See also his (1933b: 294-295).
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(C3) The universe must be interpretable under the domain of the natural numbers.
We have seen, in the previous sections, that the arguments in support of restricting 
the applicability of the account via (C l) and (C2) are far from conclusive. I will now 
discuss in greater detail the third requirement.
Let’s grant Quine our adherence to (Cl )  and (C2). Quine still faces his most 
serious problems with condition (C3). The latter is necessary for Quine, we have 
seen, in order to avoid objections relating to the size of the universe. If the universe 
under study is re-interpretable in terms of the natural numbers, it ensures that the 
substitutional account gets the extension right. In fact, this requirement amounts 
to a requirement concerning the size of the universe. Quine’s account will work 
only if the universe is interpretable in terms of the theory of the natural numbers. 
The natural numbers form a denumerably infinite universe. So in order for Quine’s 
account to get the extension right, we have to assume the infinity of the universe. 
This is problematic. For one thing, although it seems probable that the universe 
is infinite, it is not proved to be true. For another thing, even if it is infinite, it 
could have been finite. Ordinarily, we would like to say that what counts as a logical 
truth should not depend on the size of the universe — should not, that is, depend on 
contingent matters. Quine, of course, is only concerned with getting the extension 
right, he is not concerned with getting our intuitions right. However, a point similar 
to one made earlier applies here. If an account of logical consequence does not capture 
our intuitions about what follows from what, in what sense is it an account of logical 
consequence?
We know that Quine does not like to talk in terms of ‘models’ and ‘domains’: for 
him, there is only one domain, and that is the (assumed to be infinite) universe. In 
this case, we have seen, his account works (provided that (C l) and (C2) are also 
satisfied). But most people would like to say that there are such things as valid and 
invalid logical consequences in finite domains, and that any correct account should
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get the extension right in these cases too. I can’t see any reason why talk of ‘finite 
domains’ and ‘models’ should be forbidden. Quine’s account cannot do the job here.
I think the above discussion of (C l) -  (C3) shows that the substitutional account 
of logical truth and logical consequence is ultimately unsatisfying. There is no satis­
fying justification for restricting the applicability of the account in the way that (C l) 
-  (C3) forces us to do. Faced with this situation, and assuming she accepts to drop 
these clauses, how can a Quinean minimise the ontological and modal commitments? 
To drop clause (C l), we have seen, commits one to a different interpretational ac­
count, the one exposed by Tarski in his (1935). But how does Tarski’s account fare 
if we drop clauses (C2) and (C3)? This is a tricky question. To answer it, we have 
to consider in what sense the Tarskian account is a model-theoretic one. (C2) and 
(C3), in effect, relate to the size of the universe. We know that for Quine, there is 
only one ‘domain’ — the actual universe. If it is infinite then his account steers clear 
of problems such as (4.10). As we have seen in section 4.7, in Tarski’s definition of 
logical consequence there is no mention of domains. He only talks about ‘arbitrary 
sequences of objects’ satisfying sentential functions. One has the impression that 
there is only one domain — the universe. He is however explicit that any definition of 
logical consequence has to be relativised to some particular language. Nevertheless, 
it does seem that we can have many different languages all ‘talking’ about the same 
domain (the same universe). Acknowledging the possibility of different languages 
does not commit one to a multitude of ‘domains’. Etchemendy, we have seen, seems 
to think that Tarski’s account is merely a variation of the substitutional one, and 
that both accounts are what he calls ‘interpretational’, that is, with varying only the 
interpretation of the non-logical terms, not the domains. If that is the case, then 
Tarski’s account, as it is defined in his (1935), is no more satisfying than Quine’s 
since it is also hostage to clauses (C2) and (C3).
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The crucial point is that in order to free ourselves from these unjustified clauses, 
we have to be able to vary the domain — we have to be able to talk not just about 
the actual universe, but also other domains. Let’s grant, despite the fact that it is 
controversial, that Tarski’s account is merely a refined version of Quine’s. Tarski’s 
account, as it stands, does not allow us to vary the domain. The only thing allowed 
is to vary how we interpret the non-logical terms — that is, how the extension of the 
non-logical constants is assigned. These variations, under our assumed interpretation 
of Tarski, all occur within one and the same domain. Since this is the case, then 
Tarski’s account is hostage to the size of the universe. If it contains only one object 
and the identity symbol is logical, it will consider as logically false sentences such as 
‘3a;3î/(~ {x = y )) \  Otherwise, it will consider such sentences logically true. But it 
seems that the logicality of this sentence — of any sentence — has to be independent 
of the size of the universe. A similar problem occurs with (4.10). In an infinite domain, 
the Tarskian account will take (4.10) to be non-logical. But in a finite domain, (4.10) 
would count as a logical truth. Again, the objection is that whether (4.10) is a logical 
tru th  or not has to be a matter independent of the size of the universe.
The upshot is that in order to meet these criticisms, a correct account has to allow 
for variation of domains. That is, it has to be able to make sense of our intuition 
that a logical tru th  is true no matter how the world is configured. We want to 
say that a logical truth keeps its logical status no matter the size of the universe 
— no matter if there is one, zero, or infinitely many objects in it. This is why we 
have to be able to talk of a sentence being true in every domain, where a domain 
is a description of how the world is. To do this is to do what Etchemendy calls 
‘representational semantics’. A representational semantics is a semantics constructed 
in terms of contemporary model theory. This kind of semantics is very different 
from the kind of semantics Tarski developed in his (1935) — remember that we 
assume here that Tarski’s definition of logical truth is interpretational. In Tarski’s
192
account, what we vary are the interpretations assigned to the non-logical terms. In 
contemporary model theory, however, what we vary are the models, where a model 
is to be understood as a description of a possible configuration of the world. For 
instance, a sentence is logically true, in model theory, if it is true in all models — in 
all possible worlds.
In representational semantics, we don’t encounter problems with either (4.10) or 
truths involving identity. (4.10) is clearly not a logical tru th  under representational 
semantics since there is a model where it is false, namely a model with infinitely many 
objects. Same with ‘3æ3y(~ {x — ?/))’: it doesn’t matter whether we treat identity 
as logical or not when testing this sentence for logicality since whatever our choice 
of logical terms, this sentence is not a logical truth under representational semantics 
because there is a model making it false, namely a model with only one element.
W hat is needed, then, is an account of logical consequence which contains a modal 
ingredient. This modal ingredient is essential to handle the counter-examples studied 
in sections 4.10 and 4.11. The interpretational accounts, both Quine’s and Tarski’s, 
are attempts to define logical consequence without modalities. Presumably, this is 
what made these accounts attractive in the first place, but it is also why, finally, 
they are unsuccessful. It does not mean that a correct account has to be exclusively 
modal. Indeed, Shapiro (1998) and Hanson (1997) have both suggested that the 
best account of logical consequence consists in blend of the interpretational and the 
representational approaches .Such a blended characterisation of logical consequence 
can be formulated thus:^^
(BLD ) 0  is a logical consequence of P iff 0  holds in all possibilities under every 
interpretation of the non-logical terminology in which F holds.
Hanson calls the interpretational approach the ‘formal approach’ and the representational ap­
proach the ‘modal approach’. We will use both terminology in what follows.
^^This formulation is taken from Shapiro (1998: 148). Hanson’s definition is virtually identical 
(1997: 379).
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The preceding sections have been concerned mainly with making a case to the effect 
that Quine has no choice but to embrace a modal account such as (BLD). If this 
is right, then Quine cannot be an Error-theorist about logical necessity. He has to 
acknowledge the need, in order to explain and define the central concept of logical 
consequence, for a representational account making an irreducible use of modal no­
tions. In the Appendix, we investigate the nature of the modality inherent in (BLD) 
in greater detail.
4.13 C onclusion
In this Chapter, as in the previous Chapters, the objective was to assess a brand of 
scepticism about logical necessity. We have seen, first, that Quine’s account of logical 
truth must embrace a notion of meaning in order to specify the interpretation of the 
set O’ of logical constants. However, Quine might be able to bypass that objection 
by putting forward an extensional account of meaning, even if it is not clear how 
that might be done. Sections 4.4-4.12, however, pointed to a much more serious 
defect in relation to his account of logical consequence. Indeed, we have seen that the 
substitutional account cannot be made to work — any theory of logical consequence 
has to be modal if it is to answer the counterexamples raised. Such an account does 
not have to be exclusively modal. (BLD), a blended account containing both an 
interpretational element and a modal element, does answer the counterexamples, and 
the modality in play allows us to represent different size of the domain. Even if the 
nature of the modality in (BLD) is minimal, it still shows its irreducibility, and this 
is enough for the purposes at hand. An interesting line of research for future work 
would be to assess whether the notion of modality in (BLD) is strong enough to 
account for all our intuitions about what follows from what — perhaps we need an 
even stronger notion of modality, one allowing us to represent not merely different 
sizes of the domain, but possibilities in general.
C H A P T E R  5 
C O N C L U SIO N
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5.1 Sum m ary o f C hapters 1—4
In Chapter One, we carefully analysed the argument in sections 1-4 of ‘Two 
Dogmas’. This argument is often taken to be directed against the very intelligibility 
of notions such as analyticity, meaning, necessity and synonymy. If these were the 
argument’s target, and if the argument had proved to be correct, that would have 
amounted to one of the most revolutionary philosophical argument ever produced. 
But is such an argument possible even in principle? Indeed, how can notions such as 
meaning and synonymy be unintelligible? If the very notion of an expression meaning 
something turned out to be spurious, that would mean, so to speak, that nothing 
makes sense. Such a conclusion itself does not make sense. Its very formulation 
requires expressions to have meaning. If Quine was arguing against the very notion 
of meaning, he was bound— prima facie at least — to fail. We have seen that the 
argument’s target, properly interpreted, is not the notion of meaning qua notion, but 
only a particular understanding of meaning. Quine’s charge against meaning is to be 
understood in the light of his aim to deconstruct the a priori via an attack on the 
analytic /  synthetic distinction. This is to be explained by the fact that Carnap’s 
notion of the a priori in Logical Syntax rests on the analytic /  synthetic distinction. 
This distinction, in turn, rests on the notion of meaning since to be analytic is to be 
true by virtue of meaning (for Carnap). Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that 
Quine is only attacking the notion of meaning needed to form the building blocks of 
the analytic /  synthetic distinction. The notion of meaning required to play this role, 
according to Quine, is the Platonistic, abstract notion of meaning. In short, Quine 
is arguing against the myth of the museum, in which meanings are the exhibits and 
words are labels for those abstract exhibits. This interpretation of Quine’s argument 
does not imply scepticism about meaning in general, but, rather, only scepticism 
about the myth of the museum. I argued in Chapter One that Quine’s argument, so 
construed, is compelling.
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This study of Quine’s argument against analyticity was important in the context 
of a thesis on scepticism about logical necessity. Indeed, for Carnap, what logically 
follows from what is to be decided on the basis of analytic statements. In Carnap’s 
system, the notion of logical necessity is built upon the notion of analyticity. More 
precisely, it is because the rules of inference are analytic that we have the inexorability 
of statements of logical consequence. Accordingly, an argument against the intelligi­
bility of analyticity as understood by Carnap amounts to an argument against the 
intelligibility of a notion of logical necessity based on analyticity.
The conclusion to be drawn from this study of what I have called ‘Radical Irreal- 
ism’ is twofold. Firstly, Quine’s argument, when properly interpreted, is cogent and 
convincing. Secondly, the fact that Carnap’s notion of logical necessity (according to 
Quine) requires the myth of the museum concerning meaning is good reason to make 
us suspicious of its viability. Correspondingly, we should also accept that a correct 
theory of logical necessity must avoid a commitment to Platonism about meaning. 
Such a commitment would weaken the plausibility of the theory, making it open to the 
forceful arguments advocated by Quine as well as other arguments against Platonism 
about meaning, such as those of Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations.
In Chapter One, then, I am sympathetic to Quine’s scepticism — so long as the 
argument is not inflated to amount to a full-blown attack on the very notion of mean­
ing. In Chapter 2, I examined Quine’s epistemological holism, according to which all 
statements have a relation to experience, even statements having to do with mathe­
matics and logic. The difference between logical statements and, say, observational 
statements is one of degree, not kind. That is, no statements are situated outside the 
web of belief. There are no a priori statements, no analytic statements and no nec­
essary statements. They all are a posteriori and contingent. However, Quine makes, 
in his philosophy of logic, a metatheorem /  theorem distinction. This cleavage is not 
without its problems. By approaching the matter via the puzzle raised by Lewis Car­
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roll in his ‘W hat the Tortoise said to Achilles’, we have seen that there is a tension in 
Quine’s thoughts about the foundations of logic. He is, on the one hand, an advocate 
of naturalised epistemology, in which logic has no normative status; on the other 
hand, he is also a traditional logician, for whom logic encodes the norms of correct 
reasoning. I concluded that Quine’s philosophy of logic does not have the resources 
to resolve this tension, leaving us with an unsatisfying account of the status of logic. 
Drawing on Davidson’s views about weakness of the will, I then offered a solution 
to Carroll’s puzzle contriving to be internalist in spirit while avoiding the excesses of 
externalism.
In Chapter 3, I examined a related argument against Quine’s holism, one advo­
cated by Wright. This argument purports to show that holism, to be a coherent 
epistemological picture, needs statements which are logically necessary. These will 
be precisely statements of the form {T\~l ©), that is, statements regulating the logi­
cal consequences in the web. After studying possible replies available to a Quinean, 
I contended that Wright’s argument goes through and conclusively shows the need 
for logically necessary statements regulating the logical links in the web. Although 
Hale and McFetridge argue that there is a gap in Wright’s argument, I suggest that 
once the target of Wright’s argument is clearly identified and once we are clear about 
the nature of our judgements of logical necessity, there is a natural way to fill the 
gap. Thus, Wright’s argument convincingly shows not only that Quine’s philosophy 
of logic is unsatisfying, but also shows the necessity of logical necessity.
In Chapter 4, we examined another aspect of Quine’s scepticism about logical 
necessity, namely his account of logical truth and logical consequence. Firstly, a case 
has been made to the effect that his theory must take into account the meaning of 
the logical constants, contrary to what he claims. This in turn shows that logical 
truths are true because they are analytic — true by virtue of meaning. However, 
this criticism does not directly address the issue of logical necessity since Quine can
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cash out the required notion of meaning in a behaviourial framework. The issue then 
becomes whether such a notion is viable; but at least it forces Quine to acknowl­
edge the need for a notion of meaning. Evaluating the viability of such a notion 
of meaning would have taken us too far from our main topic, so the question was 
left open. The remaining of the Chapter evaluated Quine’s substitutional theory of 
logical consequence. After an investigation of the theory and the various problems 
it faces, I have concluded that Quine has to espouse a representational account of 
logical consequence, one in which modality plays an essential role (more will be said 
on the notion of modality build in the representational account in the Appendix). For 
the moment, let’s point out that the result obtained holds generally, not only against 
Quine’s substitutional account. Indeed, the counter-examples that have been raised 
against interpretational theories (including Tarski’s) show the need for an irreducibly 
modal account. The crucial point is that a correct account of logical consequence 
has to allow for variation of domains. This is what, ultimately, forces any theory to 
include a modal element. In sum, the main thesis advanced in each of the Chapters 
is that scepticism about logical necessity is untenable. We need to acknowledge the 
inexorability of using logical necessity.
The Appendix can be seen as an example of future research on the topic of logical 
necessity. The strand explored has to do with the nature of modality: I will attempt 
to have a stronger grip on the modality in play in the blended account and also to 
assess its relation to various levels of discussion used when talking about inference. 
For now, however, I will indicate other avenues for future work.
5.2 Prom  non -scep tic ism  to  a p ositive  account
Now that a case has been made against scepticism about logical necessity, many 
questions remain. In fact, the implausibility of scepticism opens a realm of philo­
sophical problems. We can now ask anew Dummett’s questions: what is the source
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of logical necessity, and how do we recognise it? In the Introduction, we saw that 
Dummett’s questions presuppose that there is such a thing as logical necessity. Now 
that the matter has been resolved positively, it is worthwhile to notice that there 
is another presupposition in Dummett’s questions, namely that logical necessity is 
something that we recognise. Accordingly, perhaps one of the most pressing prob­
lem is whether we should adopt a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist view about logical 
necessity. If the right account is the cognitivist one, then we can ask Dummett’s 
questions. However, if we argue for a non-cognitivist account of logical necessity, the 
fundamental problem of logical necessity becomes: what exactly is the source of logi­
cal necessity? If i t ’s not something we recognise, then the source has to come from us. 
How this metaphor should be cashed out is the main difficulty. Wittgenstein some­
times seems to think that what is logically necessary is a matter of decision. What 
does he mean exactly? Others advocate an expressivist view, according to which we 
‘project’ our imaginative limitations onto the world. The projection metaphor raises 
a lot of problems — Blackburn, for one, is an expressivist who is cautious about its 
use (Blackburn, 1986: 122-123), preferring to talk about ‘policy’. Hale (1989) and 
Wright (1980, 1989) also discuss the cognitivist /  non-cognitivist debate, using the 
fictional figure of the Cautious Man to see whether there are facts of the matter about 
logical necessity.
Arguing for a cognitivist standpoint also raises a lot of difficulties. They are 
nicely spelled out by Dummett’s questions: indeed, if we recognise logical necessity 
— if indeed it is something we ‘track’ — what exactly is the object of our cognition? 
Is it an abstract property? Do we recognise it by a special faculty of intuition? 
The ontological and epistemological puzzles raised by cognitivism are at least as 
considerable as those raised by non-cognitivism. Hale, in the aforementioned paper, 
criticises the viability of non-cognitivism and is tempted to adopt a cognitivist view 
on the matter — although, as he recognises, the epistemological and ontological
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difficulties faced by such a view are considerable. While it is of course impossible 
to discuss these issues here, the cognitivism /  non-cognitivism debate is perhaps the 
most fundamental one to be addressed with regards to logical necessity.
The discussion of Carroll’s regress in Chapter 2 points to another set of problems, 
this time regarding statements of logical consequence and our inferential practice. 
Now that it has been established in the course of the thesis that true statements 
of logical consequence are necessary, we can enquire about our entitlement to draw 
a conclusion on the basis of the premises. How is our warrant to be understood? 
Does the fact that statements of logical consequence are necessary play a role in that 
entitlement? Should we adopt an externalist or an internalist stance about our in­
ferential practice? In the section on Carroll’s regress, I offered a solution congenial 
to an internalist outlook. The solution proposed could be understood in relation 
to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, especially the issues concerning the 
epistemology of rule-following and our understanding of rules, more precisely Wittgen­
stein’s remarks that ‘justification comes to an end’ and that when one obeys a rule, 
one obeys it ‘blindly’. My solution tries to steer a middle way between the excesses 
of externalism and the vulnerability of internalism to Carroll’s regress. Accordingly, 
the heart of the solution has to be that when we infer by using modus ponens, we 
are following a norm — but this norm would have to be granted a special status, 
protecting it from the regress. I believe that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following 
contain the seeds of a convincing explanation congenial to my solution. This is, of 
course, another matter to be addressed in future work.
To sum up, three main lines of research are definitely worth pursuing in relation 
to the topics discussed in this dissertation. There is first the issues of the status and 
role of a modal account of logical consequence. This set of problems sprang from the 
discussion of Quine’s and Tarski’s account in Chapter 4. Secondly, the cognitivism /  
non-cognitivism debate about logical necessity is a natural extension of the conclusion
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of this thesis. The last decade has seen few contributions on this debate — it deserves 
a revival. Maybe the relative silence is to be explained by the contemporary trend 
consisting of using modal discourse in the philosophical literature without enquiring 
about its nature. Indeed, nowadays, it seems that modal idioms are taken for granted. 
However, we should perhaps be unsatisfied about a philosophical theory taking for 
granted such a powerful tool — if the theory depends on something for which no 
account is available, then that theory’s appeal is diminished. Finally, the third line 
of research is related to Carroll’s regress. This puzzle forces us to be clear about 
the nature of our inferential practice. This hard question must be addressed: what 
is the nature of our warrant — if there is such a thing — when we correctly infer a 
conclusion from a set of premises?
A P P E N D IX  A
A P P E N D IX
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A  I Q uinean worries answ ered
It has been acknowledged that there is modality ‘built into’ our notion of logical 
consequence — this was indeed the main conclusion of the thesis. Now what remains 
to be done — amongst many other things — is to assess the nature of this modality. 
The problem can be put in those terms. We now know that in a valid argument, the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the premisses. That is, we have to ‘box’ statements 
of logical consequence. This is what logical necessity amounts to. At this stage of 
our enquiry, it becomes legitimate to ask about the meaning of this notion of logical 
necessity. That is, the purpose so far has been to stress the need of understanding 
true statements of the form (F \~l ©) as inevitably modal — but modal in which 
sense?
At this point one could legitimately raise the following worry. Quine does allow 
a role for logical necessity concerning validity. In a passage which appears puzzling, 
Quine writes (1953c: 169):
There is no difficulty as long as necessity is construed as validity relative say to  
the logic of truth functions and quantification and perhaps classes.(...) As long 
as necessity in sem antical applications is construed sim ply as explicit truth- 
functional validity (...) or quantificational validity, or set-theoretic validity, 
or validity of any well-determined kind, the logic of the sem antical necessity  
predicate is a significant and very central strand of proof theory. B ut it is not 
m odal logic, even unquantified m odal logic.
Quine is here saying that necessity, understood as validity, is not problematic. Ne­
cessity thus understood is exactly what this thesis is about. Wouldn’t it be possible, 
then, to reconcile the conclusions reached in the previous two Chapters with a Quinean 
understanding of logical necessity, so that the painstaking investigations leading to 
the need for a modal notion turned out to be deflated? To settle this question, we
204
have to reflect on the reasons why Quine takes himself to be entitled to say that 
necessity so construed is not problematic. His strategy involves two stages. Firstly, 
to reduce necessity to validity. Secondly, to explain validity with an interpretational 
account. For Quine, once we have a clear-cut account of validity, it is true that we 
have adequately explained logical necessity as it manifests itself in truth-functional 
logic or any logic for which we can define validity. This is because Quine will see no 
reason to reject a notion which satisfies his standards on definition and which can be 
shown to have its utility.
However, we have seen that the interpretational definition of validity — Quinean 
or Tarskian — cannot be made to work satisfactorily. An irreducibly modal element 
is needed. The exact nature of this modal element will be considered in the next sec­
tions, but nothing guarantees that this notion will lend itself to a definition satisfying 
Quine’s high standards required for definitions. In sum, Quine relies on his account 
of logical consequence to justify the claim made in the quoted passage. But it was 
the point of Chapter 4 to show that this account does not work.
Another line of reply available to a Quinean is the following. Granted, she could 
say, that in the previous Chapters we have shown the need to incorporate modality in 
the concept of logical consequence. But the notion of necessity in question should be 
understood merely as a ‘certainty’ operator. That is, we ascribe necessity to correct 
statements of logical consequence because these statements figure at the centre of the 
web. They are considered ‘true come what may’ because they are deeply entrenched 
beliefs. As a result, we find it natural to accord them a special status and elevate 
them as holding of necessity. But, the argument goes, this is just a psychological 
fact about us, not reflecting anything in the way the world is. We could as well — 
this is a crucial bit — abandon those beliefs in logical necessity and it wouldn’t make 
a difference. Once we realise the source of the belief in logical necessity — deeply 
entrenched belief — its superfluousness becomes apparent, and it should be seen as
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a mere façon de parler, a rhetorical device.
Once again, this attempt to ‘deconstruct’ logical necessity fails. The Quinean 
is here claiming that belief in logical necessity reflects a confusion between beliefs 
that are situated at the centre of the web and beliefs that have a special status. The 
Quinean holds that no beliefs have a special status, they are all on the same level. It is 
because those beliefs are central to our conceptual scheme that we think, misleadingly, 
that they are logically necessary.^ A proper analysis of those beliefs, the sceptical 
Quinean says, shows that we can do without them. But this line of argument does 
not work in light of the arguments of Chapter 3. Wright’s argument shows that belief 
in logical necessity is not an option: it is in effect inexorable. Therefore, the Quinean 
move to reduce belief in logical necessity to mere deeply entrenched belief is blocked. 
We have to believe in the necessity of some statement of logical consequence: it is 
not an option or a display of a psychological attitude such as certainty. The challenge 
is to understand the modality in question. To try and reduce it to something less 
problematic simply won’t work.
A .2 Talking abou t inference
Before exploring the question of the nature and the role of the modality in (BLD), 
we need to clear up the field. In particular, there is a need to discern between different 
levels of discussion used when talking about inference. What, for instance, is the 
relation between a characterisation of logical consequence such as (BLD) and first- 
order logic? How does first-order logic relate to our intuitive notion of ‘what follows 
from what’ ? How does the latter relate to (BLD)? What is first-order logic intended
 ^Those beliefs might have a dialectical, pragmatical role. This sense is manifested when we want 
to express an almost nnshakeable belief in something. For instance, someone might say that the 
conclusion ‘necessarily’ follows from a set of premises in order to emphasise the apparent inexorabil­
ity, but she need not believe in necessity in a stronger sense than that. This ‘conversational’ sense 
of necessity is not the one which is our concern here.
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to model? We are in a conceptual muddle. In what follows, I will distinguish between 
three levels of discussion we use when talking about inference.
The first level is the intuitive one. This is a very primitive level of discussion. 
When talking about inference, we first have in mind the notion of ‘what follows from 
what’. This is the most general characterisation of the topic under study in this 
thesis. But as such, it is not very illuminating: it refers, roughly, to our practice of 
inferring conclusions from premises. In this sense, this example illustrates a correct 
instantiation of the concept of ‘what follows from what’:
(1) All men are mortal
(2) Socrates is a man
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
No one can really dispute that. But the following example also instantiates this 
intuitive characterisation:
(4) A1 is taller than Bill
(5) Therefore, Bill is shorter than Al.
At the intuitive level, (5) follows from (4). Indeed, in actual reasoning, it is cor­
rect to infer (5) from (4), unless one is doing things at a theoretical level — this 
argument is not valid in first-order logic, since there are arguments displaying the 
same form in which the premise is true and the conclusion false. But in normal dis­
course, no one would object in the following way: “Actually, you cannot infer that 
Bill is shorter than Al from the premise that Al is taller than Bill. I do not accept 
this inference, and if you want to persuade me that (5) follows from (4), you will need 
to do better than that.” Such a person would appear somewhat eccentric.
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Staying at the intuitive level, however, one could grant that (5) follows from (4), 
but that it does not logically follow. Such a person would say that logical consequence 
is a matter of form, not of content. As such, the second example is not valid in virtue 
of form, whereas the first is. Here we witness a restriction in the notion of ‘what 
follows from what’ at the intuitive level. Both examples above are correct instances 
of what follows from what, but only the first displays a correct logical consequence.
Next comes the pre-theoretical level of discussion. At that level, we try to ar­
ticulate the intuitive notions in more precise terms. For instance, a straightforward 
pre-theoretical characterisation of the unrestricted notion of ‘what follows from what’ 
(the one embracing both examples above) would look like this:
(M O D ) 0  follows from F if and only if it is impossible for F to be true and © to be 
false.
It is clear that such a characterisation captures the intuitive notion of what follows 
from what. Importantly, this is essentially a modal representation of the intuitive 
notion. Turning now to the restricted notion — validity in virtue of form — we have 
seen in Chapter 4 that there are different ways to characterise it in pre-theoretic 
terms. First we studied the substitutional characterisation:
(SUB) © is a logical consequence of F if and only if there is no substitution of the 
non logical terms in which F is true but © is false.
There was also Tarski’s account:
(TLC ) 0  is a logical consequence of F if and only if every model of the sentences in 
F is also a model of ©.
Tarski’s account, as we have seen, can be considered as an attempt to capture the 
restricted notion only if the notion of model is understood in the interpretational way 
— otherwise it’s a version of (M OD). Finally, at the end of last Chapter, we have
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seen that a blended account might be the best we have to model validity in virtue of 
form:
(BLD ) 0  is a logical consequence of F if and only if 0  holds in all possibilities under 
every interpretation of the non-logical terminology in which F holds.
Before examining the various relations between these characterisations and what 
they are intended to capture, there is also a third level of discussion to consider, 
namely the theoretical level. At the theoretical level we have the logical systems, 
whose role is to model, in a technical sense, our reasoning practice. For instance, 
classical first-order logic is meant to capture the intuitive idea that validity is a 
matter of form. In contrast, we could say that relevant logics and modal logics are 
concerned to model the unrestricted notion of what follows from what — these logics 
use modal concepts that are meant to model the modality in (M OD).
To recapitulate, we have in this section identified three levels of discussion we 
use when talking about inference. The first level refers to our rather vague intuitions 
about inference and what follows from what. In the second level — the pre-theoretical 
one — these intuitions are articulated more precisely. The third level is the theoretical 
one. In this level we find the logical systems. We can identify two main strands going 
through the levels. There is first the strand intended to capture the notion of logical 
consequence, that is, the notion of validity in virtue of form. At the first level, it 
corresponds to the restricted notion of what follows what. Second level we find its 
associated pre-theoretical notions, such as (SUB), (TLC), (BLD). Corresponding 
to these pre-theoretical notions we have, for instance, first-order logic, which belongs 
to the third level. The other main strand starts with the unrestricted notion of what 
follows from what. A pre-theoretic account of this notion would look like something 
along the lines of (M OD). At the theoretical level, we find various modal logics 
attempting to represent (M OD).
In the next sections, we will use this tripartite framework to study the relations
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between these different characterisations. The pressing question, for present purposes, 
is to enquire into whether the minimal sense of modality in (BLD) is the best we can 
do — whether, that is, it can be argued that a full-blown notion of modality such as 
the one displayed in (M OD) is required to account for validity.
A .3 K reisel’s p roof and (B L D )
The objective in the remaining of the Appendix is to assess the nature of the 
modality in (BLD). W hat has been established, so far, is that there is modality in 
the notion of logical consequence at the pre-theoretical level. Now we can ask: what 
is the relation between (BLD) and, on the one hand, our intuitive ideas about ‘what 
follows from what’, and, on the other hand, logical systems? As for the first question, 
the answer is straightforward: (BLD) is designed to capture our formal intuitions 
about logical consequence, not the unrestricted notion of what follows from what. The 
modality in (BLD) is there to handle counterexamples having to do with the size of 
the domain. This point is important — the notion of possibility in (BLD) has to be 
understood strictly as representing different sizes of the domain, nothing else. This 
is why it is a ‘modest’ notion of modality and not a ‘full-blown’ one like the one that 
appears in (M OD). If the modality in (BLD) were playing the role of representing 
possibilities in an unrestricted sense, the account would be undistinguishable from 
(M OD) — it wouldn’t be an account of logical form anymore. In sum, (BLD) is 
intended to capture the insight that logical consequence is a m atter of form and its 
modality has to be understood in a restricted sense.
Now what about the relation between (BLD) and the theoretical level? Is there 
a logic capable of representing inferential practice so as to capture the insight that 
logic is a matter of form and to deal with its irreducible notion of modality? Indeed, 
we must not forget that (BLD) is only a general formulation of what a correct, 
formalised logical system must capture. In particular, we want to know whether
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standard first-order model theory (let’s call it (SM T)) is a good model, so to speak, 
of (BLD). There is currently much work being done in that field.^ Interestingly, 
perhaps the most ground-breaking results in this direction were obtained more than 
three decades ago by Georg Kreisel in a few paragraphs of his paper ‘Informal Rigour 
and Completeness Proofs’. To answer the question at hand, I suggest the following 
strategy: that we use the well-known argument from Kreisel showing that (SMT) 
captures our intuitive notion of validity in virtue of form. This in turn will be sufficient 
to ‘prove’ that (SM T) succeeds in modelling (BLD). I turn now to Kreisel’s proof.
Following Kreisel, let ‘ Valcd means that a  is intuitively valid — valid in all struc­
tures — and ‘F a ’ means that a  is model-theoretically valid {i.e., valid in the sense of 
(SM T)) — valid in the set-theoretic structure. Notice that ‘a ’ can be either a single
sentence (a logical truth) or can consist in a set of sentences (a logical consequence).
Kreisel’s proof shows that V and Val are co-extensional, that is, that:
Va(Vala = Va) (A.l)
is true for first-order logic. The left to right conditional:
'^a{Vala Va) (A.2)
is intuitively true. To see why, let’s contrapose it:
V a(~ V a  — Vala) (A.3)
This is true for the following reason. Let’s imagine that an argument is set-theoretically 
invalid. That means that there is a set-theoretic model in which the premisses of this
2See Shapiro (1998: 147-155), Hanson (1997: 398-407), and Sher (1991) for more on the relation 
between model-theoretic logical consequence and the intuitive notion of logical consequence.
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argument are true and the conclusion false. That in turns means that the argument 
is invalid in a structure, thus showing that it can’t be intuitively valid since to be 
intuitively valid means to be valid in all structures. The right to left conditional:
Va(FcK Fafa) (A.4)
requires a bit more work. The proof uses Godel’s completeness theorem. Let ‘D a ’
means ‘a  is formally derivable by means of some accepted set of formal rules’ (see 
Kreisel (1967: 89)). By Godel’s completeness theorem (remember we’re considering 
these relations only in the context of first-order logic), we have:
V a(F a —> Da) (A.6)
Now Kreisel offers an informal argument to the effect that:
Va(Da FaZa) (A.6)
thus completing the equivalence proof between F  and Val. The argument in support 
of ‘V a(Da —> ValaY  is that the standard formal rules of inference in first-order 
logic (modus ponens, substitution rules, etc) are almost universally recognised as 
being valid. Kreisel: “...one reasons in mathematical practice, using the notion of 
consequence or of logical consequence, freely and surely” (1967: 90). In fact, in
an axiomatic presentation of first-order logic, it is possible to use only two rules of
inference, namely modus ponens and the rule of substitution. These two rules are 
valid if anything is. So since these two rules are, in theory, sufficient to formalise 
first-order logic, and since they are intuitively valid, we have strong grounds to hold 
true the theorem Wa{Da V a la )’.
The proof shows the extensional equivalence between a notion at the intuitive level
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and a logical system, which belongs to the theoretical level. As such, it does not say 
anything about (BLD) — belonging to the pre-theoretical level — and its relation 
to (SM T). However, (BLD) is designed explicitly to capture the intuitive idea that 
validity is a matter of form. Other pre-theoretical accounts, for instance (SUB), are 
also designed to capture the same intuitive notion, but the notion of substitution does 
not work : it leads to accept as valid arguments which are not valid. To handle these 
counterexamples, a pre-theoretical account has to allow for variations of domain, and 
this is the role of the modality in (BLD). The idea behind (BLD) is, I take it, the 
following: we want to say that validity is a matter of form and independent of the size 
of the universe. The second clause, despite the fact that it leads one to incorporate a 
modal element in one’s pre-theoretical account, is formal in spirit. Indeed, to claim 
that validity should not depend on the size of the domain amounts to claiming that 
validity has nothing to do with the way the world is — it shouldn’t matter, if validity 
is strictly formal, how many objects there are. Admittedly, there is an irony here: 
to save the insight that logical consequence is strictly a matter of form, we have 
to include a modal element. In any case, (BLD) corresponds strictly to what we 
mean by validity in virtue of form. Since the latter notion is extensionally equivalent 
to (SM T), we have by transitivity that (BLD) and (SM T) are also extensionally 
equivalent.
This result is welcome, since it means that the current model-theoretic definition 
already in place is a good model of what we mean by logical consequence. A Quinean, 
I contended in Chapter 4, is forced to embrace something like it for first-order logic. 
For second-order logic, no one has yet been able to prove the same result. It is bound 
to be more complicated, since for higher-order logics the completeness theorem does 
not hold and the proof for the first-order case makes essential use of it. But a strong 
Quinean will not be bothered by that, given that for her second-order logic is not 
logic.
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However, there is a sense in which it might be welcomed by a Quinean. In effect, 
Kreisel’s proof demonstrates an equivalence between two notions not containing any 
modal element. The proof bypasses the pre-theoretical level, and this is the level 
where modality appears. Indeed, in our intuitive notion of logical form, it seems 
that there is no modality involved. Prima facie, ‘truth in all structures’ contains 
no mention of modality. Same for (SMT); it is certainly not modal logic. What 
happened to the modality involved in the blended account? I t ’s as if (SM T) had 
sublimated the modality, managing to be both a representation of (BLD) and free of 
modal notions. We can rest assured that (SM T) will represent the modality in the 
blended account assuming that the models provide domains of different size.
Nonetheless, it is not that clear that a Quinean can sensibly applaud the fact that 
(SM T) is not a modal logic. What (SM T) does is to model our inferring practice — 
more precisely, it models our notion of validity in virtue of form. A pre-theoretical 
account, such as (BLD) or (SUB), is meant to clarify the intuitive notion of validity, 
that is, to make sense of it in an illuminating and explanatory way. Since it has been 
shown in the last Chapter that any pre-theoretical account of logical form has to 
contain a modal element, we can safely say that there is an irreducible modal element 
in the concept of logical consequence. That (SM T) satisfyingly models the blended 
account without using modality is only because there are enough sets to model any 
size of domain. Put differently, one could say that (SM T) has modality built right 
into its notion of models — they are playing the representational role. Admittedly, 
the possible models represent only various size of the domain — but it does, in the 
end, model modality. If there is a relief to be found in the Quinean camp, it should 
rather be that the modality in (BLD) is not full-blown.
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A .4  M odal in tu itions about inference
(BLD) captures our formal intuitions about what follows from what. It does not 
capture the unrestricted notion of what follows what, the one according to which we 
can infer that Bill is smaller than Al if it is true that Al is taller than Bill. We want 
to say that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premise in that kind 
of case because there are arguments with the same logical form which have a true 
premise and a false conclusion. Indeed, ‘taller than’ and ‘smaller than’ are not logical 
terms. So it is easy to replace those non-logical terms with other terms rendering the 
argument false. But as a matter of practice, it is correct to infer that Bill is smaller 
than Al from the given premise. We infer in the unrestricted sense all the time — 
it works well, it’s an established practice. Accordingly, what has to be conceded is 
that (BLD) and(SM T) do not accurately model the way we actually infer. They 
undergenerate in that sense.
This seems unfortunate. The splitting of the notion of what follows from what 
between its restricted sense and its unrestricted sense appears completely artificial 
from the standpoint of our actual practice of inferring. That does not mean, of course, 
that the restricted notion is not interesting, nor that (SM T) is not highly important 
and fruitful. However, it does remain the case that (SM T) is limited as a model 
of inference. Indeed, let us imagine someone who does not know how to infer, or 
who, for some reason, infers very erratically. We then successfully teach that person 
(SM T). Then we confront that person with the premise ‘Al is taller than Bill’ and 
we ask her if she would infer from that the sentence ‘Bill is shorter than Al’. A good 
logic student, she argues that she can’t draw that inference, because she formalised 
that argument into the language of (SM T) and it showed that it has an invalid 
argument-form. Thus, for any intuitively correct inference that is not valid in virtue 
of form, she rejects it — not only in the classroom or in her logic tests, but also in 
her day-to-day life. Since so much of our actual reasoning is not strictly formal, such
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a person would still struggle outside the classroom despite having learned everything 
about (SM T). This shows that (SM T) is a limited tool to model reasoning.
There is no doubt that on the pre-theoretical level, a purely modal account such 
as (M OD) captures the unrestricted notion. There is also no doubt that on the 
theoretical level modal logics are intended to model (M OD) and the unrestricted 
notion. It is tempting to conclude that any correct logic whose role is to represent 
the way we actually infer would have to be modal. To a Quinean who would agree 
that logic’s main role is to represent the way we actually infer, this conclusion would 
be totally catastrophic, yet unavoidable — a commitment to both (M OD) and modal 
logic is a Quinean’s nightmare but an anti-sceptic’s dream. This, if correct, represents 
an important victory for the defender of modalities.
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